Lemma OA2(i), oa5 (PDF 37) — with N ≤ M − 1 and at least N + 1 contractors tied at the lowest initial effort, some SPE has everyone exert q̲/N in every period
ProvedAssemblyCoord.Feedback.lemma_OA2_iConsider the -contractor, -period coordination game with information feedback, under the standing assumptions, started from an arbitrary initial effort vector . Suppose that
- , and
- at least contractors share the lowest initial effort level: there is a set of contractors with and for all and all .
Then there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium along whose path every contractor exerts the minimum per-period effort in every period:
This is the existence half of Proposition 2(i): it supplies an SPE with the all-minimum outcome, which is then shown to be secure.
Formalization Note. The hypothesis is the lemma's prose ("at least contractors have equal lowest initial effort level"), not the display (26), which prints all levels equal; the prose is the weaker hypothesis. "All contractors exert at the lower boundary in each period is an SPE strategy" is read as "some SPE has this path": the profile that plays after every history is not an SPE when , since a contractor left strictly behind with one period to go gains by catching up. is written P.N + 1 ≤ P.M.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AssemblyCoord_Feedback_Model
namespace AssemblyCoord.Feedback
theorem lemma_OA2_i (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (hN : P.N + 1 ≤ P.M)
(q0 : Fin P.M → ℝ)
(htie : ∃ S : Finset (Fin P.M), P.N + 1 ≤ S.card ∧ ∀ i ∈ S, ∀ j, q0 i ≤ q0 j) :
∃ σ : Profile P.M, P.IsSPE q0 σ ∧
∀ n, n < P.N → ∀ i : Fin P.M, σ i (pathHist σ n) = P.qlo / P.N := by sorry
end AssemblyCoord.Feedback
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.