Display (12), p. 3345 — the uniform-pricing optimum: N_S^U, N_B^U, p^U, f^U, Π^U = 2v²/(8 − (2b+θH+θL)²), and N_j^U (fn. 14)
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.uniform_equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-pricingquadratic-optimizationtwo-sided-markets
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with stand-alone value , cross-side benefit and seller types , with and Assumption 1. Write .
Under uniform pricing the platform's problem has a solution, and every solution satisfies
where and . Moreover (footnote 14), the participation of type- sellers is
These closed forms are the uniform-pricing side of every welfare comparison in Proposition 2.
Formalization Note. The optimum is a global maximizer of over ; existence is part of the statement. is the type- demand at the common fee.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem uniform_equilibrium (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
(∃ x : ℝ × ℝ, IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x) ∧
∀ x : ℝ × ℝ, IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x →
x.2 = 2 * v * (2 * b + θH + θL) / Uden b θH θL ∧
x.1 = 4 * v / Uden b θH θL ∧
PU v b x.1 x.2 = v * (4 - (θH + θL) * (2 * b + θH + θL)) / Uden b θH θL ∧
FU θH θL x.1 x.2 = v * (θH + θL - 2 * b) / Uden b θH θL ∧
profitU v b θH θL x = 2 * v ^ 2 / Uden b θH θL ∧
sellerU θH θH θL x = v * (2 * b + 3 * θH - θL) / Uden b θH θL ∧
sellerU θL θH θL x = v * (2 * b + 3 * θL - θH) / Uden b θH θL := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3345, §4.2.1, display (12); p. 3355, footnote 14
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.