Proposition 4.6, p. 18 — global welfare: adoption helps for large Δ, hurts for large adoption costs
ProvedPermBlockchain.Failure.proposition_4_6blockchaincomparative-staticsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1welfare
Consider the reduced-form blockchain supply chain under its standing assumptions, with fixed and . Write for the total welfare in scenario , and say that Assumption 1 holds at when .
- Full adoption can raise welfare. There is such that for every at which Assumption 1 holds.
- Partial adoption can raise welfare. There is such that for every at which Assumption 1 holds.
- Full adoption can lower welfare. For every at which Assumption 1 holds there is such that, for every vector of positive adoption costs with , in the model with these costs.
- Partial adoption can lower welfare. For every at which Assumption 1 holds there is such that, for every vector of positive adoption costs with , in the model with these costs.
In formulas, item 1 reads
Blockchain adoption thus has ambiguous effects on global welfare: the consumer gain grows with , while the manufacturer loss grows with the adoption costs.
Formalization Note In items 3–4 only the adoption costs change (the model M.withχ χ'); and all other parameters are fixed first, as in the proof on p. 35. Assumption 1 depends on through , so it is a hypothesis at each .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_PermBlockchain_Failure_Setting
Formal statement
namespace PermBlockchain.Failure
/-- **Proposition 4.6** (p. 18), all four bullets: with `Δ = H − L` and `L` fixed,
1. `W^F > W^N` for all sufficiently large `Δ`;
2. `W^P > W^N` for all sufficiently large `Δ`;
3. at fixed `Δ`, `W^F < W^N` once `Σ_{i ∈ M} χ_i` is large enough;
4. at fixed `Δ`, `W^P < W^N` once `Σ_{i : ξ_i = h} χ_i` is large enough. -/
theorem proposition_4_6 {m : ℕ} (M : Model m) (hM : M.Standing) :
(∃ Δ₀ : ℝ, ∀ Δ : ℝ, Δ₀ < Δ → M.Assumption1 Δ → M.W .N Δ < M.W .F Δ) ∧
(∃ Δ₀ : ℝ, ∀ Δ : ℝ, Δ₀ < Δ → M.Assumption1 Δ → M.W .N Δ < M.W .P Δ) ∧
(∀ Δ : ℝ, 0 < Δ → M.Assumption1 Δ → ∃ χ₀ : ℝ, ∀ χ' : Mfr m → ℝ, (∀ i, 0 < χ' i) →
χ₀ < ∑ i, χ' i → (M.withχ χ').W .F Δ < (M.withχ χ').W .N Δ) ∧
(∀ Δ : ℝ, 0 < Δ → M.Assumption1 Δ → ∃ χ₀ : ℝ, ∀ χ' : Mfr m → ℝ, (∀ i, 0 < χ' i) →
χ₀ < ∑ i ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun i : Mfr m => i.IsHigh), χ' i →
(M.withχ χ').W .P Δ < (M.withχ χ').W .N Δ) := by sorry
end PermBlockchain.Failure
Source
Iyengar, Saleh, Sethuraman, Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, SSRN 3602376 (version of 2022-08-19), p. 18, Proposition 4.6
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.