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Lemma 1 — four generic welfare-sensitivity equivalences

Disproved
CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare.lemma_1

by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

fairnessoperations-researchp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricing

Let two nonempty groups have positive real masses did_idi​, nonnegative valuation laws with finite first moments, and common cost c≥0c\ge0c≥0. Define purchase probability qiq_iqi​, profit Ri=di(p−c)qiR_i=d_i(p-c)q_iRi​=di​(p−c)qi​, surplus SiS_iSi​, nonbuyer mean NiN_iNi​, fairness-constrained global optima and welfare as in the model. Let bib_ibi​ be any unconstrained global profit-maximizing nonnegative prices. Suppose qi,Si,Ni,Riq_i,S_i,N_i,R_iqi​,Si​,Ni​,Ri​ are continuous and twice differentiable at bib_ibi​, and qi,Si,Niq_i,S_i,N_iqi​,Si​,Ni​ are monotone and invertible on active open neighborhoods there.

Write qi=qi(bi)q_i=q_i(b_i)qi​=qi​(bi​), ri=Ri′′(bi)r_i=R_i''(b_i)ri​=Ri′′​(bi​), ai=qi′(bi)a_i=q_i'(b_i)ai​=qi′​(bi​) and ni=Ni′(bi)n_i=N_i'(b_i)ni​=Ni′​(bi​). Each of the following is a separate conditional assertion. In each applicable case, local fair optimal selections anchored at bbb exist; every such selection has a finite welfare right derivative DDD at zero, and:

  1. If b0<b1b_0<b_1b0​<b1​, price fairness satisfies D>0  ⟺  d1q1r0−d0q0r1<0D>0\iff d_1q_1r_0-d_0q_0r_1<0D>0⟺d1​q1​r0​−d0​q0​r1​<0.
  2. If q0<q1q_0<q_1q0​<q1​, demand fairness satisfies D>0  ⟺  d1q1a1r0−d0q0a0r1<0D>0\iff d_1q_1a_1r_0-d_0q_0a_0r_1<0D>0⟺d1​q1​a1​r0​−d0​q0​a0​r1​<0.
  3. If S0(b0)<S1(b1)S_0(b_0)<S_1(b_1)S0​(b0​)<S1​(b1​), surplus fairness satisfies D>0  ⟺  d1q12r0−d0q02r1>0D>0\iff d_1q_1^2r_0-d_0q_0^2r_1>0D>0⟺d1​q12​r0​−d0​q02​r1​>0.
  4. If N0(b0)<N1(b1)N_0(b_0)<N_1(b_1)N0​(b0​)<N1​(b1​), nonbuyer valuation fairness satisfies D>0  ⟺  d1q1n1r0−d0q0n0r1<0D>0\iff d_1q_1n_1r_0-d_0q_0n_0r_1<0D>0⟺d1​q1​n1​r0​−d0​q0​n0​r1​<0.

This is the full generic four-part sensitivity lemma; the four order assumptions are not combined. No strict curvature, differentiable inverse, uniqueness, or differentiable optimal path is assumed.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: two customer populations → two positive real masses indexed by Fin 2, without normalization; reason: two nonempty groups are implicit on pp. 6–7; this retains unequal and noninteger populations
  • encoding: the general lemma uses real-valued expectations → nonnegative Borel probability laws have finite first moments; reason: integrability gives genuine finite surplus and restricted expectations rather than default Bochner values
  • reading: the total-surplus displays on pp. 8 and 12 repeat S₁ → total surplus is d₀S₀(p₀)+d₁S₁(p₁); reason: the group welfare definition on p. 7 and proof on p. 31 establish the intended index; insight I2
  • reading: conditional mean Nᵢ is undefined when there are no nonbuyers → Nᵢ is explicitly zero when the conditioning event has probability zero; reason: Eq. (1) admits zero prices; this is the right-continuous extension for the goal families and changes no ordinary conditional mean; insight I5
  • reading: optimal prices are named without a tie rule → every baseline optimum and every local optimal selection anchored there are covered, with constrained-selection existence explicit; reason: the tie-independent reading prevents a convenient optimizer choice or an absent selection from hiding a case
  • encoding: the right derivative is written as a finite right limit → existence of a real D and convergence of the difference quotient from strictly positive alpha; reason: the footnote 7 limit is preserved without using a default-valued derivative at a nonexistent limit
  • reading: monotone and invertible functions have no specified domain → monotonicity and an inverse on the image of an open interval containing each baseline price; reason: the application to uniform demand requires active neighborhoods because demand and surplus are flat beyond the support; no policy locality, inverse differentiability, or nonzero curvature is assumed
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_Sensitivity
Formal statement
namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

/-- Lemma 1(a)–(d), pp. 30–31, with separate ordering antecedents. -/
theorem lemma_1 (m : Market) (hm : m.Admissible) (b : Prices)
    (hb : BaselineOptimal m b) (hr : LemmaRegularity m b) :
    (b 0 < b 1 → SensitivityClaim m b .price (fun D =>
      (0 < D ↔
        m.population 1 * demand m 1 (b 1) * deriv (deriv (profit m 0)) (b 0) -
        m.population 0 * demand m 0 (b 0) * deriv (deriv (profit m 1)) (b 1) < 0))) ∧
    (demand m 0 (b 0) < demand m 1 (b 1) → SensitivityClaim m b .demand (fun D =>
      (0 < D ↔
        m.population 1 * demand m 1 (b 1) * deriv (demand m 1) (b 1) *
          deriv (deriv (profit m 0)) (b 0) -
        m.population 0 * demand m 0 (b 0) * deriv (demand m 0) (b 0) *
          deriv (deriv (profit m 1)) (b 1) < 0))) ∧
    (surplus m 0 (b 0) < surplus m 1 (b 1) → SensitivityClaim m b .surplus (fun D =>
      (0 < D ↔
        m.population 1 * (demand m 1 (b 1)) ^ 2 * deriv (deriv (profit m 0)) (b 0) -
        m.population 0 * (demand m 0 (b 0)) ^ 2 * deriv (deriv (profit m 1)) (b 1) > 0))) ∧
    (nonbuyer m 0 (b 0) < nonbuyer m 1 (b 1) → SensitivityClaim m b .nonbuyer (fun D =>
      (0 < D ↔
        m.population 1 * demand m 1 (b 1) * deriv (nonbuyer m 1) (b 1) *
          deriv (deriv (profit m 0)) (b 0) -
        m.population 0 * demand m 0 (b 0) * deriv (nonbuyer m 0) (b 0) *
          deriv (deriv (profit m 1)) (b 1) < 0))) := by sorry

end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

/- Imported definition source (verbatim dependency snapshot for standalone inspection).

import Mathlib

open MeasureTheory

namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

/-- A nonnegative valuation law with a finite first moment (pp. 6–7). -/
def ValuationLaw (μ : Measure ℝ) : Prop :=
  IsProbabilityMeasure μ ∧ (∀ᵐ v ∂μ, 0 ≤ v) ∧ Integrable (fun v : ℝ => v) μ

end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_ValuationLaw

open MeasureTheory

namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

/-- Two marginal valuation laws, real population masses, and common marginal cost. -/
structure Market where
  law : Fin 2 → Measure ℝ
  population : Fin 2 → ℝ
  cost : ℝ

/-- The general distribution-based market conventions, pp. 6–7. -/
def Market.Admissible (m : Market) : Prop :=
  0 ≤ m.cost ∧ ∀ i, 0 < m.population i ∧ ValuationLaw (m.law i)

noncomputable def demand (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (m.law i (Set.Ici p)).toReal

noncomputable def surplus (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  ∫ v, max (v - p) 0 ∂m.law i

/-- Conditional mean of nonbuyers; explicitly zero on a null conditioning event. -/
noncomputable def nonbuyer (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  if m.law i (Set.Iio p) = 0 then 0
  else (∫ v in Set.Iio p, v ∂m.law i) / (m.law i (Set.Iio p)).toReal

noncomputable def profit (m : Market) (i : Fin 2) (p : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  m.population i * (p - m.cost) * demand m i p

abbrev Prices := Fin 2 → ℝ

noncomputable def totalProfit (m : Market) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
  profit m 0 (p 0) + profit m 1 (p 1)

/-- Group-specific surplus indices, as on pp. 7 and 31. -/
noncomputable def welfare (m : Market) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
  totalProfit m p + m.population 0 * surplus m 0 (p 0) +
    m.population 1 * surplus m 1 (p 1)

end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_Market

namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

inductive Metric where
  | price | demand | surplus | nonbuyer
  deriving DecidableEq

noncomputable def metricValue (m : Market) : Metric → Fin 2 → ℝ → ℝ
  | .price => fun _ p => p
  | .demand => demand m
  | .surplus => surplus m
  | .nonbuyer => nonbuyer m

/-- All individual global maximizers on nonnegative prices. -/
def BaselineOptimal (m : Market) (b : Prices) : Prop :=
  ∀ i, 0 ≤ b i ∧ ∀ p : ℝ, 0 ≤ p → profit m i p ≤ profit m i (b i)

noncomputable def gap (m : Market) (k : Metric) (p : Prices) : ℝ :=
  |metricValue m k 0 (p 0) - metricValue m k 1 (p 1)|

/-- Equation (1), including its full parameter and price domains. -/
def FairFeasible (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (α : ℝ) (p : Prices) : Prop :=
  α ∈ Set.Icc 0 1 ∧ (∀ i, 0 ≤ p i) ∧ gap m k p ≤ (1 - α) * gap m k b

/-- The optimum set is defined by comparison against every feasible price pair. -/
def FairOptimal (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (α : ℝ) (p : Prices) : Prop :=
  FairFeasible m b k α p ∧
    ∀ q : Prices, FairFeasible m b k α q → totalProfit m q ≤ totalProfit m p

/-- A selection of actual optima on some right neighborhood, anchored at the baseline.
No continuity or differentiability, and no restriction to active price neighborhoods. -/
def LocalOptimalSelection (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric)
    (P : ℝ → Prices) : Prop :=
  P 0 = b ∧ ∃ ε : ℝ, 0 < ε ∧ ε ≤ 1 ∧
    ∀ α ∈ Set.Icc 0 ε, FairOptimal m b k α (P α)

end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CohenPriceFairness_LocalWelfare_FairPricing

open Filter Topology

namespace CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare

/-- The finite right derivative in footnote 7, p. 12. -/
def RightDerivative (f : ℝ → ℝ) (D : ℝ) : Prop :=
  Tendsto (fun α : ℝ => (f α - f 0) / α) (nhdsWithin 0 (Set.Ioi 0)) (𝓝 D)

/-- Differentiability in a neighborhood and differentiability of the derivative at x.
Continuity at x follows; continuity of the second derivative is not assumed. -/
def TwiceDifferentiableAt (f : ℝ → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : Prop :=
  (∀ᶠ y in 𝓝 x, DifferentiableAt ℝ f y) ∧ DifferentiableAt ℝ (deriv f) x

/-- Monotonicity and an inverse on the image of an open active interval at x.
No derivative condition on the inverse or nonzero derivative is imposed. -/
def ActiveInvertible (f : ℝ → ℝ) (x : ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∃ l u : ℝ, l < x ∧ x < u ∧
    (MonotoneOn f (Set.Ioo l u) ∨ AntitoneOn f (Set.Ioo l u)) ∧
    ∃ g : ℝ → ℝ,
      (∀ p ∈ Set.Ioo l u, g (f p) = p) ∧
      (∀ y ∈ f '' Set.Ioo l u, g y ∈ Set.Ioo l u ∧ f (g y) = y)

/-- Exactly the local regularity of Lemma 1 for all four source functions. -/
def LemmaRegularity (m : Market) (b : Prices) : Prop :=
  ∀ i,
    TwiceDifferentiableAt (demand m i) (b i) ∧
    TwiceDifferentiableAt (surplus m i) (b i) ∧
    TwiceDifferentiableAt (nonbuyer m i) (b i) ∧
    TwiceDifferentiableAt (profit m i) (b i) ∧
    ActiveInvertible (demand m i) (b i) ∧
    ActiveInvertible (surplus m i) (b i) ∧
    ActiveInvertible (nonbuyer m i) (b i)

/-- Existence of a policy, and the specified finite-derivative assertion for every policy. -/
def SensitivityClaim (m : Market) (b : Prices) (k : Metric) (C : ℝ → Prop) : Prop :=
  (∃ P : ℝ → Prices, LocalOptimalSelection m b k P) ∧
    ∀ P : ℝ → Prices, LocalOptimalSelection m b k P →
      ∃ D : ℝ, RightDerivative (fun α => welfare m (P α)) D ∧ C D

end CohenPriceFairness.LocalWelfare
-/
Source
Cohen, Elmachtoub and Lei (2022), Price Discrimination with Fairness Constraints, Management Science, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4317; published artifact, PDF pages = printed pages; SHA-256 b3f8804f1610eb36d8a2ef32e836f4a65285e6b8ad427f7c82172e7a3fd73147; Appendix A, Lemma 1(a)–(d), pp. 30–31; proof pp. 31–33.
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Setting. Let mmm be a market consisting of:

  • two measures μ0,μ1\mu_0,\mu_1μ0​,μ1​ on R\mathbb{R}R;
  • real populations N0,N1N_0,N_1N0​,N1​;
  • a real cost ccc.

For a group iii and real price ppp, define:

  • Demand: Di(p)=μi([p,∞))D_i(p) = \mu_i([p,\infty))Di​(p)=μi​([p,∞)).
  • Surplus: Si(p)=∫max⁡(v−p,0) dμi(v)S_i(p) = \int \max(v-p,0)\,d\mu_i(v)Si​(p)=∫max(v−p,0)dμi​(v).
  • Nonbuyer mean: Ri(p)=∫(−∞,p)v dμiμi((−∞,p))R_i(p) = \dfrac{\int_{(-\infty,p)} v\,d\mu_i}{\mu_i((-\infty,p))}Ri​(p)=μi​((−∞,p))∫(−∞,p)​vdμi​​, set to 000 when μi((−∞,p))=0\mu_i((-\infty,p)) = 0μi​((−∞,p))=0.
  • Profit: πi(p)=Ni(p−c)Di(p)\pi_i(p) = N_i(p-c)D_i(p)πi​(p)=Ni​(p−c)Di​(p).

For price pairs:

  • Total profit: Π(p)=π0(p0)+π1(p1)\Pi(p) = \pi_0(p_0) + \pi_1(p_1)Π(p)=π0​(p0​)+π1​(p1​).
  • Welfare: W(p)=Π(p)+N0S0(p0)+N1S1(p1)W(p) = \Pi(p) + N_0S_0(p_0) + N_1S_1(p_1)W(p)=Π(p)+N0​S0​(p0​)+N1​S1​(p1​).

Hypotheses. The theorem quantifies over every market mmm and every pair b=(b0,b1)b = (b_0,b_1)b=(b0​,b1​) satisfying:

  1. Admissibility.

    • c≥0c \ge 0c≥0;
    • N0,N1>0N_0,N_1 > 0N0​,N1​>0;
    • each μi\mu_iμi​ is a probability measure with μi((−∞,0))=0\mu_i((-\infty,0)) = 0μi​((−∞,0))=0 and ∫∣v∣ dμi<∞\int|v|\,d\mu_i < \infty∫∣v∣dμi​<∞.

    So all the quantities above are genuine finite real numbers.

  2. Baseline optimality. For each iii, bi≥0b_i \ge 0bi​≥0 and πi(p)≤πi(bi)\pi_i(p) \le \pi_i(b_i)πi​(p)≤πi​(bi​) for all p≥0p \ge 0p≥0.

  3. Regularity. For each iii:

    • each of Di,Si,Ri,πiD_i, S_i, R_i, \pi_iDi​,Si​,Ri​,πi​ is differentiable on an open neighborhood of bib_ibi​, and its derivative is differentiable at bib_ibi​;
    • each of Di,Si,RiD_i, S_i, R_iDi​,Si​,Ri​ is, on some open interval (l,u)∋bi(l,u) \ni b_i(l,u)∋bi​:
      • nondecreasing or nonincreasing,
      • with a function ggg such that g(f(p))=pg(f(p)) = pg(f(p))=p on (l,u)(l,u)(l,u), and
      • g(y)∈(l,u)g(y) \in (l,u)g(y)∈(l,u) with f(g(y))=yf(g(y)) = yf(g(y))=y for every y∈f((l,u))y \in f((l,u))y∈f((l,u)).

    No continuity of f′′f''f′′ or of ggg and no nonvanishing derivative is required. By hypothesis 3, πi′′(bi)\pi_i''(b_i)πi′′​(bi​), Di′(bi)D_i'(b_i)Di′​(bi​) and Ri′(bi)R_i'(b_i)Ri′​(bi​) below are genuine derivatives.

Fairness notions used in the conclusion. For a metric kkk, write Mk(i,p)M_k(i,p)Mk​(i,p) for ppp, Di(p)D_i(p)Di​(p), Si(p)S_i(p)Si​(p) or Ri(p)R_i(p)Ri​(p), and Gk(p)=∣Mk(0,p0)−Mk(1,p1)∣G_k(p) = |M_k(0,p_0) - M_k(1,p_1)|Gk​(p)=∣Mk​(0,p0​)−Mk​(1,p1​)∣.

  • A pair ppp is fair-optimal at α\alphaα when α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], p0,p1≥0p_0,p_1 \ge 0p0​,p1​≥0, Gk(p)≤(1−α)Gk(b)G_k(p) \le (1-\alpha)G_k(b)Gk​(p)≤(1−α)Gk​(b), and Π(p)≥Π(q)\Pi(p) \ge \Pi(q)Π(p)≥Π(q) for every qqq meeting those same three conditions.
  • A local optimal selection is any function PPP from reals to price pairs with P(0)=bP(0) = bP(0)=b such that, for some 0<ε≤10<\varepsilon\le 10<ε≤1, P(α)P(\alpha)P(α) is fair-optimal at α\alphaα for every α∈[0,ε]\alpha \in [0,\varepsilon]α∈[0,ε]. No regularity of PPP is required.

Sensitivity claim. "The sensitivity claim for metric kkk with condition CCC" means both of the following:

  • (i) at least one local optimal selection for kkk exists;
  • (ii) for every local optimal selection PPP for kkk, there is a real DDD with
lim⁡α→0+W(P(α))−W(b)α=D\lim_{\alpha\to 0^+}\frac{W(P(\alpha)) - W(b)}{\alpha} = Dα→0+lim​αW(P(α))−W(b)​=D

and C(D)C(D)C(D) holds.

Conclusion. The theorem asserts all four of the following.

  • (a) Price. If b0<b1b_0 < b_1b0​<b1​, the sensitivity claim holds for the price metric, where C(D)C(D)C(D) is
D>0  ⟺  N1D1(b1) π0′′(b0)−N0D0(b0) π1′′(b1)<0.D > 0 \iff N_1 D_1(b_1)\,\pi_0''(b_0) - N_0 D_0(b_0)\,\pi_1''(b_1) < 0.D>0⟺N1​D1​(b1​)π0′′​(b0​)−N0​D0​(b0​)π1′′​(b1​)<0.
  • (b) Demand. If D0(b0)<D1(b1)D_0(b_0) < D_1(b_1)D0​(b0​)<D1​(b1​), the sensitivity claim holds for the demand metric, where C(D)C(D)C(D) is
D>0  ⟺  N1D1(b1)D1′(b1) π0′′(b0)−N0D0(b0)D0′(b0) π1′′(b1)<0.D > 0 \iff N_1 D_1(b_1) D_1'(b_1)\,\pi_0''(b_0) - N_0 D_0(b_0) D_0'(b_0)\,\pi_1''(b_1) < 0.D>0⟺N1​D1​(b1​)D1′​(b1​)π0′′​(b0​)−N0​D0​(b0​)D0′​(b0​)π1′′​(b1​)<0.
  • (c) Surplus. If S0(b0)<S1(b1)S_0(b_0) < S_1(b_1)S0​(b0​)<S1​(b1​), the sensitivity claim holds for the surplus metric, where C(D)C(D)C(D) is
D>0  ⟺  N1D1(b1)2 π0′′(b0)−N0D0(b0)2 π1′′(b1)>0.D > 0 \iff N_1 D_1(b_1)^2\,\pi_0''(b_0) - N_0 D_0(b_0)^2\,\pi_1''(b_1) > 0.D>0⟺N1​D1​(b1​)2π0′′​(b0​)−N0​D0​(b0​)2π1′′​(b1​)>0.

Note that the inequality here is ">0>0>0", not "<0<0<0".

  • (d) Nonbuyer. If R0(b0)<R1(b1)R_0(b_0) < R_1(b_1)R0​(b0​)<R1​(b1​), the sensitivity claim holds for the nonbuyer metric, where C(D)C(D)C(D) is
D>0  ⟺  N1D1(b1)R1′(b1) π0′′(b0)−N0D0(b0)R0′(b0) π1′′(b1)<0.D > 0 \iff N_1 D_1(b_1) R_1'(b_1)\,\pi_0''(b_0) - N_0 D_0(b_0) R_0'(b_0)\,\pi_1''(b_1) < 0.D>0⟺N1​D1​(b1​)R1′​(b1​)π0′′​(b0​)−N0​D0​(b0​)R0′​(b0​)π1′′​(b1​)<0.

In each part, the condition characterizes only the strict sign D>0D>0D>0. When D=0D = 0D=0 or D<0D<0D<0, it asserts only that the displayed expression fails the stated strict inequality.

Degenerate cases.

  • Reversed or equal ordering. Each part is conditional on group 000 having the strictly smaller baseline value of the relevant metric. When the ordering is reversed or equal (e.g. b0=b1b_0 = b_1b0​=b1​), that part asserts nothing.
  • Strict ordering implies positive gap. Whenever a part's antecedent holds, Gk(b)>0G_k(b) > 0Gk​(b)>0.
  • Zero baseline prices are excluded. Under admissibility, Ri(p)=0R_i(p) = 0Ri​(p)=0 and Di(p)=1D_i(p) = 1Di​(p)=1 for all p≤0p \le 0p≤0. So if bi=0b_i = 0bi​=0, then DiD_iDi​ and RiR_iRi​ are constant on (l,0](l,0](l,0] for every l<0l<0l<0, and the required injectivity fails. The hypotheses are therefore jointly unsatisfiable unless b0>0b_0 > 0b0​>0 and b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0.
  • Possible vacuity. The regularity hypothesis also rules out any μi\mu_iμi​ that makes DiD_iDi​ or RiR_iRi​ fail differentiability near bib_ibi​ (e.g. an atom at bib_ibi​), or locally constant on parts of every interval around bib_ibi​. If no market satisfies all hypotheses together, the theorem is vacuously true.
  • Existence is asserted. Whenever an antecedent holds, part (i) of the sensitivity claim asserts that a local optimal selection exists. In particular, at α=0\alpha=0α=0 the pair bbb is fair-optimal.
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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