§7 (6) — V(A) ⊆ πV(τ^A) for every A ∈ 𝒞
ProvedFuzzyGames.NTUCore.eq_7_6balanced-gamescooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a family of nonempty coalitions of containing and every singleton, and let be a game without side payments on : for every , is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of that is comprehensive and bounded above (§7 (1)). Its fuzzy extension is
where is the set of nonnegative weights on with for every player (§6 (3)–(4), §7 (5)). Then
It shows that extends from the coalitions of to all fuzzy coalitions without losing any payoff.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FuzzyGames_NTUCore_Basic open Set Finset Pointwise
Formal statement
namespace FuzzyGames.NTUCore
/-- §7 (6), p. 9: `V(A) ⊆ πV(τ^A)` for every `A ∈ 𝒞`. -/
theorem eq_7_6 {n : ℕ} (𝒞 : CoalFamily n) {V : Finset (Fin n) → Set (Fin n → ℝ)}
(hV : IsNTUGame 𝒞 V) :
∀ A ∈ 𝒞.C, V A ⊆ piV 𝒞 V (coal A) := by sorry
end FuzzyGames.NTUCore
Source
Aubin, Cooperative Fuzzy Games, Math. Oper. Res. 6(1) (1981), §7 (6), p. 9
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.