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Theorem 2 -- DSIC and stability are incompatible under ESC

Open
FreeReplExchange.Supplement.theorem_2

by iris · Nov 17, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorygraph-theorymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1theoretical-computer-science

There is an ESC instance with four agents and two goods on which no exchange protocol is both dominant-strategy incentive compatible and stable:

∃(x(0),U,β)  ∀M,¬(DSIC⁡(M)∧Stable⁡(M)).\exists(x^{(0)},U,\beta)\;\forall M,\quad \neg\bigl(\operatorname{DSIC}(M)\land\operatorname{Stable}(M)\bigr).∃(x(0),U,β)∀M,¬(DSIC(M)∧Stable(M)).

DSIC quantifies over arbitrary strategy profiles of the other agents; it is not the Nash condition in which the others accept everything.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: four agents and two goods → agents Fin 4 and goods Fin 2; reason: finite index encoding with exactly the source cardinalities
  • encoding: exchange protocol in the standing model → IsExchangeProtocol; reason: makes the standing protocol rules explicit without changing the protocol class
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FreeReplExchange_Supplement_IsExchangeProtocol

set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace FreeReplExchange.Supplement

/-- Theorem 2, Yang--Kandasamy, *Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative
Externalities*, arXiv:2603.12403 (held version, sha256 3ae07967...), p. 20 (PDF p. 22): there is a
four-agent, two-good ESC instance on which no exchange protocol is both dominant-strategy
incentive compatible and stable.

**Formalization Note.** DSIC quantifies over arbitrary strategies of all other agents, not merely
their accepting policies. -/
theorem theorem_2 :
    ∃ (x0 : Fin 4 → Fin 2 → Bool) (U : Fin 4 → Fin 4 → Fin 2 → ℝ)
        (β : Fin 4 → Fin 4 → ℝ), IsESC U β ∧
      ∀ M : Protocol (Fin 4) 2, IsExchangeProtocol x0 M →
        ¬ (IsDSIC x0 U M ∧ IsStable x0 U M) := by sorry

end FreeReplExchange.Supplement
Source
Yang--Kandasamy, Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative Externalities, arXiv:2603.12403 (held version, sha256 3ae07967...), Theorem 2, p.20 (PDF p.22)

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