Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Theorem 19, p. 12 — a revenue-optimal truthful mechanism exists (RM≥RA\mathcal R^{\mathcal M} \ge \mathcal R^{\mathcal A}RM≥RA)

Proved
CHMSPricing.UnitDemand.optimal_mechanism_exists

by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

mechanism-designmyersonp2o-batch-pfp1bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue

Consider a single-parameter instance with independent regular values vi∼Fiv_i \sim F_ivi​∼Fi​ and a set system J\mathcal JJ. There is a truthful mechanism M\mathcal MM (Myerson's mechanism) such that

RM≥RAfor every truthful mechanism A.\mathcal R^{\mathcal M} \ge \mathcal R^{\mathcal A} \quad\text{for every truthful mechanism } \mathcal A.RM≥RAfor every truthful mechanism A.

The construction of the prices in Theorem 13 starts from the service probabilities qiMq^{\mathcal M}_iqiM​ of this optimal mechanism, so its existence is what allows one set of prices to serve as a benchmark for all truthful mechanisms at once.

Formalization Note The statement is the existence content of Theorem 19: Myerson's mechanism is not constructed (pin P4). It is stated for regular distributions, the case used by the body of the paper (pin P2); the paper's theorem also covers non-regular distributions through ironing.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CHMSPricing_UnitDemand_Mechanism
Formal statement
namespace CHMSPricing.UnitDemand

/-- Theorem 19, p. 12 (existence form, pin P4): with regular distributions there is a truthful
mechanism (Myerson's) whose expected revenue `ℛ^ℳ` is at least `ℛ^𝒜` for every truthful
mechanism `𝒜`. -/
theorem optimal_mechanism_exists {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    (D : ι → ValueDist) (hreg : ∀ i, (D i).Regular) (𝒥 : SetSystem ι) :
    ∃ Mstar : Mechanism ι, IsTruthful D 𝒥 Mstar ∧
      ∀ A : Mechanism ι, IsTruthful D 𝒥 A → revenue D A ≤ revenue D Mstar := by sorry

end CHMSPricing.UnitDemand
Source
Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, p. 12, Theorem 19, App. A
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me