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§5.2, p. 1347 — the EM's optimal production without commitment is Q*_NC = Θ^{-1}((c − m)/(c − u)) + z_εσ_ε

Proved
TsayQF.NoCommit.nc_production

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

critical-fractilenewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain

In the supply chain of Tsay (1999) with costs p>c>m>0p > c > m > 0p>c>m>0, u<mu < mu<m, s≥0s \ge 0s≥0, let the signal μ\muμ have a differentiable, strictly increasing distribution function Θ\ThetaΘ and finite variance, let σε≥0\sigma_\varepsilon \ge 0σε​≥0, and let zε=Φ−1((p+s−c)/(p+s−u))z_\varepsilon = \Phi^{-1}\big((p+s-c)/(p+s-u)\big)zε​=Φ−1((p+s−c)/(p+s−u)). Without commitment the retailer buys rNC∗(Q,μ)=min⁡[μ+zεσε,Q]r^*_{NC}(Q,\mu) = \min[\mu + z_\varepsilon\sigma_\varepsilon, Q]rNC∗​(Q,μ)=min[μ+zε​σε​,Q], so the EM producing QQQ expects

πEM,NC(Q)=(c−u) Eμmin⁡[μ+zεσε,Q]−(m−u) Q.\pi_{EM,NC}(Q) = (c-u)\,E_\mu\min[\mu + z_\varepsilon\sigma_\varepsilon, Q] - (m-u)\,Q .πEM,NC​(Q)=(c−u)Eμ​min[μ+zε​σε​,Q]−(m−u)Q.

Then some QQQ solves

Θ(Q−zεσε)=c−mc−u,\Theta(Q - z_\varepsilon\sigma_\varepsilon) = \frac{c-m}{c-u},Θ(Q−zε​σε​)=c−uc−m​,

and QQQ maximizes πEM,NC\pi_{EM,NC}πEM,NC​ over R\mathbb RR if and only if it solves this equation; that is, QNC∗=Θ−1((c−m)/(c−u))+zεσεQ^*_{NC} = \Theta^{-1}\big((c-m)/(c-u)\big) + z_\varepsilon\sigma_\varepsilonQNC∗​=Θ−1((c−m)/(c−u))+zε​σε​.

The EM is a newsvendor with underage cost c−mc-mc−m and overage cost m−um-um−u facing the retailer's purchase rather than market demand.

Formalization Note Θ−1\Theta^{-1}Θ−1 and Φ−1\Phi^{-1}Φ−1 enter through their defining equations (Φ(z)=(p+s−c)/(p+s−u)\Phi(z) = (p+s-c)/(p+s-u)Φ(z)=(p+s−c)/(p+s−u) as a hypothesis on a real zzz). Productions range over all of R\mathbb RR.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TsayQF_NoCommit_Model
open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
open scoped NNReal
Formal statement
namespace TsayQF.NoCommit

theorem nc_production (D : Data) (ν : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
    (hΘ : StrictMono (cdf ν)) (hΘd : Differentiable ℝ (cdf ν)) (hν : MemLp id 2 ν)
    (v : ℝ≥0) (z : ℝ) (hz : cdf (gaussianReal 0 1) z = kR D) :
    (∃ Q : ℝ, cdf ν (Q - z * Real.sqrt v) = kEM D) ∧
      ∀ Q : ℝ, IsMaxOn (emProfit D ν v z) Set.univ Q ↔
        cdf ν (Q - z * Real.sqrt v) = kEM D := by sorry

end TsayQF.NoCommit
Source
Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives, Management Science 45(10) (1999), p. 1347, §5.2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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