The countering correspondence has nonempty convex values and a closed graph, with equilibria as fixed points
ProvedNash1950.Countering.countering_correspondence_theorembest-responseclosed-graphgame-theorykakutaninash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
In a finite game with a nonempty pure-strategy set for each player, let be the product space of mixed strategies and the set of profiles countering . Then
whenever mixed profiles converge to and for every , one has ; and if and only if is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
These are the properties of Nash's countering correspondence that underlie the equilibrium existence argument.
Formalization Note. Each pure-strategy set is required to be nonempty, as implicit in taking probability distributions. Convergence is in the product topology, and the sequence index is . The existence of a fixed point is already the proved platform theorem AGT.nash_existence and is not asserted again here.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_Nash1950_Countering_Setting open Filter
Formal statement
namespace Nash1950.Countering
theorem countering_correspondence_theorem {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
(S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
(u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
(∀ P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ, AGT.IsMixedProfile P →
(counteringSet u P).Nonempty ∧
counteringSet u P ⊆ {Q | AGT.IsMixedProfile Q} ∧
Convex ℝ (counteringSet u P)) ∧
(∀ (P Q : ℕ → ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (P₀ Q₀ : ∀ i, S i → ℝ),
(∀ k, AGT.IsMixedProfile (P k)) →
Tendsto P atTop (nhds P₀) → Tendsto Q atTop (nhds Q₀) →
(∀ k, Counters u (P k) (Q k)) → Counters u P₀ Q₀) ∧
(∀ P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ, Counters u P P ↔ AGT.IsMixedNash u P) := by sorry
end Nash1950.Countering
Source
Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), p. 49, ¶2–¶4 (PDF p. 3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.