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Section 3, p. 67 — the honest response plans form a response-plan equilibrium of an incentive-compatible mechanism

Proved
MyersonBargaining.Revelation.honest_isResponsePlanEq

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

incentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revelation-principle

Let π′\pi'π′ be a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism on the standard response sets A1,…,AnA_1,\dots,A_nA1​,…,An​ of a Bayesian collective choice problem. Define the honest response plans

σi′(bi∣ai)={1if bi=ai,0if bi≠ai.\sigma_i'(b_i\mid a_i)=\begin{cases}1&\text{if } b_i=a_i,\\0&\text{if } b_i\ne a_i.\end{cases}σi′​(bi​∣ai​)={10​if bi​=ai​,if bi​=ai​.​

Then each σi′\sigma_i'σi′​ is a response plan, (σ1′,…,σn′)(\sigma_1',\dots,\sigma_n')(σ1′​,…,σn′​) is a response-plan equilibrium for π′\pi'π′ in the sense of (14), and the allocation it generates is the honest allocation:

W(π′,σ1′,…,σn′)=V(π′).W(\pi',\sigma_1',\dots,\sigma_n')=V(\pi').W(π′,σ1′​,…,σn′​)=V(π′).

This gives the inclusion F∗⊆F∗∗F^*\subseteq F^{**}F∗⊆F∗∗ of Theorem 2.

Formalization Note The paper states only the equilibrium property and then writes x=V(π′)=W(π′,σ′)x=V(\pi')=W(\pi',\sigma')x=V(π′)=W(π′,σ′); both the response-plan property and the equality W=VW=VW=V are made explicit conclusions. Deviations range over all, possibly mixed, response plans.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Model
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_Revelation_Equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.Revelation

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

theorem honest_isResponsePlanEq (G : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.Problem ι A C) (π : C → (∀ i, A i) → ℝ)
    (hπ : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsChoiceMechanism π) (hbic : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsBIC G π) :
    (∀ i, IsResponsePlan (honest (A := A) i)) ∧
      IsResponsePlanEq G π (honest (A := A)) ∧ W G π (honest (A := A)) = MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.V G π := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.Revelation
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 67, Section 3, proof of Theorem 2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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