(4.2), p. 13 — first-order condition: for an active miner,
ProvedPoWMining.Equilibrium.eq_4_2first-order-conditionmining-gamep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Consider the mining game with miners, reward , capacity parameter and sorted positive costs-per-hash (payoff (3.4) without the fixed cost). Let be an equilibrium hash rate profile with aggregate , and let be an active miner, . Then marginal gain equals marginal cost:
This is the first-order condition of miner 's objective at an interior best response. Summing it over the active miners gives (B.1), and solving it for gives the hash rate formula of Proposition 4.1.
Formalization Note follows from and the nonnegativity of the profile, so the divisions are genuine.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PoWMining_Equilibrium_Setting
Formal statement
namespace PoWMining.Equilibrium
/-- First-order condition (4.2), p. 13: for an active miner `i` in equilibrium,
`(R/H*)(1 − h*ᵢ/H*) = cᵢ + γ h*ᵢ`. -/
theorem eq_4_2 {N : ℕ} (P : Params N) (hP : P.Standing) (h : Fin N → ℝ)
(hh : IsMiningEq P h) (i : Fin N) (hi : 0 < h i) :
P.R / aggH h * (1 - h i / aggH h) = P.c i + P.γ * h i := by sorry
end PoWMining.Equilibrium
Source
Capponi, Ólafsson & Alsabah, Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization?, arXiv:2106.09783v1, p. 13, (4.2)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.