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ExpIND,t\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathrm{IND},t}ExpIND,t, advantage, Gap and Sect(F)\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal F)Sect(F) over MMM

Definition
RestrictedDec_Supplement_SecM

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

chosen-ciphertext-securityfunctional-decryptionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1public-key-encryptionsecurity-hierarchy

For a timing t∈{na,ad}t\in\{\mathrm{na},\mathrm{ad}\}t∈{na,ad}, a scheme PPP, a family F\mathcal FF and an adversary AAA:

  1. the world bbb of ExpP,FIND,t(A,λ)\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathrm{IND},t}_{P,\mathcal F}(A,\lambda)ExpP,FIND,t​(A,λ) generates keys and runs AAA against the functional decryption oracle F(Decsk(c))F(\mathrm{Dec}_{sk}(c))F(Decsk​(c)) with the restrictions of Definition 1, with challenge bit bbb;
  2. the experiment draws bbb uniformly and outputs 111 iff b′=bb'=bb′=b; the advantage is AdvP,Ft(A,λ)=∣Pr⁡[Exp=1]−12∣\mathrm{Adv}^t_{P,\mathcal F}(A,\lambda)=|\Pr[\mathrm{Exp}=1]-\tfrac12|AdvP,Ft​(A,λ)=∣Pr[Exp=1]−21​∣;
  3. the gap is Gap(A)=∣Pr⁡[A⇒1∣b=1]−Pr⁡[A⇒1∣b=0]∣\mathrm{Gap}(A)=|\Pr[A\Rightarrow1\mid b=1]-\Pr[A\Rightarrow1\mid b=0]|Gap(A)=∣Pr[A⇒1∣b=1]−Pr[A⇒1∣b=0]∣ (App. B.4);
  4. P∈Sect(F)P\in\mathrm{Sec}^t(\mathcal F)P∈Sect(F) iff PPP has ordinary negligible-error correctness and every uniform PPT adversary has negligible advantage;
  5. IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2 over MMM are Secna(Fid)\mathrm{Sec}^{na}(\mathcal F_{\mathrm{id}})Secna(Fid​) and Secad(Fid)\mathrm{Sec}^{ad}(\mathcal F_{\mathrm{id}})Secad(Fid​).

Formalization Note The oracle is the published RestrictedDec.indOracle. The adversary may be started in a given state s0s_0s0​; the standard experiment uses the empty state, and a nonempty s0s_0s0​ is used only for the conditional bound of Theorem 11.

Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_NoisyOWMPC_Negligible
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_famId
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_expIND
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_CorrectM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_runGameM
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
open Polynomial
set_option autoImplicit false

namespace RestrictedDec

namespace Supplement

/-- The **fixed-bit world** of the experiment `Exp^{IND,t}_{P,𝓕}(A, λ)` over the message space
`M`, with the adversary started in the state `s₀`: `(pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1^λ)`, the challenge bit is
`b`, the adversary interacts with the functional decryption oracle `indOracle t` (first input `pk`,
at most `p(λ) + 1` activations), and the result is its guess `b′`.
Nguyen–Susilo, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Definition 1, p.13; App. B.4,
p.40 ("Gap(A) = |Pr[A ⇒ 1 | b = 1] − Pr[A ⇒ 1 | b = 0]|").

**Formalization Note.** `indOracle` and `Timing` are the published `RestrictedDec` ones. The
standard experiment starts the adversary in the empty state `s₀ = []`; a nonempty `s₀` is used
only to state Theorem 11's bound conditional on given sampler coins. -/
noncomputable def expWorldM (t : Timing) (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (P : PKE) (F : Family)
    (A : Adversary) (lam : ℕ) (s0 : Str) (b : Bool) : PMF Bool :=
  (P.keyLaw lam).bind fun k =>
    runGameM A P M lam k.1 (indOracle t P F lam k.2) b (A.p.eval lam + 1) none s0 k.1

/-- The **experiment** `Exp^{IND,t}_{P,𝓕}(A, λ)` over `M`, adversary started in state `s₀`:
`b ← {0,1}` uniform, then the world `b`; the output is `1` iff `b′ = b` (Definition 1, p.13). -/
noncomputable def expINDM (t : Timing) (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (P : PKE) (F : Family)
    (A : Adversary) (lam : ℕ) (s0 : Str) : PMF Bool :=
  (PMF.uniformOfFintype Bool).bind fun b =>
    (expWorldM t M P F A lam s0 b).map fun b' => decide (b' = b)

/-- The **advantage** `Adv^t_{P,𝓕}(A, λ) = |Pr[Exp^{IND,t}_{P,𝓕}(A, λ) = 1] − 1/2|` over `M`
(Definition 1, p.13), adversary started in the empty state. -/
noncomputable def advM (t : Timing) (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (P : PKE) (F : Family) (A : Adversary)
    (lam : ℕ) : ℝ :=
  |((expINDM t M P F A lam []) true).toReal - 1 / 2|

/-- The **distinguishing gap** `Gap_{P,𝓕}(A, λ) = |Pr[A ⇒ 1 | b = 1] − Pr[A ⇒ 1 | b = 0]|` in
`Exp^{IND,t}_{P,𝓕}` over `M` (App. B.4, p.40: "This is twice the usual success advantage"). -/
noncomputable def gapM (t : Timing) (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (P : PKE) (F : Family) (A : Adversary)
    (lam : ℕ) : ℝ :=
  |((expWorldM t M P F A lam [] true) true).toReal -
    ((expWorldM t M P F A lam [] false) true).toReal|

/-- The **security class** `Sec^t(𝓕)` (`IND^t_𝓕` security) over the message space `M`: the scheme
has ordinary negligible-error correctness (Definition 3) and every uniform PPT adversary has
negligible advantage in `Exp^{IND,t}_{P,𝓕}`.
Nguyen–Susilo, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Definition 1, p.13 ("A scheme
satisfies INDna F or INDad F if it has ordinary negligible-error correctness (Definition 3) and every
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary has negligible advantage in the corresponding game.
… Write Secna(F) and Secad(F) for the schemes secure in these games.").

**Formalization Note.** The published `RestrictedDec.Sec` over `M` instead of `{0,1}^{n(λ)}`.
Efficiency of the scheme is the separate predicate `IsSchemeM`. -/
def SecM (t : Timing) (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (F : Family) (P : PKE) : Prop :=
  CorrectM M P ∧ ∀ A : Adversary, A.Valid → NoisyOWMPC.Negligible (advM t M P F A)

/-- **IND-CCA1** security over `M`: `Sec^na(𝓕_id)` (§2.2, p.14: "If the identity function idM⊥ is
permitted, the pre-challenge and adaptive games recover IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2"). -/
def INDCCA1M (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (P : PKE) : Prop := SecM .na M famId P

/-- **IND-CCA2** security over `M`: `Sec^ad(𝓕_id)` (§2.2, p.14). -/
def INDCCA2M (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (P : PKE) : Prop := SecM .ad M famId P

end Supplement

end RestrictedDec
Source
Nguyen–Susilo, Between CPA and CCA: Security Hierarchies for Restricted Decryption, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Definition 1, p.13; §2.2, p.14; App. B.4, p.40

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