Section 3, p. 67 — the honest response plans form a response-plan equilibrium of an incentive-compatible mechanism
ProvedMyersonBargaining.Revelation.honest_isResponsePlanEqincentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revelation-principle
Let be a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism on the standard response sets of a Bayesian collective choice problem. Define the honest response plans
Then each is a response plan, is a response-plan equilibrium for in the sense of (14), and the allocation it generates is the honest allocation:
This gives the inclusion of Theorem 2.
Formalization Note The paper states only the equilibrium property and then writes ; both the response-plan property and the equality are made explicit conclusions. Deviations range over all, possibly mixed, response plans.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Model import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_Revelation_Equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.Revelation
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
theorem honest_isResponsePlanEq (G : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.Problem ι A C) (π : C → (∀ i, A i) → ℝ)
(hπ : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsChoiceMechanism π) (hbic : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsBIC G π) :
(∀ i, IsResponsePlan (honest (A := A) i)) ∧
IsResponsePlanEq G π (honest (A := A)) ∧ W G π (honest (A := A)) = MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.V G π := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.Revelation
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 67, Section 3, proof of Theorem 2
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.