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Note [28]: high singlet fidelity implies small key leakage

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QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P87.note28_key_leakage

by Gohan · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

prove2quantum

There are constants C>0C>0C>0 and k0>0k_0>0k0​>0, independent of the key length, state, measurement, and reference dimension, with the following property. For R≥1R\ge1R≥1 and real k≥k0k\ge k_0k≥k0​, let ρABE\rho_{ABE}ρABE​ be any normalized joint state with ABABAB squared overlap with RRR singlets greater than 1−2−k1-2^{-k}1−2−k. Alice and Bob generate a key along any common axis, and Eve may perform any delayed generalized measurement. For Alice's key KKK and Eve's outcome YYY,

I(K:Y)≤2−k(2R+k+1ln⁡2)+C2−2k.I(K:Y)\le2^{-k}\left(2R+k+\frac1{\ln2}\right)+C2^{-2k}.I(K:Y)≤2−k(2R+k+ln21​)+C2−2k.

The leading term equals 2−c2^{-c}2−c for c=k−log⁡2(2R+k+1/ln⁡2)c=k-\log_2(2R+k+1/\ln2)c=k−log2​(2R+k+1/ln2). This is accessible classical information; its dependence on RRR is retained.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_QAlgorithms_Papers_Independent_Intakenext100_P87
Formal statement
noncomputable section

namespace QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P87

open scoped Matrix ComplexConjugate

open QAlgorithms.Measurements

/-- PDF pp.14--15, note [28]: uniform large-k expansion. The main term is exactly
2^(-c), c = k - log2(2R+k+1/ln 2); it retains dependence on the key length R.
All reference dimensions and delayed Eve measurements are unrestricted. -/
theorem note28_key_leakage :
    ∃ C : ℝ, 0 < C ∧ ∃ k0 : ℝ, 0 < k0 ∧
      ∀ (R : ℕ), 0 < R → ∀ (k : ℝ), k0 ≤ k →
      ∀ {E Y : Type} [Fintype E] [DecidableEq E] [MeasurableSpace Y]
        (rho : Matrix (PairRegister R × E) (PairRegister R × E) ℂ),
      IsDensityMatrix rho →
      1 - (2 : ℝ) ^ (-k) < singletOverlap (traceRight rho) →
      ∀ (U : Matrix.unitaryGroup Bool ℂ) (Q : OperatorPOVM E Y),
      keyLeakage rho U Q ≤ ENNReal.ofReal
        ((2 : ℝ) ^ (-k) * (2 * R + k + 1 / Real.log 2) + C * (2 : ℝ) ^ (-2 * k)) := by sorry

end QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P87

end
Source
Unconditional Security Of Quantum Key Distribution Over Arbitrarily Long Distances, arXiv:quant-ph/9803006v5, PDF p. 14, Note [28]: high singlet fidelity implies small key leakage
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6.1-sol

There exist real constants C>0C>0C>0 and k0>0k_0>0k0​>0 such that the following holds for every positive integer RRR, every real k≥k0k\geq k_0k≥k0​, every finite type EEE with decidable equality, every measurable space YYY, and every positive semidefinite trace-one matrix ρ\rhoρ indexed by ((BR×BR)×E)((\mathcal B_R\times\mathcal B_R)\times E)((BR​×BR​)×E), where BR\mathcal B_RBR​ is the set of Boolean strings of length RRR. Define σw,w′=∑eρ(w,e),(w′,e)\sigma_{w,w'}=\sum_e\rho_{(w,e),(w',e)}σw,w′​=∑e​ρ(w,e),(w′,e)​ and sR(u,v)=2−R/2(−1)∣{i:ui=true}∣s_R(u,v)=2^{-R/2}(-1)^{|\{i:u_i=\mathrm{true}\}|}sR​(u,v)=2−R/2(−1)∣{i:ui​=true}∣ when vi=¬uiv_i=\neg u_ivi​=¬ui​ for all iii, and zero otherwise. If 1−2−k<Re⁡tr⁡(sRsR†σ)1-2^{-k}<\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}(s_Rs_R^\dagger\sigma)1−2−k<Retr(sR​sR†​σ), then for every Boolean-indexed unitary UUU and every operator-valued measure QQQ on YYY acting on CE\mathbb C^ECE,

sup⁡m∈Ng:Y→{0,…,m−1} measurablemax⁡{0,I(pg)}≤max⁡ ⁣{0, 2−k ⁣(2R+k+1log⁡2)+C 2−2k}in [0,∞],\sup_{\substack{m\in\mathbb N\\g:Y\to\{0,\ldots,m-1\}\ \mathrm{measurable}}} \max\{0,I(p^g)\} \leq \max\!\left\{0,\, 2^{-k}\!\left(2R+k+\frac1{\log2}\right)+C\,2^{-2k} \right\} \quad\text{in }[0,\infty],m∈Ng:Y→{0,…,m−1} measurable​sup​max{0,I(pg)}≤max{0,2−k(2R+k+log21​)+C2−2k}in [0,∞],

where pa,jg=Re⁡tr⁡((ER,U,a⊗IBR⊗Q({y:g(y)=j}))ρ)p^g_{a,j}=\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}((E_{R,U,a}\otimes I_{\mathcal B_R}\otimes Q(\{y:g(y)=j\}))\rho)pa,jg​=Retr((ER,U,a​⊗IBR​​⊗Q({y:g(y)=j}))ρ), (ER,U,a)x,y=∏iUxi,aiUyi,ai‾(E_{R,U,a})_{x,y}=\prod_iU_{x_i,a_i}\overline{U_{y_i,a_i}}(ER,U,a​)x,y​=∏i​Uxi​,ai​​Uyi​,ai​​​, and I(p)=∑a,jpa,jlog⁡2(pa,j/((∑j′pa,j′)(∑a′pa′,j)))I(p)=\sum_{a,j}p_{a,j}\log_2(p_{a,j}/((\sum_{j'}p_{a,j'})(\sum_{a'}p_{a',j})))I(p)=∑a,j​pa,j​log2​(pa,j​/((∑j′​pa,j′​)(∑a′​pa′,j​))). The operator-valued measure has zero empty-set value, identity total value, positive semidefinite values on measurable sets, and countable additivity on disjoint measurable sets. The constants are chosen before all these data, kkk need not be an integer, log⁡\loglog in the bound is the natural logarithm, and zero denominators and logarithms at zero use the conventions u/0=0u/0=0u/0=0, log⁡20=0\log_2 0=0log2​0=0.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Gohan · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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