Eq. (3), p.14 — optimal second-period price and payoff
ProvedReviewProvision.eq_3bayesian-updatingonline-reviewsoperations-researchp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1pricing
Fix a realized vector of customer evaluations. In each cluster the price
is the unique maximizer of the revenue over prices , the optimal revenue is with , and the optimal second-period payoff is
The payoff is the sum of the clusters' revenues with no joint terms, so only the marginal laws of the evaluations matter to the firm.
Differences from the source:
- generalization: N ≥ 2 clusters (§3.1, p.9) → every N; reason: the statement holds for every N, and N ≥ 2 is a special case
- generalization: p_{n2} is the firm's optimal price → p_{n2} is the unique maximizer over r ≥ 0; reason: uniqueness holds for every real v and implies optimality
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewProvision_secondPeriodPayoff
Formal statement
namespace ReviewProvision
/-- **Eq. (3)**, SSRN 3403322 (manuscript of 2021-05-24), p.14 (PDF 14): the optimal second-period
price in a cluster is `p*_{n2} = max{v/2h, 0}`, and the optimal payoff is `Σ_n m (v_n⁺)²/(4h)`.
**Formalization Note.** The first two clauses say that the price `max{v/2h, 0}` is the unique
maximizer of the cluster revenue over prices `r ≥ 0`. -/
theorem eq_3 (p : Params) {N : ℕ} (v : Fin N → ℝ) :
(∀ n, IsGreatest (clusterRevenue p (v n) '' Set.Ici 0)
(clusterRevenue p (v n) (max (v n / (2 * p.h)) 0))) ∧
(∀ n, ∀ r, 0 ≤ r →
clusterRevenue p (v n) r = clusterRevenue p (v n) (max (v n / (2 * p.h)) 0) →
r = max (v n / (2 * p.h)) 0) ∧
(∀ n, optimalRevenue p (v n) = p.m * (max (v n) 0) ^ 2 / (4 * p.h)) ∧
secondPeriodPayoff p v = ∑ n, p.m * (max (v n) 0) ^ 2 / (4 * p.h) := by sorry
end ReviewProvision
Source
Xiao, Chen, Tang, Customer Review Provision Policies with Heterogeneous Cluster Preferences, SSRN 3403322 (manuscript of 2021-05-24), eq. (3), p.14
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.