Lemma 5, PDF p. 16 — in {AB,C}, L^(AB) = r(2α+s₁)/(1−α) on Ω^(AB)_1 and rα/k on Ω^(AB)_2
ProvedEndogMerger.SymLoyal.lemma_5capacityloyal-customersmergerp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-competition
Consider the mixed merger structure with , and , and let , , be the Table A1 lower bound of price support, merged-entity profit and firm profit.
- If , i.e. , then
- If , i.e. , then
The lemma resolves the maximum in Table A1's mixed-merger column, telling which entity is more pricing aggressive; the proof of Proposition 3 uses it for every comparison involving firm .
Formalization Note The hypotheses (the paper allows in the model but every region requires ) and (implicit: is the reservation value) are added. The Table A1 quantities are defined from the table itself, not from these closed forms.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Setting import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Regions
Formal statement
namespace EndogMerger.SymLoyal
theorem lemma_5 (α k r : ℝ) (hα0 : 0 < α) (hα3 : α < 1 / 3) (hαk : α < k)
(hk : k < 1 - 2 * α) (hr : 0 < r) :
(OmegaAB₁ α k →
LAB α k r = r * (2 * α + s1 α k) / (1 - α) ∧
piAB α k r = r * (2 * α + s1 α k) ∧
piABC α k r = r * (2 * α + s1 α k) * k / (1 - α)) ∧
(OmegaAB₂ α k →
LAB α k r = r * α / k ∧
piAB α k r = r * α * (1 - α) / k ∧
piABC α k r = r * α) := by sorry
end EndogMerger.SymLoyal
Source
Wang, Wu, Tang & Dai, Endogenous merger decisions among competitors: impact of limited capacity and loyal segments, Management Science (2024), accepted manuscript, PDF p. 16, Lemma 5 and footnote 14; proof PDF p. 47
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.