§4.1, p. 10, (3) — the quantity subgame given (w, u): q^U_R(w,u) and q^U_M(w,u)
ProvedQualityEncroach.Uniform.quantity_subgamedual-channelencroachmentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain
Let , , a wholesale price and a quality be given, and write .
- For every order , the retailer's profit when the manufacturer replies with equals
- This quadratic in is maximized over all reals at
- If , the manufacturer's reply to it is
In this region, maximizes the retailer's payoff over every nonnegative order, including orders above for which the manufacturer sells nothing directly.
Together these give equation (3), the solution of the quantity competition subgame for given and .
Formalization Note. The paper derives (3) "assuming "; that assumption is a hypothesis of parts 1 and 3, not dropped.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_Uniform_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.Uniform
/-- §4.1, p. 10, (3): the quantity subgame for given `(w, u)`, `u > 0`.
(a) For `0 ≤ q_R ≤ 1 − c/u − ku`, the retailer's profit when the manufacturer replies with
`q^U_M(q_R, w, u)` is `−½ u q_R² + (½u + ½ku² + c/2 − w) q_R`.
(b) This quadratic is maximized at `q^U_R(w, u) = 1/2 − w/u + ku/2 + c/(2u)`.
(c) If `0 ≤ q^U_R(w, u) ≤ 1 − c/u − ku`, the manufacturer's reply to it is
`q^U_M(w, u) = 1/4 + w/(2u) − 3ku/4 − 3c/(4u)`, and this retailer order is
optimal among all nonnegative orders, including those outside the region of the quadratic. -/
theorem quantity_subgame (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (w u : ℝ) (hu : 0 < u) :
(∀ qR : ℝ, 0 ≤ qR → qR ≤ 1 - c / u - k * u →
retailerPayoff ⟨w, u, qR, qUM_br k c qR w u⟩ =
-(1 / 2) * u * qR ^ 2 + ((1 / 2) * u + (1 / 2) * k * u ^ 2 + c / 2 - w) * qR) ∧
(∀ q : ℝ, -(1 / 2) * u * q ^ 2 + ((1 / 2) * u + (1 / 2) * k * u ^ 2 + c / 2 - w) * q ≤
-(1 / 2) * u * qUR k c w u ^ 2 +
((1 / 2) * u + (1 / 2) * k * u ^ 2 + c / 2 - w) * qUR k c w u) ∧
(0 ≤ qUR k c w u → qUR k c w u ≤ 1 - c / u - k * u →
qUM_br k c (qUR k c w u) w u = qUM k c w u ∧
∀ qR : ℝ, 0 ≤ qR →
retailerPayoff ⟨w, u, qR, qUM_br k c qR w u⟩ ≤
retailerPayoff ⟨w, u, qUR k c w u, qUM k c w u⟩) := by sorry
end QualityEncroach.Uniform
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, p. 10, §4.1, equation (3) and the two displays before it
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.