Proposition 1, PDF p. 19 (printed p. 13) — near μ = 0, network effects raise each firm's demand, price and profit and lower its singlehomers
ProvedMultihoming.Local.proposition1_weak_network_effectsConsider the Hotelling duopoly with network effects of strength , mismatch cost and exclusive features of the two goods, at the candidate partial-multihoming prices of (16). Write for the total demand of good (the multihoming demand (14) at those prices), for its singlehomers, and for firm 's profit.
Assume partial multihoming at , that is
Then there is with such that, on and for each ,
- the total demand is strictly increasing in ;
- the number of singlehomers is strictly decreasing in ;
- the price is strictly increasing in ;
- the profit is strictly increasing in .
The firms may be asymmetric (). In contrast with full singlehoming, where prices and profits strictly fall in , weak network effects benefit both firms once some consumers multihome.
Formalization Note "Assume partial multihoming" is pinned as the three inequalities above: at the closed forms (19)–(20) give , and , so these are exactly the conditions under which both groups of singlehomers and the multihomers are positive. (The page names only one condition ; both firms' conditions are needed.) "In the neighborhood of " is read as strict monotonicity on for some ; it is one-sided because , and keeps Assumption 1 (i), . Assumption 1 (ii)–(iii) (coverage and positive shares in the full game) are not used and not assumed. Demand is the multihoming demand (14) at the candidate prices (16), not a closed form.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Multihoming_Local_Model
namespace Multihoming.Local
/-- Proposition 1, PDF p. 19: under partial multihoming at `μ = 0` (`e₀, e₁ < 2t < e₀ + e₁`),
there is `δ ∈ (0, t)` such that on `[0, δ]` each good's total demand, price and profit at the
candidate prices (16) strictly increase in `μ`, and each good's singlehomers strictly decrease. -/
theorem proposition1_weak_network_effects (t e0 e1 : ℝ) (ht : 0 < t)
(h0 : e0 < 2 * t) (h1 : e1 < 2 * t) (hpm : 2 * t < e0 + e1) :
∃ δ, 0 < δ ∧ δ < t ∧
(StrictMonoOn (fun μ => outM t μ e0 e1) (Set.Icc 0 δ) ∧
StrictMonoOn (fun μ => outM t μ e1 e0) (Set.Icc 0 δ)) ∧
(StrictAntiOn (fun μ => singleM t μ e0 e1) (Set.Icc 0 δ) ∧
StrictAntiOn (fun μ => singleM t μ e1 e0) (Set.Icc 0 δ)) ∧
(StrictMonoOn (fun μ => priceM t μ e0 e1) (Set.Icc 0 δ) ∧
StrictMonoOn (fun μ => priceM t μ e1 e0) (Set.Icc 0 δ)) ∧
(StrictMonoOn (fun μ => profitM t μ e0 e1) (Set.Icc 0 δ) ∧
StrictMonoOn (fun μ => profitM t μ e1 e0) (Set.Icc 0 δ)) := by sorry
end Multihoming.Local
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.