Proposition 8.3 (Talluri): when both firms are in Case I, or both in Case II, the one-period MNL offer-set duopoly game has a pure-strategy equilibrium in complete offer sets
ProvedRevenueManagement.mnl_offer_set_equilibriumdiscrete-choiceduopolynash-equilibriumoffer-setsoperations-researchrevenue-management
Two firms with MNL fare products (positive weights, prices decreasing in the product index) and a no-purchase weight compete in one period of the dynamic game (8.31): firm 1 offering its first products against firm 2's first earns , with , and firm 2 symmetrically. If both firms are in Case I () or both in Case II ( on every complete set), there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in complete offer sets. The mixed case can fail (Example 8.18).
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_competition
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem mnl_offer_set_equilibrium (A B : OfferFirm) (w0 : ℝ) (hw0 : 0 < w0) (hA : A.IsModel)
(hB : B.IsModel) (hcase : (A.CaseI w0 ∧ B.CaseI w0) ∨ (A.CaseII w0 ∧ B.CaseII w0)) :
∃ k l, IsOfferEquilibrium A B w0 k l := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, p. 399, Proposition 8.3 ('When both firms are in Case I, or both are in Case II, there exists an equilibrium in offer sets'), proof in Appendix 8.A pp. 404-405, from Talluri [503]
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.