Sect. 4d, proof of the converse — Bayes rationality in the system generated by f restates (2.2)
ProvedAumann1987.BayesRational.bayes_rational_iff_cebayesian-rationalitycorrelated-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp1ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a correlated strategy -tuple on a finite probability space for a game with payoffs . Take , prior , action -tuple , and let be the partition of generated by , so that and lie in the same element of iff . Then
This is the observation behind the converse of the Main Theorem: in the information system generated by , Bayesian rationality is a restatement of condition (2.2).
Formalization Note. is a probability vector but need not have full support; Bayes rationality at states of null cells is vacuous.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_BayesRational_CorrelatedEquilibrium import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_BayesRational_InformationSystem
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1987.BayesRational
/-- **Sect. 4d, proof of the converse — Bayesian rationality restates (2.2)** (Aumann 1987,
Econometrica 55, Sect. 4d, p. 11, PDF p. 12): "We need only define `(Ω, p) := Γ`, `s := f`, and
`𝒫ⁱ` to be the partition of `Ω` generated by `fⁱ` (i.e., `ω` and `ω′` are in the same element
of `𝒫ⁱ` iff `fⁱ(ω) = fⁱ(ω′)`). Bayesian rationality is then a restatement of (2.2)."
Let `f : Γ → S` be a correlated strategy `n`-tuple on a finite probability space `(Γ, q)`, and
let `𝒫ⁱ` be the partition of `Γ` generated by `fⁱ`. Then every player is Bayes rational at every
state of `Γ` (with prior `q`, partitions `𝒫ⁱ`, and action `n`-tuple `f`) if and only if `f` is
a correlated equilibrium.
**Formalization Note.** The partition generated by `fⁱ` is `Setoid.ker (fun γ => f γ i)`, whose
relation is `fⁱ(γ) = fⁱ(γ')`. `q` is a probability vector (`AGT.IsLottery`) but need not have
full support; at states whose cell is null, Bayes rationality is vacuous (see `condExp`). -/
theorem bayes_rational_iff_ce {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S : ι → Type*}
{Γ : Type*} [Fintype Γ] (h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (q : Γ → ℝ) (hq : AGT.IsLottery q)
(f : Γ → ∀ i, S i) :
(∀ (i : ι) (γ : Γ),
IsBayesRationalAt h q (fun j => Setoid.ker (fun γ' => f γ' j)) f i γ) ↔
IsCorrelatedEquilibrium h q f := by sorry
end Aumann1987.BayesRational
Source
Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), DOI 10.2307/1911154, p. 11 (PDF p. 12), Sect. 4d
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.