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An overflowed lax parse never verifies

Proved
BitcoinSig.overflow_rejected

by pitimespi · Oct 26, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetconsensusderecdsaformal-verificationschnorrsecp256k1sighash

If parseDerLax sig = some (0, 0) — the zero signature that the lax parser substitutes on overflow — then pubkeyVerify pk hash sig = false for every key and hash.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSig
open BitcoinSig BitcoinSer
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinSig.overflow_rejected (pk hash sig : Bytes) (h : BitcoinSig.parseDerLax sig = some (0, 0)) :
    BitcoinSig.pubkeyVerify pk hash sig = false := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: IsValidSignatureEncoding, IsLowDERSignature, IsCompressedOrUncompressedPubKey, IsCompressedPubKey, IsDefinedHashtypeSignature, CheckSignatureEncoding, CheckPubKeyEncoding, FindAndDelete, CTransactionSignatureSerializer, SignatureHash (BASE and WITNESS_V0), EvalChecksigPreTapscript, GenericTransactionSignatureChecker::CheckECDSASignature/CheckLockTime/CheckSequence, src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp; GetScriptOp, src/script/script.cpp; CPubKey::IsValid/Verify/CheckLowS and ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax, src/pubkey.cpp and pubkey.h; secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse (src/secp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h), secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify (ecdsa_impl.h), secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify (modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h); BIP66, BIP143, BIP340 at bips revision 100ba872c808946155b1eeb8c4568058f2eea0a7
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinSig.overflow_rejected

Binders and hypothesis. Universally quantified over three byte strings pkpkpk, hashhashhash, sigsigsig, with one hypothesis hhh: parseDerLax sigsigsig = some (0,0)(0, 0)(0,0). That is, the lax DER parser does not reject sigsigsig structurally (the result is not "none"), and the pair it returns is (0,0)(0,0)(0,0).

How the hypothesis can arise. Per the definition of parseDerLax, the pair (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) is produced in exactly these situations after the structural phase succeeds (sequence tag 0x30, a sequence-length byte whose long-form length bytes — if any — are skipped unread, two integers each with tag 0x02 and a short or long-form length that fits within the input, trailing bytes ignored): (a) after stripping leading zero bytes, the RRR integer or the SSS integer still has more than 32 bytes; or (b) both fit in 32 bytes but the big-endian value of RRR or of SSS is ≥n\geq n≥n; or (c) both integers genuinely have value 000 (for example zero-length integers, or integers consisting only of zero bytes). The hypothesis does not distinguish these cases.

Conclusion.

pubkeyVerify pk hash sig=false.\text{pubkeyVerify}\ pk\ hash\ sig = \text{false}.pubkeyVerify pk hash sig=false.

Unfolding. pubkeyVerify pk hash sigpk\,hash\,sigpkhashsig is: false if pubkeyValid pkpkpk is false (first byte does not announce the actual length); false if parsePubkey pkpkpk is "none" (not a valid compressed/uncompressed/hybrid point); false if parseDerLax sigsigsig is "none"; otherwise, with QQQ the parsed point and (r,s)(r,s)(r,s) the parsed pair, ecdsaVerifyRaw (some QQQ) (beVal hash mod nhash \bmod nhashmodn) rrr (normalizeS sss). Under hhh, (r,s)=(0,0)(r,s) = (0,0)(r,s)=(0,0), normalizeS 0=00 = 00=0, and ecdsaVerifyRaw begins with "if r=0r = 0r=0 or s=0s = 0s=0 or r≥nr \geq nr≥n or s≥ns \geq ns≥n then false", which fires. So every branch of pubkeyVerify yields false, whatever pkpkpk and hashhashhash are — including a perfectly valid key and any message bytes (which have no length constraint and are read big-endian modulo nnn).

What is not said. The statement does not say that signatures with over-long or overflowing integers are rejected by the encoding checks (isValidSignatureEncoding, checkSignatureEncoding) — it concerns only pubkeyVerify. It does not say what checkLowS returns on such a signature (by the definition it returns true, since s=0s = 0s=0 is not high, but that is not part of this statement). It does not say anything about signatures for which parseDerLax returns "none" (also false in pubkeyVerify, but not asserted here) or returns some other pair. It does not say that (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) arises only from overflow; a signature honestly encoding r=s=0r = s = 0r=s=0 also satisfies the hypothesis and is covered. It does not mention checkECDSASignature or the hash-type byte: sigsigsig here is the DER body as passed to pubkeyVerify, without any trailing hash-type byte being stripped.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 26, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 26, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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