Theorem 3 (Market-Maker Pareto Improvement) (corrected: , , )
ProvedMarketMakerAds.theorem_3A seller sells identical units. On a probability space the market outcome is a random list of nonnegative unit values: a random number of units demanded, with values that may be correlated, and a buyer of demand counted as units. Without the contract, the highest units win the -th price auction and pay the clearing price , the -th highest unit value. Every buyer evaluates the auction with the law of . The seller offers the Market-Maker contract at
computed from , with (mean-variance), resp. (CARA). A unit of value buys the contract if and (ties to the contract). The other units go to the -th price auction for the remaining units, where is the number of contract units. Let be the top of the support of with no atom there: almost surely, for every , and . Then:
- Each buyer's utility remains the same. A unit that buys the contract gets . The buyers are exactly the units with . In every outcome the sum of the buyers' utilities with the contract equals the sum without it.
- Efficiency remains optimal. Almost surely, , the auction clearing price with the contract equals , and the allocated value with the contract equals the sum of the highest unit values. No choice of at most units has a larger total value than .
- Revenue strictly increases. If (resp. ), and , then .
- Welfare strictly increases. Under the hypotheses of 3, if the buyers' utility sum without the contract is integrable, then , where welfare is the buyers' utilities plus the revenue.
Here and , with the clearing price of the second-stage auction, are computed from the two outcomes.
Offering the contract at is thus a Pareto improvement: buyers keep their utility, the allocation stays efficient, and the seller gains the markup on every contract unit.
Differences from the source:
- correction: → for the strict revenue and welfare clauses; reason: at , ; with , one buyer of value and one of value , and .
- correction: no hypothesis on the joint law of and → ; reason: the model allows correlated values and a random number of buyers; with , , and two equally likely scenarios (values , , or two i.i.d. values), has a density, , and . Independence of and is a special case.
- correction: no hypothesis on → ; reason: with and two buyers with i.i.d. values, and almost surely, so revenue is unchanged.
- generalization: the clearing price has a density → only no atom at , the top of the support of ; reason: a density has no atoms; without this, more than buyers can choose the contract (Remark 1).
- reading: a buyer "opts for" the contract → and , ties to the contract, every other buyer receives even when negative; reason: p.10 (utility comparison), p.18 (indifferent buyers opt for the contract), eq. (2) (no purchase below ), and Step 1 of p.11 (the clearing price is the -th value of all buyers); p.14's remark that an agent with negative utility does not participate is not built in, and it would not change any buyer's utility, since contract buyers have there.
- reading: the market → a random list of nonnegative unit values, its -th highest entry ( if at most units are demanded), ; reason: Assumption 2 (p.11) puts everything on a per-unit basis; values are nonnegative because the paper's clearing prices live on (pp.30–31).
- reading: the market with the contract → contract units first, then the -th price auction on the other units; efficiency = allocated value, "optimal" = no units have a larger total, welfare = buyers' utilities plus revenue; reason: proof of Theorem 3 (pp.18–19) and §3.4 (p.13).
- encoding: → ; reason: is undefined at .
- encoding: welfare compared in expectation → the buyers' utility sum without the contract is integrable; reason: the welfare comparison is between finite expectations.
- encoding: → natural-number subtraction cast to ; reason: the theorem proves almost surely, where it is the real difference.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketMakerAds_Market open MeasureTheory
namespace MarketMakerAds
/-- **Theorem 3 (Market-Maker Pareto Improvement), p.18 (corrected: β > 0, Cov(ℓ, c) ≤ 0,
E[ℓ] > 0).**
Cohen, Désir, Korula, Sivan, *Best of Both Worlds Ad Contracts*, SSRN 3088600, Theorem 3, p.18
(proof pp.18–19): "When offering the Market-Maker contract at price p*_M, both the seller's revenue
and the welfare strictly increase. Moreover, the efficiency remains optimal and each buyer's
utility remains the same."
The seller sells `I` units; the market outcome `ω` is a random list of nonnegative unit values
(`Market`), `c` is the `(I+1)`-th highest unit value with law `g`, and every buyer evaluates the
auction with `g`. The contract is offered at `p = p*_M = pStar m g`. Assume `β ≥ 0`, resp. `α > 0`,
and that `p_max` is the top of the support of `c` (`c ≤ p_max` a.s., `P(c > v) > 0` for all
`v < p_max`) with no atom at `p_max`. Then:
1. **each buyer's utility remains the same**: a unit that buys the contract gets
`U_buy(v, p) = U_A(v)`, the buyers are exactly those with `v ≥ max(p_max, p)`, and the sum of the
buyers' utilities is unchanged in every outcome;
2. **efficiency remains optimal**, almost surely: at most `I` units buy the contract, the auction
clearing price is unchanged, the allocated value is unchanged, and no `I` units have a larger
total value;
3. **revenue strictly increases**, `E[R₀] < E[R₁]`, if `β > 0` (resp. `α > 0`), `E[ℓ] > 0` and
`E[ℓ c] ≤ E[ℓ] E[c]`, where `ℓ` is the number of contract units;
4. **welfare strictly increases**, `E[W₀] < E[W₁]`, under the hypotheses of 3 and integrability of
the buyers' utility sum.
**Formalization Note** Corrections: with `β = 0`, `p*_M = µ_A` and revenue does not strictly
increase; with `E[ℓ] = 0` nobody buys; with `ℓ` positively correlated with `c` revenue can fall
(the model allows correlated values and a random number of buyers). Independence of `ℓ` and `c` is
a special case of `E[ℓ c] ≤ E[ℓ] E[c]`. The paper's density for `c` is replaced by "no atom at
`p_max`". -/
theorem theorem_3 {Ω : Type*} [MeasurableSpace Ω] (P : Measure Ω) [IsProbabilityMeasure P]
(M : Market Ω) (m : RiskModel) (hm : m.IsAdmissible) (pmax : ℝ)
(h_le : ∀ᵐ ω ∂P, M.c ω ≤ pmax) (h_top : ∀ v < pmax, 0 < P {ω | v < M.c ω})
(h_atom : P {ω | M.c ω = pmax} = 0) :
-- 1. each buyer's utility remains the same
((∀ v : ℝ, buysMM m (M.priceLaw P) (M.mmPrice m P) v →
Ubuy m v (M.mmPrice m P) = UA m (M.priceLaw P) v) ∧
(∀ v : ℝ, buysMM m (M.priceLaw P) (M.mmPrice m P) v ↔ max pmax (M.mmPrice m P) ≤ v) ∧
(∀ ω, M.util1 m P ω = M.util0 m P ω)) ∧
-- 2. efficiency remains optimal
(∀ᵐ ω ∂P, M.nMM m P ω ≤ M.I ∧ M.c1 m P ω = M.c ω ∧ M.eff1 m P ω = M.eff0 ω ∧
∀ s : List ℝ, s.Sublist (M.units ω) → s.length ≤ M.I → s.sum ≤ M.eff0 ω) ∧
-- 3. revenue strictly increases
(m.IsPositive → 0 < ∫ ω, (M.nMM m P ω : ℝ) ∂P →
∫ ω, (M.nMM m P ω : ℝ) * M.c ω ∂P ≤ (∫ ω, (M.nMM m P ω : ℝ) ∂P) * ∫ ω, M.c ω ∂P →
∫ ω, M.rev0 ω ∂P < ∫ ω, M.rev1 m P ω ∂P) ∧
-- 4. welfare strictly increases
(m.IsPositive → 0 < ∫ ω, (M.nMM m P ω : ℝ) ∂P →
∫ ω, (M.nMM m P ω : ℝ) * M.c ω ∂P ≤ (∫ ω, (M.nMM m P ω : ℝ) ∂P) * ∫ ω, M.c ω ∂P →
Integrable (M.util0 m P) P →
∫ ω, M.welfare0 m P ω ∂P < ∫ ω, M.welfare1 m P ω ∂P) := by sorry
end MarketMakerAds
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.