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Theorem 2 — faces along an increasing chain meet; regular implies complete

Proved
CoresConvexGames.Stability.chain_faces_inter_nonempty

by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperative-gamecorep2o-batch-p100ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} be a finite set of players and v:2N→Rv:2^N\to\mathbb Rv:2N→R a game, i.e. a set function with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0. For a payoff vector a∈RNa\in\mathbb R^Na∈RN and a coalition S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N write a(S)=∑i∈Saia(S)=\sum_{i\in S}a_ia(S)=∑i∈S​ai​. The core CCC is the set of payoff vectors aaa with a(N)=v(N)a(N)=v(N)a(N)=v(N) and a(S)≥v(S)a(S)\ge v(S)a(S)≥v(S) for all S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N; for ∅≠S⊆N\emptyset\ne S\subseteq N∅=S⊆N the face CSC_SCS​ is {a∈C:a(S)=v(S)}\{a\in C: a(S)=v(S)\}{a∈C:a(S)=v(S)}, and C∅=CC_\emptyset=CC∅​=C. Suppose the core configuration {CS}\{C_S\}{CS​} is regular. Then for any strictly increasing sequence of coalitions S1⊊S2⊊⋯⊊SmS_1\subsetneq S_2\subsetneq\cdots\subsetneq S_mS1​⊊S2​⊊⋯⊊Sm​ (m≥1m\ge1m≥1),

CS1∩CS2∩⋯∩CSm≠∅.C_{S_1}\cap C_{S_2}\cap\cdots\cap C_{S_m}\ne\emptyset .CS1​​∩CS2​​∩⋯∩CSm​​=∅.

In particular (take m=1m=1m=1), a regular core configuration is complete: every face CSC_SCS​ is nonempty.

This is the basic geometric consequence of regularity. It is what places the marginal vectors in the core and supplies the core points on prescribed hyperplanes used in the proofs of Theorems 3, 5 and 8.

Formalization Note Players are Fin n (a relabelling of Shapley's arbitrary finite NNN), a game is f : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ, and the core is the published Supermodularity.Cooperative.Core Finset.univ f. A sequence of length m≥1m\ge1m≥1 is a map Fin (m + 1) → Finset (Fin n), and "increasing" is StrictMono (strict inclusion). The "in particular" clause is stated as a second conjunct. The standing game assumption v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0 is a hypothesis.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CoresConvexGames_Stability_CoreFace
import Definitions.Def_CoresConvexGames_Stability_IsCompleteConfiguration
import Definitions.Def_CoresConvexGames_Stability_IsRegularConfiguration
Formal statement
namespace CoresConvexGames.Stability

/-- Shapley (1971), p. 18, Theorem 2: in a regular core configuration, the faces along any
strictly increasing sequence `S_1 ⊂ S_2 ⊂ ⋯ ⊂ S_m` (`m ≥ 1`) of coalitions have a common
point; in particular (`m = 1`) a regular core configuration is complete. -/
theorem chain_faces_inter_nonempty {n : ℕ} (f : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ) (hf0 : f ∅ = 0)
    (hreg : IsRegularConfiguration f) :
    (∀ (m : ℕ) (S : Fin (m + 1) → Finset (Fin n)), StrictMono S →
      (⋂ k, CoreFace f (S k)).Nonempty) ∧
    IsCompleteConfiguration f := by sorry

end CoresConvexGames.Stability
Source
Shapley, Cores of Convex Games, Int. J. Game Theory 1, 1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753431, p. 18, §3.2, Theorem 2, equation (15)
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Fix n∈Nn \in \mathbb{N}n∈N, N={0,…,n−1}N = \{0, \dots, n-1\}N={0,…,n−1} and a game fff (real-valued on subsets of NNN). For S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N, let CSC_SCS​ be the set of x∈Rnx \in \mathbb{R}^nx∈Rn such that:

  • x∈Core⁡(N,f)x \in \operatorname{Core}(N, f)x∈Core(N,f), an external definition whose body is not shown; and
  • if S≠∅S \neq \emptysetS=∅, then ∑i∈Sxi=f(S)\sum_{i \in S} x_i = f(S)∑i∈S​xi​=f(S).

The configuration is regular when CN≠∅C_N \neq \emptysetCN​=∅ and CS∩CT⊆CS∪T∩CS∩TC_S \cap C_T \subseteq C_{S \cup T} \cap C_{S \cap T}CS​∩CT​⊆CS∪T​∩CS∩T​ for all S,T⊆NS, T \subseteq NS,T⊆N.

Hypotheses.

  • f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0.
  • The configuration of fff is regular.

Conclusion. Both of the following hold.

  1. For every m∈Nm \in \mathbb{N}m∈N and every sequence of m+1m+1m+1 coalitions that is strictly increasing under inclusion,
S0⊊S1⊊⋯⊊Sm⊆N,S_0 \subsetneq S_1 \subsetneq \dots \subsetneq S_m \subseteq N,S0​⊊S1​⊊⋯⊊Sm​⊆N,

the faces have a common point:

⋂k=0mCSk≠∅.\bigcap_{k=0}^{m} C_{S_k} \neq \emptyset.k=0⋂m​CSk​​=∅.
  1. The configuration is complete: CS≠∅C_S \neq \emptysetCS​=∅ for every S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N, including S=∅S = \emptysetS=∅.

A strictly increasing sequence can have at most n+1n+1n+1 terms, so for large mmm part 1 is vacuous. The chain may start at S0=∅S_0 = \emptysetS0​=∅, whose face is the whole core.

Degenerate cases: for m=0m = 0m=0, part 1 says that each single face CS0C_{S_0}CS0​​ is nonempty. When n=0n = 0n=0 the only coalition is ∅\emptyset∅, and both parts reduce to Core⁡(∅,f)≠∅\operatorname{Core}(\emptyset, f) \neq \emptysetCore(∅,f)=∅. That is already part of the regularity hypothesis, since CN=C∅C_N = C_\emptysetCN​=C∅​ when n=0n = 0n=0.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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