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Display (12), p. 3345 — the uniform-pricing optimum: N_S^U, N_B^U, p^U, f^U, Π^U = 2v²/(8 − (2b+θH+θL)²), and N_j^U (fn. 14)

Proved
TwoSidedPD.Baseline.uniform_equilibrium

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-pricingquadratic-optimizationtwo-sided-markets

Consider the baseline two-sided platform with stand-alone value vvv, cross-side benefit bbb and seller types θH>θL>0\theta_H>\theta_L>0θH​>θL​>0, with b>0b>0b>0 and Assumption 1. Write U=8−(2b+θH+θL)2U=8-(2b+\theta_H+\theta_L)^2U=8−(2b+θH​+θL​)2.

Under uniform pricing the platform's problem max⁡(NB,NS)∈R2ΠU(NB,NS)\max_{(N_B,N_S)\in\mathbb R^2}\Pi^U(N_B,N_S)max(NB​,NS​)∈R2​ΠU(NB​,NS​) has a solution, and every solution satisfies

NSU=2v(2b+θH+θL)U,NBU=4vU,pU=v(4−(θH+θL)(2b+θH+θL))U,fU=v(θH+θL−2b)U,ΠU=2v2U,N^U_S=\frac{2v(2b+\theta_H+\theta_L)}{U},\quad N^U_B=\frac{4v}{U},\quad p^U=\frac{v\big(4-(\theta_H+\theta_L)(2b+\theta_H+\theta_L)\big)}{U},\quad f^U=\frac{v(\theta_H+\theta_L-2b)}{U},\quad \Pi^U=\frac{2v^2}{U},NSU​=U2v(2b+θH​+θL​)​,NBU​=U4v​,pU=Uv(4−(θH​+θL​)(2b+θH​+θL​))​,fU=Uv(θH​+θL​−2b)​,ΠU=U2v2​,

where pU=PU(NBU,NSU)p^U=P^U(N^U_B,N^U_S)pU=PU(NBU​,NSU​) and fU=FU(NBU,NSU)f^U=F^U(N^U_B,N^U_S)fU=FU(NBU​,NSU​). Moreover (footnote 14), the participation of type-jjj sellers is

NjU=v(2b+3θj−θ−j)U,j∈{L,H}.N^U_j=\frac{v(2b+3\theta_j-\theta_{-j})}{U},\qquad j\in\{L,H\}.NjU​=Uv(2b+3θj​−θ−j​)​,j∈{L,H}.

These closed forms are the uniform-pricing side of every welfare comparison in Proposition 2.

Formalization Note. The optimum is a global maximizer of ΠU\Pi^UΠU over R2\mathbb R^2R2; existence is part of the statement. NjUN^U_jNjU​ is the type-jjj demand θjNB−fU\theta_jN_B-f^Uθj​NB​−fU at the common fee.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline

theorem uniform_equilibrium (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
    (hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
    (∃ x : ℝ × ℝ, IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x) ∧
    ∀ x : ℝ × ℝ, IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x →
      x.2 = 2 * v * (2 * b + θH + θL) / Uden b θH θL ∧
      x.1 = 4 * v / Uden b θH θL ∧
      PU v b x.1 x.2 = v * (4 - (θH + θL) * (2 * b + θH + θL)) / Uden b θH θL ∧
      FU θH θL x.1 x.2 = v * (θH + θL - 2 * b) / Uden b θH θL ∧
      profitU v b θH θL x = 2 * v ^ 2 / Uden b θH θL ∧
      sellerU θH θH θL x = v * (2 * b + 3 * θH - θL) / Uden b θH θL ∧
      sellerU θL θH θL x = v * (2 * b + 3 * θL - θH) / Uden b θH θL := by sorry

end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3345, §4.2.1, display (12); p. 3355, footnote 14
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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