A heuristic equilibrium carries no variant with negative expected profit:
ProvedAssortSearch.HeurEq.equilibrium_profit_nonnegConsider the independent assortment search model with , , , monotone margins ( whenever ) and an operational cost that is concave and increasing on with . Let be a heuristic equilibrium of iterative no-search assortment planning. Then every variant of has non-negative expected profit:
Here the demand is the no-search prediction with the estimated preferences, which coincides with the observed demand . The paper asserts this step in the proof of Theorem 8 ("as we show in the previous section"), referring to its remark in §4.3 that an optimal assortment contains no non-positive-profit variant because of cannibalization.
Formalization Note is an added hypothesis: the paper never states , and the step can fail without it. Monotone preferences and margins are the paper's standing assumptions (§3, pp. 5–6). The §4.3 remark says "strictly positive", which is false for a zero-profit variant; the non-strict form of p. 23 is stated.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AssortSearch_HeurEq_Model
namespace AssortSearch.HeurEq
open RetailVariety.Structure
/-- Proof of Theorem 8, p. 23 (asserted there "as we show in the previous section"): a
heuristic equilibrium `x*` contains no variant with negative expected profit (as estimated under
`v̂(x*)`, which reproduces the observed demands at `x*`):
`π_i(x*) = m_i q_i^m(x* | v̂(x*)) − c(q_i^m(x* | v̂(x*))) ≥ 0` for all `1 ≤ i ≤ x*`. -/
theorem equilibrium_profit_nonneg {n : ℕ} (lam : ℝ) (m : Fin n → ℝ) (c : ℝ → ℝ)
(v : Fin n → ℝ) (v0 : ℝ)
(hv : ∀ i, 0 < v i) (hanti : Antitone v) (hv0 : 0 < v0) (hlam : 0 < lam)
(hm : ∀ j k : Fin n, v k ≤ v j → m k ≤ m j)
(hcc : ConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Icc 0 1) c) (hcm : MonotoneOn c (Set.Icc 0 1))
(hc0 : 0 ≤ c 0)
(xstar : ℕ) (heq : IsHeuristicEquilibrium lam m c v v0 xstar)
(i : Fin n) (hi : i.val < xstar) :
0 ≤ m i * share (estPref lam v v0 xstar) (estPrefNoPurchase lam v v0 xstar)
(popularSet n xstar) i -
c (share (estPref lam v v0 xstar) (estPrefNoPurchase lam v v0 xstar)
(popularSet n xstar) i) := by sorry
end AssortSearch.HeurEq
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.