Eq. (2)–(3) — the lower stages of Case O (corrected: )
ProvedOceanPlastic.eq_3business-modelsoperations-researchp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1recyclingsupply-chainsustainability
Let with , and . For every acquisition price , a collector's unique optimal volume is , so that the total volume is . The unique solution of the processor's problem is
At this price the volume, the collectors' income and the processor's profit are
This records the domain on which the closed forms (3), used in the firm's problem (4), are the equilibrium of the lower stages.
Differences from the source:
- correction: h(r_c,r_p) = (p_m+r_p−r_c)/2 and (3) for all bonuses → for r_c ≤ p_m + r_p; reason: for r_c > p_m + r_p the printed h is negative: M = k = 1, p_m = 1, r_p = 0, r_c = 3 gives objective (1−h)(h+3), decreasing on h ≥ 0, so h = 0 and volume 3, not V^O(3) = 2
- reading: bonuses r_c, r_p → r_c, r_p ≥ 0; reason: a bonus is a payment to the local supply chain; (4) requires r ≥ 0
- reading: "the same derivation as in the Benchmark Case" → the collector's unique maximizer at unit payment h + r_c; reason: this is that derivation, over q ∈ ℝ
- reading: M, v̄_o, Q_o unspecified positive sizes; p_m a price; c_E^r with no stated sign → real M, v̄_o, Q_o > 0, p_m ≥ 0, c_E^r ≥ 0 (fields of Params), with k > 0, δ_o ∈ [0,1), ρ_p ∈ (0,1] as printed; reason: sizes, a price and a value; v̄_o is the upper end of a uniform law; M is real as in the paper, which differentiates in M
- reading: collectors' total income → gross payment (price received) × (volume); reason: the only reading consistent with Π^B_C = Mp_m²/(4k), eq. (3) and Π^{OS}_C = kq_t²/M (p. 14); net utility would be half of it
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_OceanPlastic_Params import Definitions.Def_OceanPlastic_Benchmark import Definitions.Def_OceanPlastic_CaseO
Formal statement
namespace OceanPlastic
open Params
/-- **Eq. (2)–(3): the lower stages of Case O (corrected: `r_c ≤ p_m + r_p`).**
Baron–Romero–Zhang–Zhou, MSOM, doi:10.1287/msom.2022.0643, §3.2(a), eq. (2)–(3), p. 10.
Given bonuses `r_c, r_p ≥ 0` with `r_c ≤ p_m + r_p`, each collector's unique optimal volume at
acquisition price `h` is `(h + r_c) / k`; the processor's unique optimal price in
`max_{h ≥ 0} (p_m − h + r_p) q_t(h + r_c)` is `h(r_c, r_p) = (p_m + r_p − r_c) / 2`; and at that price,
with `r = r_c + r_p`, the volume, the collectors' income and the processor's profit are
`V^O(r)`, `Π^O_C(r)` and `Π^O_P(r)` of eq. (3).
**Formalization Note** The paper states this for all bonuses, which is false for
`r_c > p_m + r_p`: the printed `h` is then negative and the constrained optimum is `h = 0`.
Collectors' income is the gross payment `(h + r_c) q_t(h + r_c)`. -/
theorem eq_3 (P : Params) (rc rp : ℝ) (hrc : 0 ≤ rc) (hrp : 0 ≤ rp) (hdom : rc ≤ P.pm + rp) :
(∀ h q : ℝ, IsMaxOn (P.collectorUtility (h + rc)) Set.univ q ↔ q = (h + rc) / P.k) ∧
(∀ h : ℝ, P.qt (h + rc) = P.M * ((h + rc) / P.k)) ∧
(∀ h : ℝ, (0 ≤ h ∧ IsMaxOn (P.processorObjO rc rp) (Set.Ici 0) h) ↔
h = (P.pm + rp - rc) / 2) ∧
P.qt ((P.pm + rp - rc) / 2 + rc) = P.VO (rc + rp) ∧
((P.pm + rp - rc) / 2 + rc) * P.qt ((P.pm + rp - rc) / 2 + rc) = P.PiOC (rc + rp) ∧
P.processorObjO rc rp ((P.pm + rp - rc) / 2) = P.PiOP (rc + rp) := by sorry
end OceanPlastic
Source
Baron–Romero–Zhang–Zhou, Innovative Business Models in Ocean-Bound Plastic Recycling, MSOM, doi:10.1287/msom.2022.0643, §3.2(a), eq. (2)–(3), p.10
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.