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Strict asymptotic inclusion Sect(G)⊊Sect(F)\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal G)\subsetneq\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal F)Sect(G)⊊Sect(F)

Definition
RestrictedDec_Supplement_SecSubsetneq

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

chosen-ciphertext-securityfunctional-decryptionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1public-key-encryptionsecurity-hierarchy

For families G,F\mathcal G,\mathcal FG,F and a timing ttt, Sect(G)⊊Sect(F)\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal G)\subsetneq\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal F)Sect(G)⊊Sect(F) over MMM means:

  1. every efficient scheme over MMM (polynomial-time, decrypting into Mλ∪{⊥}M_\lambda\cup\{\bot\}Mλ​∪{⊥}, App. A.1) in Sect(G)\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal G)Sect(G) is in Sect(F)\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal F)Sect(F); and
  2. one efficient scheme lies in Sect(F)\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal F)Sect(F) but not in Sect(G)\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal G)Sect(G).

This is the paper's asymptotic notion of strictness: a single uniformly constructible scheme satisfies the weaker notion while a single PPT attack breaks the stronger one, possibly only on infinitely many security parameters.

Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_IsSchemeM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_SecM
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false

namespace RestrictedDec

namespace Supplement

/-- **Strict asymptotic inclusion** `Sec^t(𝓖) ⊊ Sec^t(𝓕)` over the message space `M`: every
(efficient) scheme over `M` in `Sec^t(𝓖)` is in `Sec^t(𝓕)`, and one efficient scheme is in `Sec^t(𝓕)` but not in `Sec^t(𝓖)`.
Nguyen–Susilo, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), §2.3, p.15 ("An inclusion is
strict in the asymptotic sense only when a single uniformly constructible encryption scheme
satisfies the weaker notion and a single PPT attack has nonnegligible advantage for the stronger one
(possibly on an infinite subsequence of security parameters)").

**Formalization Note.** "Not in `Sec^t(𝓖)`" is the negation of `SecM`; for a correct scheme it says
that some uniform PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage. The inclusion ranges over the schemes
of the paper, those with message space `M` (`IsSchemeM`: polynomial-time, and `Dec` outputs in
`M_λ ∪ {⊥}`, App. A.1, p.29). Over arbitrary `PKE` values it would be false: a decryption output
outside `M_λ` is not covered by the simulation `𝓕 ⪯ 𝓖` of §3.1, which is stated on `M_⊥` only. -/
def SecSubsetneq (t : Timing) (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (G F : Family) : Prop :=
  (∀ P : PKE, IsSchemeM M P → SecM t M G P → SecM t M F P) ∧
    ∃ P : PKE, IsSchemeM M P ∧ SecM t M F P ∧ ¬ SecM t M G P

end Supplement

end RestrictedDec
Source
Nguyen–Susilo, Between CPA and CCA: Security Hierarchies for Restricted Decryption, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), §2.3, p.15

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