Proposition 1(d), p. 16 (corrected: c > 0, c < 1/2; D = S on γ = λ/2) — in Region (d) the unique symmetric equilibrium price is c + √(λγ/2), with full coverage
ProvedCongestedPlatforms.Surge.proposition_1_dequilibrium-pricenash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1two-sided-platform
Take , a market size and a commission , and suppose lies in Region (d):
Let . Then:
- a price is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the pricing game if and only if ;
- at the market is fully covered: ;
- if , equilibrium demand is strictly lower than equilibrium supply, ;
- if , they are equal.
In this region the platforms compete head to head for the customers in the middle of the line and still have spare driver capacity. This statement formalizes part (d) of Proposition 1; the clause of the same printed sentence about Region (c) belongs to part (c), which is not posed in this mission.
Formalization Note Same equilibrium notion as Proposition 1(a): action set , supply constraint on the deviations and on .
Differences from the source:
- correction: → ; reason: at the profit is identically when , so every price satisfying (3.6) is an equilibrium and uniqueness fails.
- correction: Region (d) for any → Region (d) with ; reason: for the printed region is nonempty but the formula is wrong; counterexample , , where the printed exceeds and the true equilibrium is .
- correction: "equilibrium demand strictly lower than equilibrium supply" → strict when , equality when ; reason: the boundary is in the printed region and there; counterexample , , .
- reading: "the following are the symmetric equilibrium prices" → is a symmetric Nash equilibrium iff ; reason: the formula names the equilibrium whose existence and uniqueness Theorem 1 asserts.
- reading: action set → ; reason: the natural bounds of pp. 11, 13 at .
- reading: the supply constraint (3.6) restricts the deviations → it also holds at ; reason: "The prices selected by the platforms must also satisfy the following supply constraint" (p. 14).
- encoding: "the platforms fully cover the market" → ; reason: this is the Case F condition of Lemma 1.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CongestedPlatforms_Surge_Setting
Formal statement
namespace CongestedPlatforms.Surge
theorem proposition_1_d (lam γ c : ℝ) (hlam : 0 < lam) (hc0 : 0 < c) (hc : c < 1 / 2)
(hD1 : γ < (1 / 2 - c) ^ 2 / (2 * lam)) (hD2 : lam / 2 ≤ γ) :
(∀ p : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p ↔ p = c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2)) ∧
(lam < dP lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2)) + dP lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2))) ∧
(lam / 2 < γ →
D lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2)) (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2)) <
S lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2)) (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2))) ∧
(γ = lam / 2 →
D lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2)) (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2)) =
S lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2)) (c + Real.sqrt (lam * γ / 2))) := by sorry
end CongestedPlatforms.Surge
Source
Bernstein, DeCroix, Keskin, Competition between Two-Sided Platforms under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects, SSRN 3250224, version of September 16, 2019, p. 16, Proposition 1(d); proof: Online Supplement, pp. 2–4 (PDF 34–36)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.