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Theorem 2 — in Ω4\Omega_4Ω4​ pride raises the optimal profit, guilt lowers it iff τm∗<b1/b0\tau^*_m<b_1/b_0τm∗​<b1​/b0​ (corrected: demand D≥0D\ge0D≥0)

Proved
PrideGuilt.theorem_2

by iris · Oct 30, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

closed-loop-supply-chainevolutionary-game-theoryoperations-researchp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1pricingremanufacturing

Fix every parameter except the social pride γP\gamma_PγP​ and guilt γG\gamma_GγG​, and let Π∗(γP,γG)\Pi^*(\gamma_P,\gamma_G)Π∗(γP​,γG​) be the manufacturer's optimal profit over prices and rewards (p,f)∈R2(p,f)\in\mathbb R^2(p,f)∈R2 with nonnegative demand. Assume the standing assumptions, γP>0\gamma_P>0γP​>0, γG>0\gamma_G>0γG​>0 and (γP,γG)∈Ω4(\gamma_P,\gamma_G)\in\Omega_4(γP​,γG​)∈Ω4​, and write τm∗=b0Δc−b0cr−b1γG+b0γP2b0(γP−γG)\tau^*_m=\dfrac{b_0\Delta c-b_0c_r-b_1\gamma_G+b_0\gamma_P}{2b_0(\gamma_P-\gamma_G)}τm∗​=2b0​(γP​−γG​)b0​Δc−b0​cr​−b1​γG​+b0​γP​​. Then Π∗\Pi^*Π∗ has both partial derivatives at (γP,γG)(\gamma_P,\gamma_G)(γP​,γG​), and:

  1. ∂Π∗∂γP≥0\dfrac{\partial\Pi^*}{\partial\gamma_P}\ge0∂γP​∂Π∗​≥0;
  2. ∂Π∗∂γG<0\dfrac{\partial\Pi^*}{\partial\gamma_G}<0∂γG​∂Π∗​<0 if (b0−2b1)γP+b1γG<b0(cr−Δc)(b_0-2b_1)\gamma_P+b_1\gamma_G<b_0(c_r-\Delta c)(b0​−2b1​)γP​+b1​γG​<b0​(cr​−Δc), and ∂Π∗∂γG≥0\dfrac{\partial\Pi^*}{\partial\gamma_G}\ge0∂γG​∂Π∗​≥0 if (b0−2b1)γP+b1γG≥b0(cr−Δc)(b_0-2b_1)\gamma_P+b_1\gamma_G\ge b_0(c_r-\Delta c)(b0​−2b1​)γP​+b1​γG​≥b0​(cr​−Δc); moreover (b0−2b1)γP+b1γG<b0(cr−Δc)(b_0-2b_1)\gamma_P+b_1\gamma_G<b_0(c_r-\Delta c)(b0​−2b1​)γP​+b1​γG​<b0​(cr​−Δc) holds iff τm∗<b1/b0\tau^*_m<b_1/b_0τm∗​<b1​/b0​;
  3. ∂Π∗∂γP≥∂Π∗∂γG\dfrac{\partial\Pi^*}{\partial\gamma_P}\ge\dfrac{\partial\Pi^*}{\partial\gamma_G}∂γP​∂Π∗​≥∂γG​∂Π∗​ if b0γG−b1γP≤b0(cr−Δc)b_0\gamma_G-b_1\gamma_P\le b_0(c_r-\Delta c)b0​γG​−b1​γP​≤b0​(cr​−Δc), and ∂Π∗∂γP<∂Π∗∂γG\dfrac{\partial\Pi^*}{\partial\gamma_P}<\dfrac{\partial\Pi^*}{\partial\gamma_G}∂γP​∂Π∗​<∂γG​∂Π∗​ if b0γG−b1γP>b0(cr−Δc)b_0\gamma_G-b_1\gamma_P>b_0(c_r-\Delta c)b0​γG​−b1​γP​>b0​(cr​−Δc); moreover b0γG−b1γP≤b0(cr−Δc)b_0\gamma_G-b_1\gamma_P\le b_0(c_r-\Delta c)b0​γG​−b1​γP​≤b0​(cr​−Δc) holds iff τm∗≤(b0+b1)/(2b0)\tau^*_m\le(b_0+b_1)/(2b_0)τm∗​≤(b0​+b1​)/(2b0​).

So in the region of moderately high difficulty of remanufacturing where pride outweighs guilt, stronger pride never hurts the manufacturer, while stronger guilt hurts exactly when the optimal recycling rate is below b1/b0b_1/b_0b1​/b0​, and guilt helps more than pride exactly when that rate exceeds (b0+b1)/(2b0)(b_0+b_1)/(2b_0)(b0​+b1​)/(2b0​).

Formalization Note The partial derivatives are the derivatives of the one-variable sections x↦Π∗(x,γG)x\mapsto\Pi^*(x,\gamma_G)x↦Π∗(x,γG​) at γP\gamma_PγP​ and y↦Π∗(γP,y)y\mapsto\Pi^*(\gamma_P,y)y↦Π∗(γP​,y) at γG\gamma_GγG​; their existence is part of the conclusion. Each "i.e." equivalence is stated once as an iff; its negation is the "i.e." of the second line.

Differences from the source:

  • correction: the optimum of (5) (and Π⋆(f) = max_p Π(p,f)) is an unconstrained max over (p, f) → supremum over (p, f) ∈ ℝ² with demand D(p, f) ≥ 0; reason: as printed the max counts a negative demand times a negative margin as profit: it is +∞ for unrestricted f, and with b0 = 1, b1 = 0.5, cn = 1, cu = 0.5, ce = 3, IP = IG = 0, γP = 4, γG = 1 (a point of Ω4) the max over f ≤ c_r is 1.5625 at demand −1.25, independent of γG, contradicting Theorem 2(ii); the paper's footnote 4 (p.13) and p.12 require feasible demand
  • reading: max over p, f with no stated domain → p and f range over all of ℝ; reason: (5) puts no bound on p or f; f* is negative at some points of Ω4 (−0.5 in the example above), so a sign restriction would falsify Proposition 5
  • generalization: the discussion of §4 is restricted to the part of Ω4 where p* ≥ 0 (p.13) → all of Ω4, no p* ≥ 0 hypothesis; reason: Theorem 2 holds on all of Ω4 (Π* = K²/(4b0) with K = 1 − b1IG − b0cn + b0a²/(4s) > 0, a = γP − (c_r − Δc) − (b1/b0)γG > 0, s = γP − γG > 0); it specializes to the source's statement on the p* ≥ 0 part
  • encoding: ∂Π*/∂γP and ∂Π*/∂γG → deriv of the one-variable sections x ↦ Π*(x, γG) and y ↦ Π*(γP, y), with their differentiability asserted; reason: partial derivatives of a function of two variables; differentiability rules out Lean's junk value deriv = 0
  • encoding: τ*(f), the evolutionarily stable rate of Lemma 1 → the Lemma 1 formula tauStar, including its printed values at the endpoints and at τ^0 = τ_m(f); reason: the manufacturer's problem is built on the Lemma 1 formula (p.11); in Ω4 the endpoint values are the limits of τ_m, so the supremum does not depend on them
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_PrideGuilt_Standing
import Definitions.Def_PrideGuilt_optProfit
import Definitions.Def_PrideGuilt_InOmega4
import Definitions.Def_PrideGuilt_tauMStar
Formal statement
namespace PrideGuilt

/-- **Theorem 2 (impact of pride and guilt on the optimal profit in `Ω₄`), corrected: demand
`D ≥ 0` in (5).**
Huang–Nguyen–Tseng–Chen–Kirshner, *Pride or Guilt?*, M&SOM 26(6) (2024), doi:10.1287/msom.2023.0721, Theorem 2, p.18 (PDF 19).

Fix every parameter except `γ_P, γ_G`, assume the standing assumptions, `γ_P, γ_G > 0` and
`(γ_P, γ_G) ∈ Ω₄`, and write `d = c_r − Δc`. The optimal profit `Π*(γ_P, γ_G)` has partial
derivatives in `γ_P` and in `γ_G` at this point, and
(i) `∂Π*/∂γ_P ≥ 0`;
(ii) `∂Π*/∂γ_G < 0` if `(b₀ − 2b₁)γ_P + b₁γ_G < b₀d`, and `∂Π*/∂γ_G ≥ 0` if
  `(b₀ − 2b₁)γ_P + b₁γ_G ≥ b₀d`; the first condition holds iff `τ*_m < b₁/b₀`;
(iii) `∂Π*/∂γ_P ≥ ∂Π*/∂γ_G` if `b₀γ_G − b₁γ_P ≤ b₀d`, and `∂Π*/∂γ_P < ∂Π*/∂γ_G` if
  `b₀γ_G − b₁γ_P > b₀d`; the first condition holds iff `τ*_m ≤ (b₀ + b₁)/(2b₀)`.

**Formalization Note.** `Π*` is `optProfit`, the supremum of `Π(p, f)` over `(p, f) ∈ ℝ²` with
`D(p, f) ≥ 0` (correction; as printed, (5) is maximized at a negative demand and the theorem fails
at `b₀ = 1`, `b₁ = 0.5`, `c_n = 1`, `c_u = 0.5`, `c_e = 3`, `I_P = I_G = 0`, `γ_P = 4`, `γ_G = 1`).
The partial derivatives are `deriv` of the one-variable sections `x ↦ Π*(x, γ_G)` and
`y ↦ Π*(γ_P, y)`, whose differentiability is part of the conclusion. Each "i.e." equivalence is
one `↔`; its negation is the "i.e." of the second line. No `p* ≥ 0` restriction is assumed. -/
theorem theorem_2 (P : Params) (hP : Standing P) (γP γG : ℝ) (hγP : 0 < γP) (hγG : 0 < γG)
    (hΩ : InOmega4 P γP γG) :
    DifferentiableAt ℝ (fun x => optProfit P x γG) γP ∧
    DifferentiableAt ℝ (fun y => optProfit P γP y) γG ∧
    0 ≤ deriv (fun x => optProfit P x γG) γP ∧
    ((P.b0 - 2 * P.b1) * γP + P.b1 * γG < P.b0 * (cr P - dc P) →
        deriv (fun y => optProfit P γP y) γG < 0) ∧
    (P.b0 * (cr P - dc P) ≤ (P.b0 - 2 * P.b1) * γP + P.b1 * γG →
        0 ≤ deriv (fun y => optProfit P γP y) γG) ∧
    ((P.b0 - 2 * P.b1) * γP + P.b1 * γG < P.b0 * (cr P - dc P) ↔
        tauMStar P γP γG < P.b1 / P.b0) ∧
    (P.b0 * γG - P.b1 * γP ≤ P.b0 * (cr P - dc P) →
        deriv (fun y => optProfit P γP y) γG ≤ deriv (fun x => optProfit P x γG) γP) ∧
    (P.b0 * (cr P - dc P) < P.b0 * γG - P.b1 * γP →
        deriv (fun x => optProfit P x γG) γP < deriv (fun y => optProfit P γP y) γG) ∧
    (P.b0 * γG - P.b1 * γP ≤ P.b0 * (cr P - dc P) ↔
        tauMStar P γP γG ≤ (P.b0 + P.b1) / (2 * P.b0)) := by sorry

end PrideGuilt
Source
W. Huang, J. Nguyen, C.-L. Tseng, W. Chen, S. N. Kirshner, Pride or Guilt? Impacts of Consumers' Socially Influenced Recycling Behaviors on Closed-Loop Supply Chains, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 26(6) (2024), doi:10.1287/msom.2023.0721 (accepted manuscript, printed page = PDF page - 1), Theorem 2, p.18
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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