Proposition 4.1, pp. 15–16 — consumer welfare:
ProvedPermBlockchain.Failure.proposition_4_1blockchainconsumer-welfarep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Consider the reduced-form blockchain supply chain under its standing assumptions, with for some , and suppose Assumption 1 holds at . The consumer welfare in the full, partial and non-adoption scenarios satisfies
Both forms of blockchain adoption therefore raise consumer welfare relative to non-adoption, and full adoption raises it at least as much as partial adoption. This is the consumer side of the welfare comparison behind Proposition 4.6.
Formalization Note is the Bochner integral of against the law of the outside option, with Proposition A.1's utilities and ; the finite mean of (a standing assumption) makes it a genuine expectation.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_PermBlockchain_Failure_Setting
Formal statement
namespace PermBlockchain.Failure
open MeasureTheory
/-- **Proposition 4.1** (p. 15–16): consumer welfare satisfies `W^F_C ≥ W^P_C > W^N_C`. -/
theorem proposition_4_1 {m : ℕ} (M : Model m) (hM : M.Standing) (Δ : ℝ) (hΔ : 0 < Δ)
(hA : M.Assumption1 Δ) :
M.WC .P Δ ≤ M.WC .F Δ ∧ M.WC .N Δ < M.WC .P Δ := by sorry
end PermBlockchain.Failure
Source
Iyengar, Saleh, Sethuraman, Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, SSRN 3602376 (version of 2022-08-19), pp. 15–16, Proposition 4.1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.