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The countering correspondence has nonempty convex values and a closed graph, with equilibria as fixed points

Proved
Nash1950.Countering.countering_correspondence_theorem

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

best-responseclosed-graphgame-theorykakutaninash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

In a finite game with a nonempty pure-strategy set for each player, let Σ\SigmaΣ be the product space of mixed strategies and C(P)C(P)C(P) the set of profiles countering PPP. Then

∀P∈Σ,∅≠C(P)⊆Σ and C(P) is convex;\forall P\in\Sigma,\quad \varnothing\ne C(P)\subseteq\Sigma\ \text{and}\ C(P)\text{ is convex};∀P∈Σ,∅=C(P)⊆Σ and C(P) is convex;

whenever mixed profiles Pk,QkP_k,Q_kPk​,Qk​ converge to P,QP,QP,Q and Qk∈C(Pk)Q_k\in C(P_k)Qk​∈C(Pk​) for every kkk, one has Q∈C(P)Q\in C(P)Q∈C(P); and P∈C(P)P\in C(P)P∈C(P) if and only if PPP is a mixed Nash equilibrium.

These are the properties of Nash's countering correspondence that underlie the equilibrium existence argument.

Formalization Note. Each pure-strategy set is required to be nonempty, as implicit in taking probability distributions. Convergence is in the product topology, and the sequence index is kkk. The existence of a fixed point is already the proved platform theorem AGT.nash_existence and is not asserted again here.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_Nash1950_Countering_Setting

open Filter
Formal statement
namespace Nash1950.Countering

theorem countering_correspondence_theorem {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    (S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
    (u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
    (∀ P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ, AGT.IsMixedProfile P →
      (counteringSet u P).Nonempty ∧
        counteringSet u P ⊆ {Q | AGT.IsMixedProfile Q} ∧
          Convex ℝ (counteringSet u P)) ∧
    (∀ (P Q : ℕ → ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (P₀ Q₀ : ∀ i, S i → ℝ),
      (∀ k, AGT.IsMixedProfile (P k)) →
      Tendsto P atTop (nhds P₀) → Tendsto Q atTop (nhds Q₀) →
      (∀ k, Counters u (P k) (Q k)) → Counters u P₀ Q₀) ∧
    (∀ P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ, Counters u P P ↔ AGT.IsMixedNash u P) := by sorry

end Nash1950.Countering
Source
Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), p. 49, ¶2–¶4 (PDF p. 3)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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