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Proposition 2, p. 3346 — price discrimination raises profit, buyer, low-type seller surplus and welfare; high types gain iff b > b̂ (then strict Pareto)

Proved
TwoSidedPD.Baseline.proposition2_welfare

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pareto-improvementprice-discriminationtwo-sided-marketswelfare

Consider a monopoly platform serving a mass one of buyers, who get a stand-alone value vvv and a benefit bbb per seller on the platform, and two categories of sellers L,HL,HL,H of mass one each, who earn θj\theta_jθj​ per buyer, with θH>θL>0\theta_H>\theta_L>0θH​>θL​>0 and b>0b>0b>0. Outside options are uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Assume Assumption 1:

0<v<4−(b+θL)2−(b+θH)2,θH−3θL2<b.0<v<4-(b+\theta_L)^2-(b+\theta_H)^2,\qquad \frac{\theta_H-3\theta_L}{2}<b .0<v<4−(b+θL​)2−(b+θH​)2,2θH​−3θL​​<b.

Under uniform pricing the platform chooses (NB,NS)(N_B,N_S)(NB​,NS​) to maximize ΠU\Pi^UΠU; under price discrimination it chooses (NB,NL,NH)(N_B,N_L,N_H)(NB​,NL​,NH​) to maximize ΠD\Pi^DΠD. Both problems have a solution, and for every uniform optimum and every discrimination optimum:

  1. (i) the platform, buyers and low-type sellers are better off under price discrimination: ΠU<ΠD\Pi^U<\Pi^DΠU<ΠD, CSU<CSDCS^U<CS^DCSU<CSD, DSLU<DSLDDS^U_L<DS^D_LDSLU​<DSLD​;
  2. (ii) total welfare is higher under price discrimination: SWU<SWDSW^U<SW^DSWU<SWD;
  3. (iii) high-type sellers are better off under price discrimination if and only if
b>b^(θH,θL)≡32−7(θH−θL)2−3θH−θL4;b>\hat b(\theta_H,\theta_L)\equiv\frac{\sqrt{32-7(\theta_H-\theta_L)^2}-3\theta_H-\theta_L}{4};b>b^(θH​,θL​)≡432−7(θH​−θL​)2​−3θH​−θL​​;
  1. in this case price discrimination is a strict Pareto improvement over uniform pricing: the platform, the buyers, the low-type and the high-type sellers are all strictly better off.

This is the paper's main welfare result: unlike the classical one-sided analysis with linear demands, seller-side price discrimination by a two-sided platform raises total welfare and can benefit every group.

Formalization Note. Equilibria are global maximizers of ΠU\Pi^UΠU over R2\mathbb R^2R2 and of ΠD\Pi^DΠD over R3\mathbb R^3R3 (the objects the first-order conditions (7)–(11) solve), not points in [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n. "Better off" means a strictly higher profit for the platform and strictly higher surplus for buyers and sellers, with surpluses defined by the integrals of App. A.2. b>0b>0b>0 is the standing assumption of §3.2 and footnote 10. Assumption 1(i) is used as printed (v<…v<\dotsv<…); the paper's bound bˉ\bar bbˉ (p. 3344) corresponds to 2v<…2v<\dots2v<…, which is what interior buyer participation NBD=2v/D<1N^D_B=2v/D<1NBD​=2v/D<1 needs, so the printed assumption does not by itself keep participation in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1); the statement does not claim it does. On the parameter region 32−7(θH−θL)2>032-7(\theta_H-\theta_L)^2>032−7(θH​−θL​)2>0, so Real.sqrt is the ordinary square root.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline

theorem proposition2_welfare (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
    (hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
    ((∃ x : ℝ × ℝ, IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x) ∧ (∃ y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ, IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y)) ∧
    ∀ (x : ℝ × ℝ) (y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ), IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x → IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
      -- (i) platform, buyers and low-type sellers are strictly better off
      (profitU v b θH θL x < profitD v b θH θL y ∧
        buyerSurplusU v b θH θL x < buyerSurplusD v b θH θL y ∧
        sellerSurplusU θL θH θL x < sellerSurplusDL θL y) ∧
      -- (ii) total welfare is strictly higher
      welfareU v b θH θL x < welfareD v b θH θL y ∧
      -- (iii) high-type sellers are strictly better off iff b > b̂(θH, θL)
      (sellerSurplusU θH θH θL x < sellerSurplusDH θH y ↔ bhat θH θL < b) ∧
      -- in that case, a strict Pareto improvement
      (bhat θH θL < b →
        profitU v b θH θL x < profitD v b θH θL y ∧
        buyerSurplusU v b θH θL x < buyerSurplusD v b θH θL y ∧
        sellerSurplusU θL θH θL x < sellerSurplusDL θL y ∧
        sellerSurplusU θH θH θL x < sellerSurplusDH θH y) := by sorry

end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3346, §4.3.1, Proposition 2; proof App. A.2, pp. 3352–3353
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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