Lemma 2.6 (essential uniqueness) — all Nash flows have the same cost
ProvedSelfishRouting.Potential.lemma_2_6_cost_eqnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1selfish-routinguniqueness
Consider a routing instance with latency functions that are nonnegative, nondecreasing and continuous on , routes given by edge–route incidence columns, and positive rates . Write for the cost of a flow.
Lemma 2.6, second part. If and are flows at Nash equilibrium, then
Nash flows need not be unique, but their cost is; this is what makes the ratio of §2.5 independent of the choice of Nash flow.
Formalization Note Only the second sentence of Lemma 2.6 is formalized here; the first is lemma_2_6_existence. Routes are incidence columns, a generalization of simple paths; continuity and monotonicity are imposed on .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KellyStochasticNetworks_Wardrop import Definitions.Def_SelfishRouting_Potential_Model open KellyStochasticNetworks
Formal statement
namespace SelfishRouting.Potential
theorem lemma_2_6_cost_eq {J R Sd : ℕ} (A : Fin J → Fin R → ℝ) (s : Fin R → Fin Sd)
(rate : Fin Sd → ℝ) (ℓ : Fin J → ℝ → ℝ)
(hA : ∀ j r, A j r = 0 ∨ A j r = 1) (hrate : ∀ i, 0 < rate i)
(hℓnn : ∀ j t, 0 ≤ t → 0 ≤ ℓ j t)
(hℓmono : ∀ j, MonotoneOn (ℓ j) (Set.Ici 0))
(hℓcont : ∀ j, ContinuousOn (ℓ j) (Set.Ici 0))
(x x' : Fin R → ℝ) (hx : IsNashFlow A s ℓ rate x) (hx' : IsNashFlow A s ℓ rate x') :
SelfishRouting.Bicriteria.cost A ℓ x = SelfishRouting.Bicriteria.cost A ℓ x' := by sorry
end SelfishRouting.Potential
Source
Roughgarden & Tardos, How Bad is Selfish Routing?, J. ACM 49(2) (2002), author's manuscript of 5 Dec 2001, p. 9, Lemma 2.6 (second sentence)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.