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Lemma 6.2 — auxiliary profits: 1/rλ1/r_\lambda1/rλ​ is convex, rλ=μ sech2(log⁡(λ/λx))r_\lambda=\mu\,\mathrm{sech}^2(\log(\lambda/\lambda_x))rλ​=μsech2(log(λ/λx​)), and stability (40)

Proved
BilateralProfitRegular.lemma_6_2

by iris · Nov 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bilateral-tradeonline-learningp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1posted-pricesregret-boundsregular-distributions

Let the seller and buyer distributions be independent and regular on [0,1][0,1][0,1], with strictly positive densities. Let λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, let rλr_\lambdarλ​ be the auxiliary profit and λx\lambda_xλx​ the balancing parameter of eq. (38). Then:

  1. x↦1/rλ(x)x\mapsto 1/r_\lambda(x)x↦1/rλ​(x) is convex on int(T)\mathrm{int}(\mathcal T)int(T).
  2. With sech(t)=2/(et+e−t)\mathrm{sech}(t)=2/(e^t+e^{-t})sech(t)=2/(et+e−t), for every x∈int(T)x\in\mathrm{int}(\mathcal T)x∈int(T),
rλ(x)=μ(x) sech2(log⁡λλx),0≤μ(x)−rλ(x)≤μ(x)(log⁡λλx)2.r_\lambda(x)=\mu(x)\,\mathrm{sech}^2\Big(\log\frac{\lambda}{\lambda_x}\Big),\qquad 0\le\mu(x)-r_\lambda(x)\le\mu(x)\Big(\log\frac{\lambda}{\lambda_x}\Big)^2 .rλ​(x)=μ(x)sech2(logλx​λ​),0≤μ(x)−rλ​(x)≤μ(x)(logλx​λ​)2.
  1. In particular, 0<rλ(x)≤μ(x)0<r_\lambda(x)\le\mu(x)0<rλ​(x)≤μ(x) and rλx(x)=μ(x)r_{\lambda_x}(x)=\mu(x)rλx​​(x)=μ(x).
  2. For every θ∈R\theta\in\mathbb Rθ∈R,
μ⋆−rλeθ(x)≤2(μ⋆−rλ(x))+2μ⋆θ2.\mu^\star-r_{\lambda e^\theta}(x)\le2\big(\mu^\star-r_\lambda(x)\big)+2\mu^\star\theta^2 .μ⋆−rλeθ​(x)≤2(μ⋆−rλ​(x))+2μ⋆θ2.

The lemma explains why the algorithm optimizes the convex reciprocals 1/rλ1/r_\lambda1/rλ​ in place of the profit: rλr_\lambdarλ​ matches μ\muμ at the balancing parameter, and it degrades only quadratically in the log-error of λ\lambdaλ.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: independent regular seller and buyer distributions on [0,1][0,1][0,1] with strictly positive densities (§2, §6) → RegularUnit E for a published Environment E (supports [0,1][0,1][0,1], E.Regular); PPP, μ\muμ from the joint law E.prior, Fs,FbF_s,F_bFs​,Fb​ = E.cdfS, E.cdfB; reason: the same class: Definitions 2.1–2.2 with the standing positivity of the densities; the valuation laws are the environment's
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_BilateralProfitRegular_Stochastic
import Definitions.Def_BilateralProfitRegular_Auxiliary
Formal statement
namespace BilateralProfitRegular

open MechanismDesign.BilateralTrade

/-- **Lemma 6.2 (Auxiliary profits)**, Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi (manuscript, sha256
e91e8127…), p.37 (PDF 39). For independent regular seller and buyer distributions on `[0, 1]` with
strictly positive densities and every `λ > 0`: `x ↦ 1/r_λ(x)` is convex on `int(𝒯)`; for every
`x ∈ int(𝒯)`, `r_λ(x) = µ(x) sech²(log(λ/λ_x))` with `sech t = 2/(e^t + e^{−t})` and
`0 ≤ µ(x) − r_λ(x) ≤ µ(x) (log(λ/λ_x))²` (39); in particular `0 < r_λ(x) ≤ µ(x)` and
`r_{λ_x}(x) = µ(x)`; and for every `θ ∈ ℝ`, `µ⋆ − r_{λe^θ}(x) ≤ 2(µ⋆ − r_λ(x)) + 2µ⋆θ²` (40).

**Formalization Note.** `r_λ`, `λ_x` are eq. (38) with `F_s = E.cdfS`, `F_b = E.cdfB`; `µ` is
computed from the joint law `E.prior`; `µ⋆` is the supremum of `µ` over `[0,1]²`. Logarithms are
natural. -/
theorem lemma_6_2 (E : Environment) (hE : RegularUnit E) (lam : ℝ) (hlam : 0 < lam) :
    ConvexOn ℝ intT (fun x => 1 / auxProfit E lam x) ∧
    ∀ x ∈ intT,
      auxProfit E lam x =
          mu E x * (2 / (Real.exp (Real.log (lam / balance E x)) +
            Real.exp (-Real.log (lam / balance E x)))) ^ 2 ∧
        0 ≤ mu E x - auxProfit E lam x ∧
        mu E x - auxProfit E lam x ≤ mu E x * Real.log (lam / balance E x) ^ 2 ∧
        0 < auxProfit E lam x ∧ auxProfit E lam x ≤ mu E x ∧
        auxProfit E (balance E x) x = mu E x ∧
        ∀ θ : ℝ, muStar E - auxProfit E (lam * Real.exp θ) x ≤
          2 * (muStar E - auxProfit E lam x) + 2 * muStar E * θ ^ 2 := by sorry

end BilateralProfitRegular
Source
Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi, Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism (manuscript, STOC 2027 submission, sha256 e91e81279505b765c7c96c219d674c0fbbbd6ca47a00da8fe228d498ca25ac87), Lemma 6.2, p.37 (PDF 39)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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