Theorem 2 — impact of imposing a little fairness on social welfare
DisprovedCohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare.theorem_2Consider a seller with unlimited supply, two groups of positive real population masses , common marginal cost , and all nonnegative real prices. Both groups have either uniform valuations on with , , or exponential valuations of rates , . Purchase occurs at valuation at least price. Profit, consumer surplus and nonbuyer valuation are derived from these laws.
There exists an unconstrained global optimum for each group. For every pair of baseline optima, and separately for each of the four metrics, local selections of global profit-maximizing fair price pairs anchored at that baseline exist. For every such selection, the finite right derivative at zero of social welfare exists and obeys the printed strict signs:
Here fairness means with , and welfare is total profit plus . All eight family/metric cases are included, without excluding zero cost, high cost, zero baseline gaps, below-cost prices, or absent sales.
This is the source's claim, retained as a statement to resolve. The counterexamples in the accompanying insights are not removed by extra hypotheses or by weakening a strict sign.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: two customer populations → two positive real masses indexed by Fin 2, without normalization; reason: two nonempty groups are implicit on pp. 6–7; this retains unequal and noninteger populations
- reading: the total-surplus displays on pp. 8 and 12 repeat S₁ → total surplus is d₀S₀(p₀)+d₁S₁(p₁); reason: the group welfare definition on p. 7 and proof on p. 31 establish the intended index; insight I2
- reading: conditional mean Nᵢ is undefined when there are no nonbuyers → Nᵢ is explicitly zero when the conditioning event has probability zero; reason: Eq. (1) admits zero prices; this is the right-continuous extension for the goal families and changes no ordinary conditional mean; insight I5
- reading: optimal prices are named without a tie rule → every baseline optimum and every local optimal selection anchored there are covered, with constrained-selection existence explicit; reason: the tie-independent reading prevents a convenient optimizer choice or an absent selection from hiding a case
- encoding: the right derivative is written as a finite right limit → existence of a real D and convergence of the difference quotient from strictly positive alpha; reason: the footnote 7 limit is preserved without using a default-valued derivative at a nonexistent limit
- encoding: unconstrained optimal prices are denoted by argmax → existence of a pair of global baseline maximizers is an explicit conclusion; reason: this exposes the existence implicit in the source instead of assuming it or letting universal baseline quantification be vacuous
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_Sensitivity import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_Families
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- The full printed Theorem 2 (p. 12), including its strict signs at zero and high costs. -/
theorem theorem_2 (m : Market) (hd : ∀ i, 0 < m.population i)
(hc : 0 ≤ m.cost) (hf : Families m) :
(∃ b : Prices, BaselineOptimal m b) ∧
∀ b : Prices, BaselineOptimal m b →
SensitivityClaim m b .price (fun D => 0 < D) ∧
SensitivityClaim m b .nonbuyer (fun D => 0 < D) ∧
SensitivityClaim m b .demand (fun D => D < 0) ∧
SensitivityClaim m b .surplus (fun D => D < 0) := by sorry
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/- Imported definition source (verbatim dependency snapshot for standalone inspection).
import Mathlib
open MeasureTheory
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- A nonnegative valuation law with a finite first moment (pp. 6–7). -/
def ValuationLaw (μ : Measure ℝ) : Prop :=
IsProbabilityMeasure μ ∧ (∀ᵐ v ∂μ, 0 ≤ v) ∧ Integrable (fun v : ℝ => v) μ
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_ValuationLaw
open MeasureTheory
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- Two marginal valuation laws, real population masses, and common marginal cost. -/
structure Market where
law : Fin 2 → Measure ℝ
population : Fin 2 → ℝ
cost : ℝ
/-- The general distribution-based market conventions, pp. 6–7. -/
def Market.Admissible (m : Market) : Prop :=
0 ≤ m.cost ∧ ∀ i, 0 < m.population i ∧ ValuationLaw (m.law i)
noncomputable def demand (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
(m.law i (Set.Ici p)).toReal
noncomputable def surplus (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
∫ v, max (v - p) 0 ∂m.law i
/-- Conditional mean of nonbuyers; explicitly zero on a null conditioning event. -/
noncomputable def nonbuyer (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
if m.law i (Set.Iio p) = 0 then 0
else (∫ v in Set.Iio p, v ∂m.law i) / (m.law i (Set.Iio p)).toReal
noncomputable def profit (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
m.population i * (p - m.cost) * demand m i p
abbrev Prices := Fin 2 → ℝ
noncomputable def totalProfit (m : Market) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
profit m 0 (p 0) + profit m 1 (p 1)
/-- Group-specific surplus indices, as on pp. 7 and 31. -/
noncomputable def welfare (m : Market) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
totalProfit m p + m.population 0 * surplus m 0 (p 0) +
m.population 1 * surplus m 1 (p 1)
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_Market
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
inductive Metric where
| price | demand | surplus | nonbuyer
deriving DecidableEq
noncomputable def metricValue (m : Market) : Metric → Fin 2 → ℝ → ℝ
| .price => fun _ p => p
| .demand => demand m
| .surplus => surplus m
| .nonbuyer => nonbuyer m
/-- All individual global maximizers on nonnegative prices. -/
def BaselineOptimal (m : Market) (b : Prices) : Prop :=
∀ i, 0 ≤ b i ∧ ∀ p : ℝ, 0 ≤ p → profit m i p ≤ profit m i (b i)
noncomputable def gap (m : Market) (k : Metric) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
|metricValue m k 0 (p 0) - metricValue m k 1 (p 1)|
/-- Equation (1), including its full parameter and price domains. -/
def FairFeasible (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (α : ℝ) (p : Prices) : Prop :=
α ∈ Set.Icc 0 1 ∧ (∀ i, 0 ≤ p i) ∧ gap m k p ≤ (1 - α) * gap m k b
/-- The optimum set is defined by comparison against every feasible price pair. -/
def FairOptimal (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (α : ℝ) (p : Prices) : Prop :=
FairFeasible m b k α p ∧
∀ q : Prices, FairFeasible m b k α q → totalProfit m q ≤ totalProfit m p
/-- A selection of actual optima on some right neighborhood, anchored at the baseline.
No continuity or differentiability, and no restriction to active price neighborhoods. -/
def LocalOptimalSelection (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric)
(P : ℝ → Prices) : Prop :=
P 0 = b ∧ ∃ ε : ℝ, 0 < ε ∧ ε ≤ 1 ∧
∀ α ∈ Set.Icc 0 ε, FairOptimal m b k α (P α)
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_FairPricing
open Filter Topology
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- The finite right derivative in footnote 7, p. 12. -/
def RightDerivative (f : ℝ → ℝ) (D : ℝ) : Prop :=
Tendsto (fun α : ℝ => (f α - f 0) / α) (nhdsWithin 0 (Set.Ioi 0)) (𝓝 D)
/-- Differentiability in a neighborhood and differentiability of the derivative at x.
Continuity at x follows; continuity of the second derivative is not assumed. -/
def TwiceDifferentiableAt (f : ℝ → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : Prop :=
(∀ᶠ y in 𝓝 x, DifferentiableAt ℝ f y) ∧ DifferentiableAt ℝ (deriv f) x
/-- Monotonicity and an inverse on the image of an open active interval at x.
No derivative condition on the inverse or nonzero derivative is imposed. -/
def ActiveInvertible (f : ℝ → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : Prop :=
∃ l u : ℝ, l < x ∧ x < u ∧
(MonotoneOn f (Set.Ioo l u) ∨ AntitoneOn f (Set.Ioo l u)) ∧
∃ g : ℝ → ℝ,
(∀ p ∈ Set.Ioo l u, g (f p) = p) ∧
(∀ y ∈ f '' Set.Ioo l u, g y ∈ Set.Ioo l u ∧ f (g y) = y)
/-- Exactly the local regularity of Lemma 1 for all four source functions. -/
def LemmaRegularity (m : Market) (b : Prices) : Prop :=
∀ i,
TwiceDifferentiableAt (demand m i) (b i) ∧
TwiceDifferentiableAt (surplus m i) (b i) ∧
TwiceDifferentiableAt (nonbuyer m i) (b i) ∧
TwiceDifferentiableAt (profit m i) (b i) ∧
ActiveInvertible (demand m i) (b i) ∧
ActiveInvertible (surplus m i) (b i) ∧
ActiveInvertible (nonbuyer m i) (b i)
/-- Existence of a policy, and the specified finite-derivative assertion for every policy. -/
def SensitivityClaim (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (C : ℝ → Prop) : Prop :=
(∃ P : ℝ → Prices, LocalOptimalSelection m b k P) ∧
∀ P : ℝ → Prices, LocalOptimalSelection m b k P →
∃ D : ℝ, RightDerivative (fun α => welfare m (P α)) D ∧ C D
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_Market
open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- Uniform probability on [0,b] for positive b: normalized restricted Lebesgue measure. -/
noncomputable def uniformLaw (b : ℝ) : Measure ℝ :=
(ENNReal.ofReal b)⁻¹ • volume.restrict (Set.Icc 0 b)
/-- Both groups use the same one of the two continuous families, with unequal parameters. -/
def Families (m : Market) : Prop :=
(∃ b : Fin 2 → ℝ, (∀ i, 0 < b i) ∧ b 0 ≠ b 1 ∧
∀ i, m.law i = uniformLaw (b i)) ∨
(∃ rate : Fin 2 → ℝ, (∀ i, 0 < rate i) ∧ rate 0 ≠ rate 1 ∧
∀ i, m.law i = expMeasure (rate i))
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
-/
Read-back
What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5
The statement concerns a two-group market , with groups indexed by . Each group has:
- a Borel measure on , its valuation law;
- a real number , its population mass.
There is also a single real number , the common cost.
Derived quantities. For a group and a real price :
- Demand is , converted to a real number. The interval includes the endpoint .
- Surplus is , taken as a Bochner integral. This means it is whenever the integrand is not integrable.
- Nonbuyer mean is
The interval here is open at , and the denominator is converted to a real number.
- Group profit is .
For a price pair :
- Total profit is .
- Welfare is
Metrics and gaps. There are four metrics , each with a per-group value :
- price: ;
- demand: ;
- surplus: ;
- nonbuyer: .
The gap of a price pair is .
Hypotheses. The theorem assumes exactly the following, and nothing else:
-
and .
-
. No upper bound is placed on .
-
One of two family conditions holds:
- Uniform: there are with such that, for each , is times Lebesgue measure restricted to . This is the uniform probability distribution on .
- Exponential: there are rates with such that, for each , is the exponential distribution with rate . This is Lebesgue measure with density for and for .
Both groups belong to the same family, with unequal parameters.
Baseline optimality. A price pair is baseline-optimal if, for each :
- , and
- for every real .
In words, each is a global maximizer of its own group's profit over nonnegative prices.
Conclusion. The theorem asserts two things:
- (a) At least one baseline-optimal exists.
- (b) For every baseline-optimal , a sensitivity claim holds for each of four metric/sign combinations:
- price, with ;
- nonbuyer, with ;
- demand, with ;
- surplus, with .
Feasibility and fair optimality. Fix the baseline and a metric . Call a price pair feasible at level if all three of the following hold:
- ;
- and ;
- .
Call fair-optimal at level if it is feasible at level and for every feasible at level .
Local optimal selection. A map from reals to price pairs is a local optimal selection if:
- , and
- there exists with such that is fair-optimal at level for every .
No continuity of is required. Values of outside are unconstrained.
Sensitivity claim. The sensitivity claim for asserts two things:
- (i) At least one local optimal selection exists.
- (ii) For every local optimal selection , there is a finite real with the stated sign such that
The limit is taken over only, and .
So the theorem asserts all of the following:
- the existence of fair-optimal prices for every in some interval , for each of the four metrics and each baseline ;
- that the right derivative of welfare exists along every such selection;
- that this right derivative is strictly positive for the price and nonbuyer metrics;
- that it is strictly negative for the demand and surplus metrics.
Degenerate cases. The index set always has exactly two elements, so there are no empty or one-element cases. The parameter only ranges over . Division by in the difference quotient never occurs at , because the limit is taken only over .
In both families, for every . So the nonbuyer mean takes its default value at all nonpositive prices, including .
The surplus integrals are of integrable functions in both families, so the Bochner default of does not arise. The measures are finite, so the conversions of measures to real numbers are exact.
The cost is permitted. Arbitrarily large is also permitted. For example, in the uniform family with , the profit is at most on all of and equals at every . Every such price is then a valid , and the conclusion must hold for each such choice of .
If has , the constraint at every level reduces to . This happens, for instance, when under the price metric. In that case itself is fair-optimal at every , because it maximizes each separately. Hence the constant map is a local optimal selection, and its welfare difference quotient is identically . The statement nonetheless requires the strict sign condition on for that selection too.
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.