Proposition 4.13 — on , is increasing and is decreasing
ProvedImpulseGames.CostMonotonicity.xbar_monotoneConsider the linear two-player impulse game of Section 4.1 with discount rate , volatility , fixed and proportional intervention costs , , fixed and proportional gains , , and running-payoff targets , under the standing assumptions
Let , , let be the unique zero of , let , fix , and let
be the thresholds (4.20) of the Nash equilibrium of Proposition 4.7. Then
Player 1 intervenes below and player 2 above , so the common continuation region grows strictly as the fixed cost of intervening increases: the players intervene less when intervening costs more.
Formalization Note. The statement is about the explicit functions (4.20)–(4.21); the equilibrium property of Proposition 4.7 is not part of it. "Increasing" is read strictly, as the paper's proof gives. The domain is for both claims, where and is the paper's zero; outside it the Lean functions take placeholder values that the statement does not see.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ImpulseGames_CostMonotonicity_Thresholds
namespace ImpulseGames.CostMonotonicity
theorem xbar_monotone (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
StrictMonoOn P.xbar2 (Set.Ioi P.cTilde) ∧ StrictAntiOn P.xbar1 (Set.Ioi P.cTilde) := by sorry
end ImpulseGames.CostMonotonicity
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.