Lemma 1 — four generic welfare-sensitivity equivalences
DisprovedCohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare.lemma_1Let two nonempty groups have positive real masses , nonnegative valuation laws with finite first moments, and common cost . Define purchase probability , profit , surplus , nonbuyer mean , fairness-constrained global optima and welfare as in the model. Let be any unconstrained global profit-maximizing nonnegative prices. Suppose are continuous and twice differentiable at , and are monotone and invertible on active open neighborhoods there.
Write , , and . Each of the following is a separate conditional assertion. In each applicable case, local fair optimal selections anchored at exist; every such selection has a finite welfare right derivative at zero, and:
- If , price fairness satisfies .
- If , demand fairness satisfies .
- If , surplus fairness satisfies .
- If , nonbuyer valuation fairness satisfies .
This is the full generic four-part sensitivity lemma; the four order assumptions are not combined. No strict curvature, differentiable inverse, uniqueness, or differentiable optimal path is assumed.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: two customer populations → two positive real masses indexed by Fin 2, without normalization; reason: two nonempty groups are implicit on pp. 6–7; this retains unequal and noninteger populations
- encoding: the general lemma uses real-valued expectations → nonnegative Borel probability laws have finite first moments; reason: integrability gives genuine finite surplus and restricted expectations rather than default Bochner values
- reading: the total-surplus displays on pp. 8 and 12 repeat S₁ → total surplus is d₀S₀(p₀)+d₁S₁(p₁); reason: the group welfare definition on p. 7 and proof on p. 31 establish the intended index; insight I2
- reading: conditional mean Nᵢ is undefined when there are no nonbuyers → Nᵢ is explicitly zero when the conditioning event has probability zero; reason: Eq. (1) admits zero prices; this is the right-continuous extension for the goal families and changes no ordinary conditional mean; insight I5
- reading: optimal prices are named without a tie rule → every baseline optimum and every local optimal selection anchored there are covered, with constrained-selection existence explicit; reason: the tie-independent reading prevents a convenient optimizer choice or an absent selection from hiding a case
- encoding: the right derivative is written as a finite right limit → existence of a real D and convergence of the difference quotient from strictly positive alpha; reason: the footnote 7 limit is preserved without using a default-valued derivative at a nonexistent limit
- reading: monotone and invertible functions have no specified domain → monotonicity and an inverse on the image of an open interval containing each baseline price; reason: the application to uniform demand requires active neighborhoods because demand and surplus are flat beyond the support; no policy locality, inverse differentiability, or nonzero curvature is assumed
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_Sensitivity
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- Lemma 1(a)–(d), pp. 30–31, with separate ordering antecedents. -/
theorem lemma_1 (m : Market) (hm : m.Admissible) (b : Prices)
(hb : BaselineOptimal m b) (hr : LemmaRegularity m b) :
(b 0 < b 1 → SensitivityClaim m b .price (fun D =>
(0 < D ↔
m.population 1 * demand m 1 (b 1) * deriv (deriv (profit m 0)) (b 0) -
m.population 0 * demand m 0 (b 0) * deriv (deriv (profit m 1)) (b 1) < 0))) ∧
(demand m 0 (b 0) < demand m 1 (b 1) → SensitivityClaim m b .demand (fun D =>
(0 < D ↔
m.population 1 * demand m 1 (b 1) * deriv (demand m 1) (b 1) *
deriv (deriv (profit m 0)) (b 0) -
m.population 0 * demand m 0 (b 0) * deriv (demand m 0) (b 0) *
deriv (deriv (profit m 1)) (b 1) < 0))) ∧
(surplus m 0 (b 0) < surplus m 1 (b 1) → SensitivityClaim m b .surplus (fun D =>
(0 < D ↔
m.population 1 * (demand m 1 (b 1)) ^ 2 * deriv (deriv (profit m 0)) (b 0) -
m.population 0 * (demand m 0 (b 0)) ^ 2 * deriv (deriv (profit m 1)) (b 1) > 0))) ∧
(nonbuyer m 0 (b 0) < nonbuyer m 1 (b 1) → SensitivityClaim m b .nonbuyer (fun D =>
(0 < D ↔
m.population 1 * demand m 1 (b 1) * deriv (nonbuyer m 1) (b 1) *
deriv (deriv (profit m 0)) (b 0) -
m.population 0 * demand m 0 (b 0) * deriv (nonbuyer m 0) (b 0) *
deriv (deriv (profit m 1)) (b 1) < 0))) := by sorry
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/- Imported definition source (verbatim dependency snapshot for standalone inspection).
import Mathlib
open MeasureTheory
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- A nonnegative valuation law with a finite first moment (pp. 6–7). -/
def ValuationLaw (μ : Measure ℝ) : Prop :=
IsProbabilityMeasure μ ∧ (∀ᵐ v ∂μ, 0 ≤ v) ∧ Integrable (fun v : ℝ => v) μ
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_ValuationLaw
open MeasureTheory
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- Two marginal valuation laws, real population masses, and common marginal cost. -/
structure Market where
law : Fin 2 → Measure ℝ
population : Fin 2 → ℝ
cost : ℝ
/-- The general distribution-based market conventions, pp. 6–7. -/
def Market.Admissible (m : Market) : Prop :=
0 ≤ m.cost ∧ ∀ i, 0 < m.population i ∧ ValuationLaw (m.law i)
noncomputable def demand (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
(m.law i (Set.Ici p)).toReal
noncomputable def surplus (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
∫ v, max (v - p) 0 ∂m.law i
/-- Conditional mean of nonbuyers; explicitly zero on a null conditioning event. -/
noncomputable def nonbuyer (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
if m.law i (Set.Iio p) = 0 then 0
else (∫ v in Set.Iio p, v ∂m.law i) / (m.law i (Set.Iio p)).toReal
noncomputable def profit (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
m.population i * (p - m.cost) * demand m i p
abbrev Prices := Fin 2 → ℝ
noncomputable def totalProfit (m : Market) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
profit m 0 (p 0) + profit m 1 (p 1)
/-- Group-specific surplus indices, as on pp. 7 and 31. -/
noncomputable def welfare (m : Market) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
totalProfit m p + m.population 0 * surplus m 0 (p 0) +
m.population 1 * surplus m 1 (p 1)
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_Market
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
inductive Metric where
| price | demand | surplus | nonbuyer
deriving DecidableEq
noncomputable def metricValue (m : Market) : Metric → Fin 2 → ℝ → ℝ
| .price => fun _ p => p
| .demand => demand m
| .surplus => surplus m
| .nonbuyer => nonbuyer m
/-- All individual global maximizers on nonnegative prices. -/
def BaselineOptimal (m : Market) (b : Prices) : Prop :=
∀ i, 0 ≤ b i ∧ ∀ p : ℝ, 0 ≤ p → profit m i p ≤ profit m i (b i)
noncomputable def gap (m : Market) (k : Metric) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
|metricValue m k 0 (p 0) - metricValue m k 1 (p 1)|
/-- Equation (1), including its full parameter and price domains. -/
def FairFeasible (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (α : ℝ) (p : Prices) : Prop :=
α ∈ Set.Icc 0 1 ∧ (∀ i, 0 ≤ p i) ∧ gap m k p ≤ (1 - α) * gap m k b
/-- The optimum set is defined by comparison against every feasible price pair. -/
def FairOptimal (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (α : ℝ) (p : Prices) : Prop :=
FairFeasible m b k α p ∧
∀ q : Prices, FairFeasible m b k α q → totalProfit m q ≤ totalProfit m p
/-- A selection of actual optima on some right neighborhood, anchored at the baseline.
No continuity or differentiability, and no restriction to active price neighborhoods. -/
def LocalOptimalSelection (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric)
(P : ℝ → Prices) : Prop :=
P 0 = b ∧ ∃ ε : ℝ, 0 < ε ∧ ε ≤ 1 ∧
∀ α ∈ Set.Icc 0 ε, FairOptimal m b k α (P α)
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_FairPricing
open Filter Topology
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
/-- The finite right derivative in footnote 7, p. 12. -/
def RightDerivative (f : ℝ → ℝ) (D : ℝ) : Prop :=
Tendsto (fun α : ℝ => (f α - f 0) / α) (nhdsWithin 0 (Set.Ioi 0)) (𝓝 D)
/-- Differentiability in a neighborhood and differentiability of the derivative at x.
Continuity at x follows; continuity of the second derivative is not assumed. -/
def TwiceDifferentiableAt (f : ℝ → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : Prop :=
(∀ᶠ y in 𝓝 x, DifferentiableAt ℝ f y) ∧ DifferentiableAt ℝ (deriv f) x
/-- Monotonicity and an inverse on the image of an open active interval at x.
No derivative condition on the inverse or nonzero derivative is imposed. -/
def ActiveInvertible (f : ℝ → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : Prop :=
∃ l u : ℝ, l < x ∧ x < u ∧
(MonotoneOn f (Set.Ioo l u) ∨ AntitoneOn f (Set.Ioo l u)) ∧
∃ g : ℝ → ℝ,
(∀ p ∈ Set.Ioo l u, g (f p) = p) ∧
(∀ y ∈ f '' Set.Ioo l u, g y ∈ Set.Ioo l u ∧ f (g y) = y)
/-- Exactly the local regularity of Lemma 1 for all four source functions. -/
def LemmaRegularity (m : Market) (b : Prices) : Prop :=
∀ i,
TwiceDifferentiableAt (demand m i) (b i) ∧
TwiceDifferentiableAt (surplus m i) (b i) ∧
TwiceDifferentiableAt (nonbuyer m i) (b i) ∧
TwiceDifferentiableAt (profit m i) (b i) ∧
ActiveInvertible (demand m i) (b i) ∧
ActiveInvertible (surplus m i) (b i) ∧
ActiveInvertible (nonbuyer m i) (b i)
/-- Existence of a policy, and the specified finite-derivative assertion for every policy. -/
def SensitivityClaim (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (C : ℝ → Prop) : Prop :=
(∃ P : ℝ → Prices, LocalOptimalSelection m b k P) ∧
∀ P : ℝ → Prices, LocalOptimalSelection m b k P →
∃ D : ℝ, RightDerivative (fun α => welfare m (P α)) D ∧ C D
end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
-/
Read-back
What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5
Setting. Let be a market consisting of:
- two measures on ;
- real populations ;
- a real cost .
For a group and real price , define:
- Demand: .
- Surplus: .
- Nonbuyer mean: , set to when .
- Profit: .
For price pairs:
- Total profit: .
- Welfare: .
Hypotheses. The theorem quantifies over every market and every pair satisfying:
-
Admissibility.
- ;
- ;
- each is a probability measure with and .
So all the quantities above are genuine finite real numbers.
-
Baseline optimality. For each , and for all .
-
Regularity. For each :
- each of is differentiable on an open neighborhood of , and its derivative is differentiable at ;
- each of is, on some open interval :
- nondecreasing or nonincreasing,
- with a function such that on , and
- with for every .
No continuity of or of and no nonvanishing derivative is required. By hypothesis 3, , and below are genuine derivatives.
Fairness notions used in the conclusion. For a metric , write for , , or , and .
- A pair is fair-optimal at when , , , and for every meeting those same three conditions.
- A local optimal selection is any function from reals to price pairs with such that, for some , is fair-optimal at for every . No regularity of is required.
Sensitivity claim. "The sensitivity claim for metric with condition " means both of the following:
- (i) at least one local optimal selection for exists;
- (ii) for every local optimal selection for , there is a real with
and holds.
Conclusion. The theorem asserts all four of the following.
- (a) Price. If , the sensitivity claim holds for the price metric, where is
- (b) Demand. If , the sensitivity claim holds for the demand metric, where is
- (c) Surplus. If , the sensitivity claim holds for the surplus metric, where is
Note that the inequality here is "", not "".
- (d) Nonbuyer. If , the sensitivity claim holds for the nonbuyer metric, where is
In each part, the condition characterizes only the strict sign . When or , it asserts only that the displayed expression fails the stated strict inequality.
Degenerate cases.
- Reversed or equal ordering. Each part is conditional on group having the strictly smaller baseline value of the relevant metric. When the ordering is reversed or equal (e.g. ), that part asserts nothing.
- Strict ordering implies positive gap. Whenever a part's antecedent holds, .
- Zero baseline prices are excluded. Under admissibility, and for all . So if , then and are constant on for every , and the required injectivity fails. The hypotheses are therefore jointly unsatisfiable unless and .
- Possible vacuity. The regularity hypothesis also rules out any that makes or fail differentiability near (e.g. an atom at ), or locally constant on parts of every interval around . If no market satisfies all hypotheses together, the theorem is vacuously true.
- Existence is asserted. Whenever an antecedent holds, part (i) of the sensitivity claim asserts that a local optimal selection exists. In particular, at the pair is fair-optimal.
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.