(21), p. 17 (PDF p. 20), with (7), p. 10 — under C(m) = ½γm² the blockholder's optimal monitoring is m* = ξ(β − s)/γ
ProvedCommonOwnership.Governance.eq21_optimal_monitoringcommon-ownershipcorporate-governancemonitoringp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let , and , and let the monitoring cost be quadratic, . A blockholder with residual stake chooses monitoring to maximize
Then the rule
is an optimal monitoring rule, and every optimal monitoring rule coincides with it on .
This is the closed form (21) of the first-order condition (7), . It connects the abstract optimality predicate used in Proposition 3 with the explicit surplus of Appendix A.
Formalization Note The condition is footnote 19's form of ; with it puts inside . The statement asserts both existence (the formula is optimal) and uniqueness on .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CommonOwnership_Governance_Model
Formal statement
namespace CommonOwnership.Governance
/-- (7), p. 10, and (21), p. 17: under the quadratic cost (20), the blockholder's optimal monitoring
at residual stake `t = β − s ∈ [0, β]` exists, is unique, and equals `ξ t / γ`. -/
theorem eq21_optimal_monitoring (β ξ γ : ℝ) (hβ : 0 < β) (hβ1 : β ≤ 1) (hξ : 0 < ξ)
(hγ : ξ < γ) :
IsOptMonitoring (quadCost γ) ξ β (fun t => ξ * t / γ) ∧
∀ mstar : ℝ → ℝ, IsOptMonitoring (quadCost γ) ξ β mstar →
∀ t ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) β, mstar t = ξ * t / γ := by sorry
end CommonOwnership.Governance
Source
Denicolò & Panunzi, Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance, ECGI Finance Working Paper 927/2023 (SSRN 4523644, July 24, 2023; Management Science DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2023.03467), p. 17 (PDF p. 20), (20), (21), footnote 19; p. 10 (PDF p. 13), §3.2.1, (7)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.