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The newsvendor game of Chapter 14: profits of retailer, supplier and chain, and the wholesale price, buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts

Definition
SupplyChainTheory_contracts

by naimengye · Sep 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

contractsgame-theorynewsvendoroperations-researchsupply-chain

The single-period newsvendor game of Chapter 14 of Snyder and Shen, in which a supplier sets the terms of a contract and a retailer then chooses an order quantity QQQ.

Data (Sect. 14.3). A ContractData carries the retail price rrr, the supplier's and retailer's per-unit costs cs,crc_s, c_rcs​,cr​, their loss-of-goodwill costs ps,prp_s, p_rps​,pr​ and the salvage value vvv, with v<crv < c_rv<cr​ and cs+cr<rc_s + c_r < rcs​+cr​<r and all costs nonnegative; c=cs+crc = c_s + c_rc=cs​+cr​ and p=ps+prp = p_s + p_rp=ps​+pr​. Demand is a probability law DDD on R\mathbb{R}R with mean μ\muμ (meanDemand).

Profits (Sect. 14.4). expSales D Q is S(Q)=E[min⁡{Q,D}]S(Q) = \mathbb{E}[\min\{Q, D\}]S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] (14.1) and expLeftover D Q is I(Q)=E[(Q−D)+]I(Q) = \mathbb{E}[(Q - D)^+]I(Q)=E[(Q−D)+] (14.3). For a transfer payment T(Q)T(Q)T(Q) from retailer to supplier, retailerProfit P D T Q is πr(Q)=(r−v+pr)S(Q)−(cr−v)Q−prμ−T(Q)\pi_r(Q) = (r - v + p_r)S(Q) - (c_r - v)Q - p_r\mu - T(Q)πr​(Q)=(r−v+pr​)S(Q)−(cr​−v)Q−pr​μ−T(Q) (14.5), supplierProfit P D T Q is πs(Q)=psS(Q)−csQ−psμ+T(Q)\pi_s(Q) = p_s S(Q) - c_s Q - p_s\mu + T(Q)πs​(Q)=ps​S(Q)−cs​Q−ps​μ+T(Q) (14.6), and chainProfit P D Q is their sum Π(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ\Pi(Q) = (r - v + p)S(Q) - (c - v)Q - p\muΠ(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ (14.7).

Contracts. The wholesale price contract has wholesaleTransfer w Q =wQ= wQ=wQ; wholesaleCoordPrice P is the price (14.13), wholesaleInducing P D Q is w(Q)w(Q)w(Q) of (14.14), the price that makes QQQ optimal for the retailer, and supplierInducedProfit P D Q is πs(Q,w(Q))\pi_s(Q, w(Q))πs​(Q,w(Q)) of (14.15). IGFR f D says the generalized failure rate Qf(Q)/Fˉ(Q)Q f(Q)/\bar F(Q)Qf(Q)/Fˉ(Q) of a density fff is nondecreasing on Q>0Q > 0Q>0. The buyback contract has buybackTransfer D w b Q =wQ−b I(Q)= wQ - b\,I(Q)=wQ−bI(Q), coordinating price buybackPrice P b =w(b)= w(b)=w(b) of (14.22), share buybackShare P b =λ= \lambda=λ of (14.25), and the credits buybackB1, buybackB2 of (14.29)-(14.30). The revenue sharing contract has revenueShareTransfer P D w φ Q of (14.33), price revenueSharePrice P φ of (14.34) and share revenueShareLambda P φ of (14.36). The quantity flexibility contract has quantityFlexTransfer P D w δ Q of (14.45), wQ−(w+cr−v)∫(1−δ)QQF(t) dtwQ - (w + c_r - v)\int_{(1-\delta)Q}^{Q} F(t)\,dtwQ−(w+cr​−v)∫(1−δ)QQ​F(t)dt, and price quantityFlexPrice P D Q0 δ of (14.46).

Formalization Note Demand is an arbitrary law on R\mathbb{R}R (the book's examples use normal demand), and optimal quantities are maximizers over all of R\mathbb{R}R; the theorems add the regularity each needs (finite mean, continuous distribution function, a density). The book's Fˉ(Q)\bar F(Q)Fˉ(Q) is written 1−F(Q)1 - F(Q)1−F(Q) with Mathlib's cdf.

Definition code
import Mathlib

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory

namespace SupplyChainTheory

/-- The data of the newsvendor game, Sect. 14.3 (Table 14.3): retail price `r`, per-unit costs
`cs` (supplier) and `cr` (retailer), loss-of-goodwill costs `ps`, `pr`, salvage value `v`, with
`v < cr` and `cs + cr < r`. -/
structure ContractData where
  r : ℝ
  cs : ℝ
  cr : ℝ
  ps : ℝ
  pr : ℝ
  v : ℝ
  cs_nonneg : 0 ≤ cs
  ps_nonneg : 0 ≤ ps
  pr_nonneg : 0 ≤ pr
  v_nonneg : 0 ≤ v
  v_lt_cr : v < cr
  profitable : cs + cr < r

namespace ContractData

/-- `c = cs + cr`. -/
def c (P : ContractData) : ℝ := P.cs + P.cr
/-- `p = ps + pr`. -/
def p (P : ContractData) : ℝ := P.ps + P.pr

end ContractData

/-- (14.1): expected sales `S(Q) = E[min{Q, D}]`. -/
noncomputable def expSales (D : Measure ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ := ∫ d, min Q d ∂D

/-- (14.3): expected leftover inventory `I(Q) = E[(Q − D)⁺]`. -/
noncomputable def expLeftover (D : Measure ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ := ∫ d, max (Q - d) 0 ∂D

/-- The mean demand `μ = E[D]`. -/
noncomputable def meanDemand (D : Measure ℝ) : ℝ := ∫ d, d ∂D

/-- (14.5): the retailer's expected profit under a transfer payment `T(Q)`. -/
noncomputable def retailerProfit (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (T : ℝ → ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (P.r - P.v + P.pr) * expSales D Q - (P.cr - P.v) * Q - P.pr * meanDemand D - T Q

/-- (14.6): the supplier's expected profit under a transfer payment `T(Q)`. -/
noncomputable def supplierProfit (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (T : ℝ → ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  P.ps * expSales D Q - P.cs * Q - P.ps * meanDemand D + T Q

/-- (14.7): the supply chain's total expected profit `Π(Q)`. -/
noncomputable def chainProfit (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (P.r - P.v + P.p) * expSales D Q - (P.c - P.v) * Q - P.p * meanDemand D

/-- The wholesale price contract, Sect. 14.5: `T_w(Q, w) = wQ`. -/
def wholesaleTransfer (w : ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ := w * Q

/-- (14.13): the wholesale price at which both players' optimal quantities equal `Q₀`. -/
noncomputable def wholesaleCoordPrice (P : ContractData) : ℝ :=
  P.cs - (P.c - P.v) / (P.r - P.v + P.p) * P.ps

/-- (14.14): `w(Q)`, the wholesale price that makes `Q` optimal for the retailer. -/
noncomputable def wholesaleInducing (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (P.r - P.v + P.pr) * (1 - cdf D Q) - (P.cr - P.v)

/-- (14.15): the supplier's profit `πₛ(Q, w(Q))` when she induces the order `Q`. -/
noncomputable def supplierInducedProfit (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  supplierProfit P D (wholesaleTransfer (wholesaleInducing P D Q)) Q

/-- Increasing generalized failure rate (Sect. 14.5): `Q f(Q) / F̄(Q)` is increasing on `Q > 0`. -/
def IGFR (f : ℝ → ℝ) (D : Measure ℝ) : Prop :=
  MonotoneOn (fun Q => Q * f Q / (1 - cdf D Q)) (Set.Ioi 0)

/-- The buyback contract, Sect. 14.6: `T_b(Q, w, b) = wQ − b I(Q)`. -/
noncomputable def buybackTransfer (D : Measure ℝ) (w b : ℝ) (Q : ℝ) : ℝ := w * Q - b * expLeftover D Q

/-- (14.22): `w(b)`, the coordinating wholesale price for buyback credit `b`. -/
noncomputable def buybackPrice (P : ContractData) (b : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  b + P.cs - (P.c - P.v) * (b + P.ps) / (P.r - P.v + P.p)

/-- (14.25): the retailer's share `λ = (r − v + pr − b) / (r − v + p)` under buyback. -/
noncomputable def buybackShare (P : ContractData) (b : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (P.r - P.v + P.pr - b) / (P.r - P.v + P.p)

/-- (14.29): the buyback credit `b₁` at which the retailer earns the entire profit. -/
noncomputable def buybackB1 (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (Q0 : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  P.r - P.v + P.pr - (P.r - P.v + P.p) * (chainProfit P D Q0 + meanDemand D * P.pr)
    / (chainProfit P D Q0 + meanDemand D * P.p)

/-- (14.30): the buyback credit `b₂` at which the supplier earns the entire profit. -/
noncomputable def buybackB2 (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (Q0 : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  P.r - P.v + P.pr - (P.r - P.v + P.p) * (meanDemand D * P.pr)
    / (chainProfit P D Q0 + meanDemand D * P.p)

/-- The revenue sharing contract, Sect. 14.7, (14.33): the retailer keeps a fraction `φ` of sales
and salvage revenue, `T_r(Q, w, φ) = (w + (1 − φ)v) Q + (1 − φ)(r − v) S(Q)`. -/
noncomputable def revenueShareTransfer (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (w phi : ℝ) (Q : ℝ) :
    ℝ :=
  (w + (1 - phi) * P.v) * Q + (1 - phi) * (P.r - P.v) * expSales D Q

/-- (14.34): `w(φ)`, the coordinating wholesale price for revenue fraction `φ`. -/
noncomputable def revenueSharePrice (P : ContractData) (phi : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  -P.cr + phi * P.v + (P.c - P.v) * (phi * (P.r - P.v) + P.pr) / (P.r - P.v + P.p)

/-- (14.36): the retailer's share `λ = (φ(r − v) + pr) / (r − v + p)` under revenue sharing. -/
noncomputable def revenueShareLambda (P : ContractData) (phi : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (phi * (P.r - P.v) + P.pr) / (P.r - P.v + P.p)

/-- The quantity flexibility contract, Sect. 14.8, (14.45):
`T_q(Q, w, δ) = wQ − (w + cr − v) ∫_{(1−δ)Q}^{Q} F(d) dd`. -/
noncomputable def quantityFlexTransfer (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (w delta : ℝ) (Q : ℝ) :
    ℝ :=
  w * Q - (w + P.cr - P.v) * ∫ t in (1 - delta) * Q..Q, cdf D t

/-- (14.46): `w(δ)`, the wholesale price making `Q₀` optimal for the retailer. -/
noncomputable def quantityFlexPrice (P : ContractData) (D : Measure ℝ) (Q0 delta : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (P.r - P.v + P.pr) * (1 - cdf D Q0)
      / ((1 - cdf D Q0) + (1 - delta) * cdf D ((1 - delta) * Q0))
    - P.cr + P.v
end SupplyChainTheory
Source
Lawrence V. Snyder and Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley 2019, DOI 10.1002/9781119584445, Sect. 14.3-14.4 pp. 565-568 (Table 14.3, Eq. 14.1-14.8), Sect. 14.5 pp. 568-571 (Eq. 14.9-14.15, IGFR), Sect. 14.6 pp. 574-577 (Eq. 14.18-14.30), Sect. 14.7 pp. 578-579 (Eq. 14.33-14.36), Sect. 14.8 pp. 581-582 (Eq. 14.44-14.46)

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