Eqs. (8), (9), (A.1), (A.2), pp. 3187, 3195 — the in-house equilibrium efforts
ProvedBrandLicensing.Intensive.eq_A1_A2_inHouse_eqbrand-extensionclosed-formfirst-order-conditionsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Under the standing assumptions , , , , , , let . A pair maximizes the brand owner's in-house profit (7) over if and only if
In particular the in-house equilibrium exists and is unique. These are the solutions of the first-order conditions (8) and (9); the statement includes that they are the global maximizer on the non-negative quadrant.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_BrandLicensing_Intensive_Model
Formal statement
namespace BrandLicensing.Intensive
/-- (8), (9), (A.1), (A.2), pp. 3187, 3195: the in-house optimum exists, is unique, and is given
by (A.1)–(A.2). -/
theorem eq_A1_A2_inHouse_eq (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (eC eE : ℝ) :
IsInHouseEq P eC eE ↔ eC = eCH_cf P ∧ eE = eEH_cf P := by sorry
end BrandLicensing.Intensive
Source
Bacchiega, Colucci, Denicolò & Magnani, Only the Ugly Face? A Theoretical Model of Brand Dilution, Management Science 70(5) (2024), p. 3187 (PDF 7), eqs. (8), (9); p. 3195 (PDF 15), Appendix A, eqs. (A.1), (A.2)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.