Lemma 1, p. 995 — τ₀ ∈ (Q₀, Q₁) exists uniquely; the retailer orders Q₁ if T < τ₀, Q₀ if T > τ₀, either if T = τ₀
ProvedChannelRebate.Quantity.lemma1_optimal_orderchannel-rebatenewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain-contracts
In the setting of the mission, let , , , and let satisfy
For a target put . Then:
- (a) there is exactly one with , and it lies in the open interval ;
- (b) for every target , the set of the retailer's optimal orders under the target rebate is
The lemma says the retailer either ignores the rebate and orders the wholesale newsvendor quantity, or "goes for" it and orders the newsvendor quantity at the effective price , switching at the threshold .
Formalization Note is not a function of the data: part (b) holds for every solving , which part (a) shows to be unique. The optimal-order claims are equalities of sets of maximizers over .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CachonCoord_Newsvendor_Contracts import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Quantity_Setting open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Quantity
/-- Taylor (2002), Lemma 1, p. 995. With `Q₀ = Φ⁻¹((p − w)/(p − s))`,
`Q₁ = Φ⁻¹((p + u − w)/(p + u − s))` and `f₀(T) = r(Q₀|T) − r(Q₁|T)` on `T ∈ [Q₀, Q₁]`:
(a) the root `τ₀` of `f₀` on `[Q₀, Q₁]` exists, is unique and lies in `(Q₀, Q₁)`;
(b) the retailer's optimal order set is `{Q₁}` if `T < τ₀`, `{Q₀}` if `T > τ₀`, and
`{Q₀, Q₁}` if `T = τ₀`. -/
theorem lemma1_optimal_order (p c s w u : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcw : c < w) (hwp : w < p)
(hsc : s < c) (hu : 0 < u) (D : Demand)
(Q0 : ℝ) (hQ0 : 0 < Q0) (hΦ0 : Phi D Q0 = (p - w) / (p - s))
(Q1 : ℝ) (hQ1 : 0 < Q1) (hΦ1 : Phi D Q1 = (p + u - w) / (p + u - s)) :
-- (a)
(∃! τ0 : ℝ, τ0 ∈ Set.Icc Q0 Q1 ∧
retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q0 - retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q1 = 0) ∧
(∀ τ0 : ℝ, τ0 ∈ Set.Icc Q0 Q1 →
retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q0 - retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q1 = 0 →
τ0 ∈ Set.Ioo Q0 Q1) ∧
-- (b)
(∀ τ0 : ℝ, τ0 ∈ Set.Icc Q0 Q1 →
retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q0 - retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q1 = 0 →
∀ T : ℝ, 0 ≤ T →
(T < τ0 → optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s w u T D) = {Q1}) ∧
(τ0 < T → optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s w u T D) = {Q0}) ∧
(T = τ0 → optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s w u T D) = {Q0, Q1})) := by sorry
end ChannelRebate.Quantity
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 995, Lemma 1 (with the definitions of Q₁, f₀, τ₀ preceding it); proof p. 1005
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.