(25): the signaling threshold lies in
ProvedICOTheory.Signaling.eq_25_alphaStar_mem_Ioocorporate-financeinformation-asymmetryinitial-coin-offeringssignaling
Let , and . Then the threshold
satisfies .
This is the claim "" attached to display (25): in the least-cost separating equilibrium the high type sells a proper, nonempty share of its venture.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: §4's standing conditions μ_H > μ_L (p. 18), σ the standard deviation of ξ_i² (p. 18, p. 31), γ the risk aversion of a risk-averse entrepreneur (Assumption 1(i), p. 12) → hypotheses μL < μH, 0 < σ, 0 < γ; reason: the section states them once; as binders they exclude nothing the paper admits and keep Lean's junk values of √ and / out
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ICOTheory_Signaling_alphaStar
Formal statement
namespace ICOTheory.Signaling
/-- **Display (25): the signaling threshold `α*` lies in `(0, 1)`.**
Chod, Lyandres, *A Theory of ICOs: Diversification, Agency, and Information Asymmetry*,
SSRN 3159528 (December 14, 2019), §4, display (25), p. 20:
`α* ≡ (4μ_H − 4μ_L + σ²γ − √((4μ_H − 4μ_L)(4μ_H − 4μ_L + 2σ²γ)))/(σ²γ) ∈ (0, 1)`.
For `μ_L < μ_H` (§4, p. 18: `μ_H > μ_L`), `σ > 0` and `γ > 0`, `0 < α* < 1`.
**Formalization Note.** `σ` is the standard deviation of `ξ_i²` and `γ` the risk aversion of
the risk-averse entrepreneur (Assumption 1(i), p. 12); these are §4's standing conditions.
At `μ_L = μ_H` the formula equals `1`, so the strict inequality `μL < μH` is needed. -/
theorem eq_25_alphaStar_mem_Ioo {μH μL σ γ : ℝ} (hμ : μL < μH) (hσ : 0 < σ) (hγ : 0 < γ) :
0 < alphaStar μH μL σ γ ∧ alphaStar μH μL σ γ < 1 := by sorry
end ICOTheory.Signaling
Source
Chod, Lyandres, A Theory of ICOs: Diversification, Agency, and Information Asymmetry, SSRN 3159528 (December 14, 2019), §4, display (25), p. 20