Proof of Proposition 2, p. A.1 — M2's monopoly investment T^m_2 = 1/(16k2 − 1) lies below T̂2(0|β): no monopoly
ProvedCrossLicensing.Innovation.monopoly_infeasiblecross-licensinginnovationmonopolyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let and . Consider manufacturer 2's payoff as a monopolist when , namely its monopoly gross profit (Lemma 1 at ) minus its investment . Then is nonnegative and is the unique maximizer of
and it lies strictly below the duopoly boundary:
Since Lemma 1 requires for the supplier to choose a monopoly, manufacturer 2's own monopoly optimum never reaches the monopoly region: this is the paper's argument that a monopoly is not an equilibrium outcome.
Formalization Note The paper argues at only, as stated here; the claim for every profile is part of the goal theorem (every innovation equilibrium is a duopoly).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CrossLicensing_Innovation_ClosedForms
Formal statement
namespace CrossLicensing.Innovation
theorem monopoly_infeasible (β k2 : ℝ) (hk2 : 49 / 144 < k2) (hβ0 : 0 ≤ β)
(hβ : β < Real.sqrt 3 - 1) :
0 ≤ 1 / (16 * k2 - 1) ∧
(∀ T2 : ℝ, 0 ≤ T2 → T2 ≠ 1 / (16 * k2 - 1) →
(T2 + 1) ^ 2 / 16 - k2 * T2 ^ 2 <
(1 / (16 * k2 - 1) + 1) ^ 2 / 16 - k2 * (1 / (16 * k2 - 1)) ^ 2) ∧
1 / (16 * k2 - 1) < That2 β 0 := by sorry
end CrossLicensing.Innovation
Source
Wang, Huang, Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, SSRN 3053682 (version of 2023-04-27), proof of Proposition 2, p. A.1 (PDF 33)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.