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Theorem 6.2 — multiplier vectors of budget-constrained GSP autobidding equilibria are FIXP-complete (one slot per item, unit CTRs)

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FixpReciprocal.Supplement.theorem_6_2

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionsautobiddingcomputational-complexityfixpp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

A GSP sponsored-shopping instance has a bidder set BBB, an item set J\mathcal JJ partitioned into ownership sets (Jℓ)ℓ∈B(\mathcal J_\ell)_{\ell\in B}(Jℓ​)ℓ∈B​, a positive rational value vsv_svs​ of each item sss to its owner, and a positive rational budget MℓM_\ellMℓ​ of each bidder. There is one advertising slot per item and every click-through rate equals one. Bidder ℓ\ellℓ uses one multiplier αℓ∈[0,1]\alpha_\ell\in[0,1]αℓ​∈[0,1], bidding bs=αℓvsb_s=\alpha_\ell v_sbs​=αℓ​vs​ on each s∈Jℓs\in\mathcal J_\ells∈Jℓ​. For a ranking σ=(s1,…,sm)\sigma=(s_1,\dots,s_m)σ=(s1​,…,sm​) and sk∈Jℓs_k\in\mathcal J_\ellsk​∈Jℓ​, the price is

ck(α,σ)=max⁡({bsk′:k<k′≤m, sk′∉Jℓ}∪{0}),c_k(\alpha,\sigma)=\max\big(\{b_{s_{k'}}:k<k'\le m,\ s_{k'}\notin\mathcal J_\ell\}\cup\{0\}\big),ck​(α,σ)=max({bsk′​​:k<k′≤m, sk′​∈/Jℓ​}∪{0}),

and for a distribution π\piπ over rankings, Pℓ(α,π)=Eσ∼π[∑k: sk∈Jℓck(α,σ)]P_\ell(\alpha,\pi)=\mathbb E_{\sigma\sim\pi}\big[\sum_{k:\,s_k\in\mathcal J_\ell}c_k(\alpha,\sigma)\big]Pℓ​(α,π)=Eσ∼π​[∑k:sk​∈Jℓ​​ck​(α,σ)]. The pair (α,π)(\alpha,\pi)(α,π) is a budget-constrained autobidding equilibrium (Definition 6.1) if for every ranking σ\sigmaσ and bidder ℓ\ellℓ:

  1. π(σ)>0  ⟹  bs1≥⋯≥bsm\pi(\sigma)>0\implies b_{s_1}\ge\dots\ge b_{s_m}π(σ)>0⟹bs1​​≥⋯≥bsm​​;
  2. Pℓ(α,π)≤MℓP_\ell(\alpha,\pi)\le M_\ellPℓ​(α,π)≤Mℓ​;
  3. Pℓ(α,π)<Mℓ  ⟹  αℓ=1P_\ell(\alpha,\pi)<M_\ell\implies\alpha_\ell=1Pℓ​(α,π)<Mℓ​⟹αℓ​=1.

Theorem. Given such an instance, computing a multiplier vector α∈[0,1]B\alpha\in[0,1]^Bα∈[0,1]B of a budget-constrained autobidding equilibrium is

FIXP-complete.\text{FIXP-complete.}FIXP-complete.

Because this is a special case of the general model, hardness here also gives FIXP-completeness for general slot counts and click-through rates.

Formalization Note The problem is the published budgetGSPProblemOn restricted to OneSlotUnitCTR; a solution is a vector α\alphaα for which some π\piπ makes (α,π)(\alpha,\pi)(α,π) an exact equilibrium (IsApproxABEB 0).

Differences from the source:

  • reading: ownership sets (J_ℓ)_{ℓ∈B} that partition J → Auction.WellFormed: every bidder owns at least one item (and hence at least one bidder and one item, as 1 ≤ K = M); reason: the blocks of a partition are nonempty; this is the paper's own notion, not an added restriction
  • encoding: the items of a bidder as an unordered set J_ℓ → each bidder's values listed in nonincreasing order (Auction.WellFormed); reason: the order of a bidder's items is presentation only: prices, payments and equilibria do not depend on item labels, and any instance is put in this form by sorting each list
  • encoding: one slot per item, click-through rate one at every slot → OneSlotUnitCTR: K = M and every entry of the ctr list equals 1; K and the ctr list are part of the encoded instance; reason: the published auction carries K and the CTRs as data; with K = M and unit CTRs they are determined by the rest
  • encoding: rankings σ of J and a probability distribution π over rankings → Auction.Alloc (bijections from ranks Fin M to items) and π : Alloc → ℝ, nonnegative with total 1; reason: the same objects
  • encoding: price (17) and expected payment (18) → published price (maximum over bids of later-ranked items of other owners, together with 0) and expPayment with ctrAt = 1 at every rank; reason: with K = M and unit CTRs, Σ_k ctr_k · price_k is Σ_k price_k, which is (18)
  • encoding: output: a multiplier vector α ∈ [0,1]^B of an equilibrium → solutions are α : Fin n → ℝ such that ∃ π with IsApproxABEB 0 α π ((19)–(21), α ∈ [0,1]^n); reason: the theorem asks for the multiplier vector only
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FixpReciprocal_FIXPComplete
import Definitions.Def_ExactAutobid_Equilibria_GSP
import Definitions.Def_FixpReciprocal_Supplement_Classes
Formal statement
namespace FixpReciprocal.Supplement

open ExactAutobid.Equilibria

/-- **Theorem 6.2 (Autobidding).** Given a GSP sponsored-shopping instance with one slot per item and
all click-through rates equal to one, computing a multiplier vector `α ∈ [0, 1]^B` of a
budget-constrained autobidding equilibrium (Definition 6.1) is FIXP-complete.

Shimizu, *FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions*, STOC 2027
submission (sha256 ffcad4a7…), Theorem 6.2, p.22; §6.1 and Definition 6.1, pp.21–22, (17)–(21).

**Formalization Note.** The problem is the published `budgetGSPProblemOn` restricted to
`OneSlotUnitCTR`: instances are auctions with positive rational item values, one positive rational
budget per bidder, `K = M` and unit click-through rates; a solution is a multiplier vector `α` for
which some distribution `π` over rankings makes `(α, π)` an exact equilibrium (`IsApproxABEB 0`:
(19)–(21) with the no-self-pricing price (17) and payment (18)). The published standing assumptions
require every bidder to own at least one item and list each bidder's values in nonincreasing order. -/
theorem theorem_6_2 :
    FIXPComplete (budgetGSPProblemOn OneSlotUnitCTR) := by sorry

end FixpReciprocal.Supplement
Source
Shimizu, FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price Auctions (STOC 2027 submission, sha256 ffcad4a7…), Theorem 6.2, p.22 (PDF p.24); §6.1 and Definition 6.1, pp.21–22 (PDF pp.23–24), (17)–(21)

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