Proposition A.9 — NoG ∩ (μ,γ)-HG, NoG ∩ γ-PG and NSG are pairwise ⟨·,·⟩_{μ,γ}-orthogonal
ProvedDecompGames.Duplication.proposition_A_9game-decompositionorthogonal-decompositionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1
Let be a finite set of players; player has a finite strategy set , and is the set of strategy profiles. A game is a vector of payoff functions ; is the space of games. For let be a strictly positive measure on , the product measure, , and let be a co-measure vector, a strictly positive function of .
Let be the inner product (2.15). The three classes , and are pairwise orthogonal:
- whenever is -normalized and -potential and is -normalized and -harmonic;
- whenever is -normalized and -potential and is nonstrategic;
- whenever is -normalized and -harmonic and is nonstrategic.
Together with Lemma A.11 this yields Theorem 2.11.
Differences from the source:
- generalization: standing assumptions n ≥ 2 players and |Sⁱ| ≥ 2 strategies for every player (p. 7) → any finite type of players ι and any finite strategy sets S i, of any size; reason: the result holds without these assumptions (with an empty Sⁱ the space of profiles is empty and every game is 0); every instance of the source is an instance of the Lean statement
- encoding: μⁱ a strictly positive finite measure on Sⁱ → μ i : S i → ℝ, the point masses, with 0 < μ i a for all a (IsMeasureVec); reason: a measure on a finite set is determined by its point masses; μⁱ(Sⁱ) is mass μ i = ∑ₐ μ i a
- encoding: γⁱ a co-measure, a strictly positive measure on S⁻ⁱ (Definition 2.1) → γ i : (∀ j, S j) → ℝ positive with γ i (Function.update s i a) = γ i s (IsCoMeasureVec); reason: functions on S⁻ⁱ are exactly the functions on S that do not depend on the coordinate sⁱ
- encoding: statements over s⁻ⁱ ∈ S⁻ⁱ and profiles (tⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) → statements over full profiles s : ∀ j, S j, with (tⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) written Function.update s i tⁱ; reason: the coordinate sⁱ of s is overwritten, so the quantifier ranges over the same subprofiles
- encoding: g nonstrategic: for each i there is ℓⁱ : S⁻ⁱ → ℝ with gⁱ(sⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) = ℓⁱ(s⁻ⁱ) (2.4) → gⁱ(Function.update s i a) = gⁱ(s) for all i, s, a (IsNonstrategic); reason: a function on S is of the form ℓⁱ(s⁻ⁱ) exactly when it does not depend on sⁱ
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DecompGames_Duplication_Operators
Formal statement
namespace DecompGames.Duplication
open Finset
/-- Proposition A.9, p. 31: `NoG ∩ (μ, γ)-HG`, `NoG ∩ γ-PG` and `NSG` are pairwise orthogonal for
`⟨·,·⟩_{μ,γ}` (2.15). -/
theorem proposition_A_9 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S : ι → Type}
[∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
(μ : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (hμ : IsMeasureVec μ)
(γ : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (hγ : IsCoMeasureVec γ) :
(∀ p h : Game ι S, IsNormalized μ p → IsPotential γ p →
IsNormalized μ h → IsHarmonic μ γ h → ipGame μ γ p h = 0) ∧
(∀ p n : Game ι S, IsNormalized μ p → IsPotential γ p →
IsNonstrategic n → ipGame μ γ p n = 0) ∧
(∀ h n : Game ι S, IsNormalized μ h → IsHarmonic μ γ h →
IsNonstrategic n → ipGame μ γ h n = 0) := by sorry
end DecompGames.Duplication
Source
Abdou, Pnevmatikos, Scarsini & Venel, Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations, arXiv:1901.06048v2, p. 31, Proposition A.9
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.