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Eq. (3), p.14 — optimal second-period price and payoff

Proved
ReviewProvision.eq_3

by iris · Oct 30, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bayesian-updatingonline-reviewsoperations-researchp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1pricing

Fix a realized vector v⃗\vec vv of customer evaluations. In each cluster nnn the price

pn2∗=max⁡{vn/2h, 0}p^*_{n2}=\max\{v_n/2h,\,0\}pn2∗​=max{vn​/2h,0}

is the unique maximizer of the revenue m(vn−hr)rm(v_n-hr)rm(vn​−hr)r over prices r≥0r\ge0r≥0, the optimal revenue is m(vn+)2/(4h)m(v_n^+)^2/(4h)m(vn+​)2/(4h) with x+=max⁡{x,0}x^+=\max\{x,0\}x+=max{x,0}, and the optimal second-period payoff is

Π2∗(v⃗)=∑n=1Nm(vn+)24h.\Pi_2^*(\vec v)=\sum_{n=1}^N\frac{m(v_n^+)^2}{4h}.Π2∗​(v)=n=1∑N​4hm(vn+​)2​.

The payoff is the sum of the clusters' revenues with no joint terms, so only the marginal laws of the evaluations matter to the firm.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: N ≥ 2 clusters (§3.1, p.9) → every N; reason: the statement holds for every N, and N ≥ 2 is a special case
  • generalization: p_{n2} is the firm's optimal price → p_{n2} is the unique maximizer over r ≥ 0; reason: uniqueness holds for every real v and implies optimality
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ReviewProvision_secondPeriodPayoff
Formal statement
namespace ReviewProvision

/-- **Eq. (3)**, SSRN 3403322 (manuscript of 2021-05-24), p.14 (PDF 14): the optimal second-period
price in a cluster is `p*_{n2} = max{v/2h, 0}`, and the optimal payoff is `Σ_n m (v_n⁺)²/(4h)`.

**Formalization Note.** The first two clauses say that the price `max{v/2h, 0}` is the unique
maximizer of the cluster revenue over prices `r ≥ 0`. -/
theorem eq_3 (p : Params) {N : ℕ} (v : Fin N → ℝ) :
    (∀ n, IsGreatest (clusterRevenue p (v n) '' Set.Ici 0)
      (clusterRevenue p (v n) (max (v n / (2 * p.h)) 0))) ∧
    (∀ n, ∀ r, 0 ≤ r →
      clusterRevenue p (v n) r = clusterRevenue p (v n) (max (v n / (2 * p.h)) 0) →
        r = max (v n / (2 * p.h)) 0) ∧
    (∀ n, optimalRevenue p (v n) = p.m * (max (v n) 0) ^ 2 / (4 * p.h)) ∧
    secondPeriodPayoff p v = ∑ n, p.m * (max (v n) 0) ^ 2 / (4 * p.h) := by sorry

end ReviewProvision
Source
Xiao, Chen, Tang, Customer Review Provision Policies with Heterogeneous Cluster Preferences, SSRN 3403322 (manuscript of 2021-05-24), eq. (3), p.14
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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