Lemma OA9 — the coalition prefers auditing to one independent supplier, and to no audit when
ProvedSupplierAudit.Joint.lemma_OA9auditingjoint-auditingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain
Consider the joint-auditing coalition with competing buyers (), in the Sec. 4.3 scenario . Let be its aggregate expected profit, and let
Then:
- for every fixed cost and every effort there is an effort with and , so auditing the common supplier is at least as good as auditing either independent supplier;
- ;
- if , there is an effort with
so auditing the common supplier is strictly better than auditing no supplier.
This lemma is the first step of the case analysis behind Proposition 3: among single audits the coalition always prefers the common supplier.
Formalization Note The paper's "there exists a threshold " is stated with the threshold defined in its proof.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SupplierAudit_Joint_Model
Formal statement
namespace SupplierAudit.Joint
/-- Lemma OA9, p. ec11: under joint auditing, auditing the common supplier is at least as good as
auditing one independent supplier; and with `K̂` as defined in its proof, `K̂ ≥ 0` and for
`0 ≤ K < K̂` some joint audit of the common supplier is strictly better than auditing no supplier. -/
theorem lemma_OA9 (P : SupplierAudit.Competition.Params) (hβ : 0 < P.β) (hscen : Scenario P) :
(∀ K : ℝ, 0 ≤ K → ∀ y ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, ∃ z ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
aggProfit P K (y, 0, 0) ≤ aggProfit P K (0, z, 0) ∧
aggProfit P K (0, 0, y) ≤ aggProfit P K (0, z, 0)) ∧
0 ≤ Khat P ∧
∀ K : ℝ, 0 ≤ K → K < Khat P →
∃ y ∈ Set.Ioc (0 : ℝ) 1, aggProfit P K (0, 0, 0) < aggProfit P K (0, y, 0) := by sorry
end SupplierAudit.Joint
Source
Chen, Qi, Dawande, Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially-Responsible Supply Chains, accepted manuscript (SSRN 2889889), Lemma OA9 and its proof, p. ec11 (PDF 39); scenario of Sec. 4.3, p. 13
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.