(18), p. 17 (proved in step (i.b), p. ec13) — for b1 < n*, b2 < m*, the value is linear in b2: U*(b1,b2) = b2·U*(b1,1)
ProvedNetInspect.Rate.eq_18game-valuep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1security-gamezero-sum-game
Let be a detection model, and . Then the value of the game is linear in the attack resources:
The paper writes this as , where is the equilibrium detection rate of Theorem 2; since , the two forms agree. The linearity is what makes the equilibrium detection rate independent of .
Formalization Note The statement is written with in place of , so that it does not refer forward to the number defined by Theorem 2. is the optimal value of (LP1). The hypothesis is added, as for Theorem 1.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_BlottoLP_Flow_ZeroSum import Definitions.Def_NetInspect_Rate_Model
Formal statement
namespace NetInspect.Rate
open Finset DetectionModel
/-- (18) (p. 17), proved in step (i.b) (p. ec13): for `b1 < n*` and `1 ≤ b2 < m*` the value
of the game is linear in `b2`, `U*(b1, b2) = b2 · U*(b1, 1)` (`U*(b1, 1) = 1 − r*_{b1}`). -/
theorem eq_18 {V E : Type*} [Fintype V] [DecidableEq V] [Fintype E] [DecidableEq E]
(G : DetectionModel V E)
{b1 b2 : ℕ} (hb1 : b1 < G.nStar) (hb2 : 1 ≤ b2) (hb2m : b2 < G.mStar) :
G.gameValue b1 b2 = (b2 : ℝ) * G.gameValue b1 1 := by sorry
end NetInspect.Rate
Source
Dahan, Sela & Amin, Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks, arXiv:1705.00349v4, p. 17, (18); p. ec13, proof of Theorem 2, step (i.b)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.