Constant-target specification for a fixed divisible supply
DefinitionSybilClinch_Supplement_fixedMechautomated-market-makerclinching-auctionmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1sybil-proofness
Fix a divisible supply and a positive initial clock price . The constant-target specification has target
on the state domain and has capacity . Its residual supply is exactly the unallocated supply of the classical adaptive clinching auction.
Formalization Note The paper's trivial environment description is omitted, as in the published TargetMech encoding; the target and state domain contain all remaining data. Capacity is represented in EReal, although here it is the finite value .
Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_TargetMech
set_option autoImplicit false
open Filter Topology Set
namespace SybilClinch
namespace Supplement
/-- Zhang, Li, Shi, Zhang, Xia, Han, *Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and
Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design*, arXiv:2610.36629 (held copy sha256
93c5d05b05cc8b80b5bb5c0ac677b9642e119277d82de797234b0242f7c5021c), Appendix B.1,
Definition B.1 (Constant target), printed p.45 (PDF p.47).
For a divisible supply `s > 0` and a positive initial clock price `pstar`, the constant-target
specification has target `T(p,X,Y)=s`, domain
`{(p,X,Y) : pstar ≤ p ∧ 0 ≤ X ∧ X ≤ s ∧ 0 ≤ Y}`, and capacity `s`.
**Formalization Note.** The paper's trivial environment description is omitted, as in the
published `TargetMech` encoding; the target and domain contain all of the remaining data. -/
def fixedMech (s pstar : ℝ) : TargetMech where
pstar := pstar
T := fun _ _ _ => s
D := {z | pstar ≤ z.1 ∧ 0 ≤ z.2.1 ∧ z.2.1 ≤ s ∧ 0 ≤ z.2.2}
cap := (s : EReal)
end Supplement
end SybilClinch
Source
Zhang, Li, Shi, Zhang, Xia, Han, Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design, arXiv:2610.36629 (held copy sha256 93c5d05b…), Appendix B.1, Definition B.1, printed p.45 (PDF p.47)