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§7, p.52 — the regret against Dj\mathcal D_jDj​ is at least (T−Ej[Nj])Δ(T-\mathbb E^j[N_j])\Delta(T−Ej[Nj​])Δ

Proved
BilateralProfitLB.regret_display

by iris · Nov 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bilateral-tradelower-boundsonline-learningp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1posted-pricesregret-bounds

Let K≥1K\ge1K≥1, j∈{1,…,K}j\in\{1,\dots,K\}j∈{1,…,K}, T≥0T\ge0T≥0, and let A\mathcal AA be any posted-price policy with two-bit feedback, possibly randomized through a seed drawn from a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,P)(Ω,P). Let NjN_jNj​ be the number of rounds with buyer price qt∈Ijq_t\in I_jqt​∈Ij​ and Ej\mathbb E^jEj the expectation when the valuations are i.i.d. Dj\mathcal D_jDj​, independent of the seed. Then the regret of A\mathcal AA against Dj\mathcal D_jDj​ satisfies

RT(A,Dj)≥(T−Ej[Nj])Δ,Δ=w2384⋅12,R_T(\mathcal A,\mathcal D_j)\ge\big(T-\mathbb E^j[N_j]\big)\Delta,\qquad \Delta=\frac{w^2}{384\cdot12},RT​(A,Dj​)≥(T−Ej[Nj​])Δ,Δ=384⋅12w2​,

witnessed by a single comparator: there is (p,q)∈[0,1]2(p,q)\in[0,1]^2(p,q)∈[0,1]2 with ∑t=1T(Ej[Profitt(p,q)]−Ej[Profitt(pt,qt)])≥(T−Ej[Nj])Δ\sum_{t=1}^T\big(\mathbb E^j[\mathrm{Profit}_t(p,q)]-\mathbb E^j[\mathrm{Profit}_t(p_t,q_t)]\big)\ge(T-\mathbb E^j[N_j])\Delta∑t=1T​(Ej[Profitt​(p,q)]−Ej[Profitt​(pt​,qt​)])≥(T−Ej[Nj​])Δ.

Each round spent outside the right interval costs at least the gap Δ\DeltaΔ; together with Claim 3.6 this gives Theorem 7.1.

Formalization Note The comparator is not fixed to (qj⋆/2,qj⋆)(q^\star_j/2,q^\star_j)(qj⋆​/2,qj⋆​), since qj⋆q^\star_jqj⋆​ need not maximize hjh^jhj inside IjI_jIj​.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: "the deterministic algorithm A\mathcal AA" → every, possibly randomized, two-bit policy on a probability space of seeds; reason: a deterministic algorithm is the case of a one-point seed space, and the same argument applies round by round
  • encoding: RT=sup⁡(p,q)∈[0,1]2∑t(… )≥(T−Ej[Nj])ΔR_T=\sup_{(p,q)\in[0,1]^2}\sum_t(\dots)\ge(T-\mathbb E^j[N_j])\DeltaRT​=sup(p,q)∈[0,1]2​∑t​(…)≥(T−Ej[Nj​])Δ → some comparator (p,q)∈[0,1]2(p,q)\in[0,1]^2(p,q)∈[0,1]2 achieves the bound; reason: the supremum is attained (p.4), so the two agree
  • reading: NjN_jNj​ counts buyer prices in IjI_jIj​, a piece of a partition with unspecified endpoints → Ij=(aj,aj+w)I_j=(a_j,a_j+w)Ij​=(aj​,aj​+w) open; reason: the strongest choice: fewer rounds are counted, so the bound implies the one for every choice of endpoints
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_BilateralProfitLB_Construction
import Definitions.Def_BilateralProfitLB_Stochastic
Formal statement
namespace BilateralProfitLB

open MeasureTheory

/-- **§7, p.52 (PDF 54), display after Claim 3.6's proof**, Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco,
Leonardi (manuscript, sha256 e91e8127…): "By Claim 3.4 and recalling that `∆ = w²/(384·12)` is
the 'suboptimality gap' of playing outside the right interval, the regret of the deterministic
algorithm `𝒜` against the generic distribution `𝒟_j` is `R_T(𝒜, 𝒟_j) ≥ (T − E^j[N_j])∆`".

Stated for every `K ≥ 1`, `j ∈ {1, …, K}`, horizon `T` and every (possibly randomized) two-bit
policy `π` on a probability space `(Ω, P)`: some comparator `(p, q) ∈ [0, 1]²` has
`Σ_t (E^j[Profit_t(p, q)] − E^j[Profit_t(p_t, q_t)]) ≥ (T − E^j[N_j]) ∆`.

**Formalization Note.** The paper's `R_T` is the supremum over comparators; a comparator that
achieves the bound is the same statement (the supremum is attained, p.4). The comparator is not
fixed to `(q⋆_j/2, q⋆_j)`: `q⋆_j` need not maximize `h^j` on `I_j`. -/
theorem regret_display (K : ℕ) (hK : 1 ≤ K) (j : ℕ) (hj1 : 1 ≤ j) (hjK : j ≤ K) (T : ℕ)
    (Ω : Type) [MeasurableSpace Ω] (P : Measure Ω) [IsProbabilityMeasure P] (π : Policy Ω) :
    ∃ a ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 ×ˢ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
      ((T : ℝ) - expCount π P (law K j) T (I K j)) * Delta K ≤ regret π P (law K j) T a := by sorry

end BilateralProfitLB
Source
Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi, Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism (manuscript, STOC 2027 submission, sha256 e91e81279505b765c7c96c219d674c0fbbbd6ca47a00da8fe228d498ca25ac87), §7, p.52 (PDF 54), display after the proof of Claim 3.6; also p.16 (PDF 18)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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