Proof of Lemma B.1, p. 18 — SBMT step: p̄_T(f′, t′)f′ + t′ > p̄_T(f*, t*)f* + t* iff v > v_T(f*, t*)
ProvedRetailerMarketplace.UnitFee.lemma_B_1_sbmt_stepmarketplacep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-feesunit-fee
Let , , , , and let be the fees of the construction, and . Write for the third-party seller's SBMT price (B.1). Then for every product valuation , the fee the monopolist collects per unit the third-party seller sells in an SBMT product market is higher under exactly above the entry threshold:
This is the SBMT step of the proof of Lemma B.1: on every product market where both firms sell, the switch of fees raises the monopolist's fee income (which is times the per-unit amount above).
Formalization Note. is the paper's standing Assumption 1.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_UnitFee_Model
Formal statement
namespace RetailerMarketplace.UnitFee
/-- Proof of Lemma B.1, p. 18 (SBMT step): with the fees `(f', t')` of the construction, the fee
M collects per unit T sells in an SBMT product market rises,
`p̄_T(f', t') f' + t' > p̄_T(f*, t*) f* + t*` with `p̄_T` from (B.1), exactly when
`v > v_T(f*, t*)`. -/
theorem lemma_B_1_sbmt_step (c fs ts ε f' t' lam : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c)
(hfs : fs ∈ Set.Ico (0 : ℝ) 1) (hε : 0 < ε) (hεts : ε < ts)
(hlam : lam ∈ Set.Icc (1 / 2 : ℝ) 1)
(hf' : f' = (ε + fs * (c + ts - ε)) / (c + ts)) (ht' : t' = ts - ε) (v : ℝ) :
pbarT c f' t' lam v * f' + t' > pbarT c fs ts lam v * fs + ts ↔ vT c fs ts < v := by sorry
end RetailerMarketplace.UnitFee
Source
Hervas-Drane & Shelegia, Retailer-Led Marketplaces, Management Science (2025), Articles in Advance, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.00315, p. 18 (PDF p. 20), Proof of Lemma B.1, second paragraph (SBMT product markets), with display (B.1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.