Proof of Proposition 2 — symmetry reduces mutual sharing to one deviation comparison
ProvedCyberShare.Sharing.symmetry_reductionThe two firms are symmetric. Exchanging their labels exchanges investment equilibria and ex-ante profits. When investment equilibria exist under mutual sharing and after one firm stops sharing, mutual sharing is an equilibrium exactly when firm 1 cannot improve its ex-ante profit by that deviation:
The comparison applies to every equilibrium selection in both investment subgames. It turns the two sharing-stage best-response checks into one comparison of the paper's ex-ante profits.
Formalization Note The displayed inequality denotes the payoffs under the corresponding subgame investment equilibria; existence of those equilibria is explicit. The same statement includes the underlying firm-swap identities.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CyberShare_Sharing_Model
namespace CyberShare.Sharing
/-- The symmetry observation in the proof of Proposition 2, pp. A.17–A.18 (PDF 49–50):
interchanging the firms interchanges the investment equilibria and ex-ante profits. Thus a
single firm's deviation comparison suffices for mutual sharing when all relevant investment
subgames have equilibria. -/
theorem symmetry_reduction (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
(∀ s1 s2 K1 K2, IsInvEq P s1 s2 K1 K2 ↔ IsInvEq P s2 s1 K2 K1) ∧
(∀ K1 K2, exAnte2 P K1 K2 = exAnte1 P K2 K1) ∧
((∃ K1 K2, IsInvEq P .S .S K1 K2) →
(∃ K1 K2, IsInvEq P .N .S K1 K2) →
(IsSharingEq P .S .S ↔
∀ K1 K2 K1' K2', IsInvEq P .S .S K1 K2 → IsInvEq P .N .S K1' K2' →
exAnte1 P K1' K2' ≤ exAnte1 P K1 K2)) := by sorry
end CyberShare.Sharing
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.