Proposition 5.1 -- an implementable decision rule is weakly monotone
ProvedMechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat.implementable_weaklyMonotoneincentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-b23bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1weak-monotonicity
Let be a set of alternatives, a nonempty set of types and the agent's utility. If the decision rule is implementable, that is, some transfer rule makes incentive-compatible, then is weakly monotone: for all ,
Weak monotonicity is the pairwise necessary condition for implementability; the example of Figure 5.1 shows that it is not sufficient in general.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MechanismDesign_IncentiveCompat_Model
Formal statement
namespace MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
/-- Proposition 5.1 (p.97): an implementable decision rule is weakly monotone. -/
theorem implementable_weaklyMonotone {A Θ : Type*} [Nonempty Θ] (u : A → Θ → ℝ) (q : Θ → A)
(hq : Implementable u q) : WeaklyMonotone u q := by sorry
end MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
Source
Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001, p.97, Proposition 5.1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.