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Theorem 5.2 — exact second-price ROI pacing equilibria are FIXP-complete for every rational δ>0\delta>0δ>0

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FixpReciprocal.Supplement.theorem_5_2

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionsautobiddingcomputational-complexityfixpp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Fix a rational δ>0\delta>0δ>0. An instance consists of integers n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and m≥1m\ge1m≥1 and binary-encoded nonnegative rational values v=(vℓ,s)ℓ∈[n],s∈[m]v=(v_{\ell,s})_{\ell\in[n],s\in[m]}v=(vℓ,s​)ℓ∈[n],s∈[m]​ with max⁡ℓ∈[n]vℓ,s>0\max_{\ell\in[n]}v_{\ell,s}>0maxℓ∈[n]​vℓ,s​>0 for every item sss. Bidder ℓ\ellℓ bids αℓvℓ,s\alpha_\ell v_{\ell,s}αℓ​vℓ,s​ on item sss; hs(α)h_s(\alpha)hs​(α) is the highest bid and ps(α)p_s(\alpha)ps​(α) the second-highest bid on sss, counting tied bids separately. A pair (α,z)∈[1,1+δ]n×[0,1]n×m(\alpha,z)\in[1,1+\delta]^n\times[0,1]^{n\times m}(α,z)∈[1,1+δ]n×[0,1]n×m is a second-price ROI pacing equilibrium (Definition 5.1) if for all ℓ\ellℓ and sss

  1. ∑ℓ=1nzℓ,s=1\sum_{\ell=1}^n z_{\ell,s}=1∑ℓ=1n​zℓ,s​=1;
  2. zℓ,s>0  ⟹  αℓvℓ,s=hs(α)z_{\ell,s}>0\implies\alpha_\ell v_{\ell,s}=h_s(\alpha)zℓ,s​>0⟹αℓ​vℓ,s​=hs​(α);
  3. ∑s=1mzℓ,sps(α)≤∑s=1mzℓ,svℓ,s\sum_{s=1}^m z_{\ell,s}p_s(\alpha)\le\sum_{s=1}^m z_{\ell,s}v_{\ell,s}∑s=1m​zℓ,s​ps​(α)≤∑s=1m​zℓ,s​vℓ,s​;
  4. ∑s=1mzℓ,sps(α)<∑s=1mzℓ,svℓ,s  ⟹  αℓ=1+δ\sum_{s=1}^m z_{\ell,s}p_s(\alpha)<\sum_{s=1}^m z_{\ell,s}v_{\ell,s}\implies\alpha_\ell=1+\delta∑s=1m​zℓ,s​ps​(α)<∑s=1m​zℓ,s​vℓ,s​⟹αℓ​=1+δ.

Theorem. For every fixed rational δ>0\delta>0δ>0, the search problem of finding an exact second-price ROI pacing equilibrium (α,z)(\alpha,z)(α,z) of such an instance is

FIXP-complete:it lies in FIXP, and every problem in FIXP SL-reduces to it.\text{FIXP-complete:}\quad\text{it lies in FIXP, and every problem in FIXP SL-reduces to it.}FIXP-complete:it lies in FIXP, and every problem in FIXP SL-reduces to it.

This settles the exact complexity of ROI pacing equilibria in second-price auctions, which were known to lie in FIXP.

Formalization Note The problem is the published roiPacingProblemOn (1 + δ) restricted to the instance class ShimizuPacing; FIXP, SL-reductions and completeness are the mission's FIXPComplete.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: bidders ℓ ∈ [n], items s ∈ [m], values v_{ℓ,s} → PacingData with Fin nb, Fin ng (0-based) and one row of rational values per bidder; WellFormed gives nb rows of ng nonnegative entries; reason: Lean indexing; the same instances
  • encoding: solution pair (α, z) ∈ [1, 1+δ]^n × [0,1]^{n×m} → one real vector y of dimension n + n·m, α = first n coordinates, z_{ℓ,s} = coordinate n + ℓ·m + s (pacingAlphaOf, pacingShareOf); reason: RealSearch solutions are single vectors; the published problem fixes this layout
  • encoding: (7): Σ_ℓ z_{ℓ,s} = 1 for every item s → ValidAllocOn: Σ_ℓ z_{ℓ,s} = 1 whenever some bid on s is positive; reason: on these instances α_ℓ ≥ 1 and max_ℓ v_{ℓ,s} > 0, so every item has a positive bid and the two conditions coincide
  • encoding: (8): z_{ℓ,s} > 0 ⟹ α_ℓ v_{ℓ,s} = h_s(α) → z_{ℓ,s} > 0 ⟹ every bid on s is at most α_ℓ v_{ℓ,s}; reason: h_s is the highest bid, so both say the bid of ℓ is the maximum
  • encoding: price p_s(α): the second-highest bid, counting tied bids separately → secondPrice: entry 1 (0-based) of the bids sorted in nonincreasing order with repetitions; reason: the same number; it exists since n ≥ 2
  • encoding: for every fixed rational δ > 0 → δ : ℚ with 0 < δ quantified outside FIXPComplete; the cap of the published problem is A = 1 + δ; reason: δ is a parameter of the problem, not instance data, so machines may depend on it, as for τ in the mission's goal
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FixpReciprocal_FIXPComplete
import Definitions.Def_ExactAutobid_Equilibria_ROIPacing
import Definitions.Def_FixpReciprocal_Supplement_Classes
Formal statement
namespace FixpReciprocal.Supplement

open ExactAutobid.Equilibria

/-- **Theorem 5.2 (ROI-constrained pacing).** For every fixed rational `δ > 0`, the following search
problem is FIXP-complete: given integers `n ≥ 2`, `m ≥ 1` and binary-encoded nonnegative rational
values `v` with `max_ℓ v_{ℓ,s} > 0` for every item `s`, find an exact second-price ROI pacing
equilibrium `(α, z) ∈ [1, 1 + δ]^n × [0, 1]^{n×m}` (Definition 5.1).

Shimizu, *FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions*, STOC 2027
submission (sha256 ffcad4a7…), Theorem 5.2, p.17; Definition 5.1, pp.16–17.

**Formalization Note.** The problem is the published `roiPacingProblemOn` with cap `A = 1 + δ`,
restricted to `ShimizuPacing`; a solution is the vector `(α, z)` of dimension `n + n m`. On these
instances every item has a positive bid, so the published "shares sum to one if some bid is positive"
is (7); "a positive share only for a highest bidder" is (8); `secondPrice` (second entry of the bids
sorted with repetitions) is `p_s`; `ROICondOn` with cap `1 + δ` is (9)–(10). `δ` is a parameter of the
problem, so machines may depend on it. -/
theorem theorem_5_2 (δ : ℚ) (hδ : 0 < δ) :
    FIXPComplete (roiPacingProblemOn (1 + δ) ShimizuPacing) := by sorry

end FixpReciprocal.Supplement
Source
Shimizu, FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions (STOC 2027 submission, sha256 ffcad4a7…), Theorem 5.2, p.17 (PDF p.19); §5.1 and Definition 5.1, pp.16–17 (PDF pp.18–19), (7)–(10)

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