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p. 12 — for an ε-NE it is sufficient to check switches to pure strategies

Proved
FixpNash.WeakApprox.isEpsApproxNash_iff_pure

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let Γ\GammaΓ be a finite game with players iii, finite pure-strategy sets SiS_iSi​ and real payoffs uiu_iui​, let xxx be a real vector indexed by the pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with j∈Sij\in S_ij∈Si​, and let ε\varepsilonε be a real number. Recall that xxx is an ε\varepsilonε-Nash equilibrium (ε\varepsilonε-NE) if xxx is a mixed profile and for every player iii and every mixed strategy yiy_iyi​ of iii, ui(x)≥ui(yi;x−i)−εu_i(x)\ge u_i(y_i;x_{-i})-\varepsilonui​(x)≥ui​(yi​;x−i​)−ε. Then xxx is an ε\varepsilonε-NE if and only if xxx is a mixed profile and

ui((i:j);x−i)≤ui(x)+εfor every player i and every j∈Si,u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})\le u_i(x)+\varepsilon\qquad\text{for every player } i \text{ and every } j\in S_i,ui​((i:j);x−i​)≤ui​(x)+εfor every player i and every j∈Si​,

that is, gi,j(x)≤εg_{i,j}(x)\le\varepsilongi,j​(x)≤ε for all i,ji,ji,j.

The paper states this in parentheses where it defines ε\varepsilonε-NE ("again, it is sufficient to check switches to pure strategies only"). Both directions of Proposition 3 use it: the first to read off gi,j(x)≤εg_{i,j}(x)\le\varepsilongi,j​(x)≤ε from an ε\varepsilonε-NE, the second to conclude an ε\varepsilonε-NE from max⁡{0,gi,j(x)}≤ε\max\{0,g_{i,j}(x)\}\le\varepsilonmax{0,gi,j​(x)}≤ε.

Formalization Note The ε\varepsilonε-NE is the published DGPNash.WellSupported.IsEpsApproxNash and ui((i:j);x−i)u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})ui​((i:j);x−i​) the published DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff. The statement is made for every real ε\varepsilonε; the paper uses it for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_NashMap_nashMap
import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_WellSupported_Equilibria
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.WeakApprox

/-- p. 12: for an ε-NE "it is sufficient to check switches to pure strategies only". -/
theorem isEpsApproxNash_iff_pure {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    (u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (x : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (ε : ℝ) :
    DGPNash.WellSupported.IsEpsApproxNash u x ε ↔
      AGT.IsMixedProfile x ∧
        ∀ (i : ι) (j : S i),
          DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff u x i j ≤ AGT.expectedPayoff u x i + ε := by sorry

end FixpNash.WeakApprox
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), §2.2, p. 12 (definition of ϵ-NE, parenthetical remark)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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